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Case Studies

This curated collection of case studies, developed by the Harvard Ministerial Leadership Program, offers practical insights into transformational leadership including key aspects of political navigation, policy implementation, and reform, drawing directly from the experiences of government Ministers.

Designed to bridge theory and practice, these studies illuminate real-world challenges, present innovative solutions across diverse sectors, and support informed decision-making. They serve as essential tools for translating knowledge into impactful policies and driving meaningful change.

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Introduction

In October 2016, Brazil’s Minister of Social and Agrarian Development, 1 Osmar Terra, introduced a collaborative early childhood development intervention called the Criança Feliz Program (PCF). In the preceding 11 years, Brazil had reduced poverty from 22.4% in 2004 to 8.7% in 2015 and extreme poverty from 7.6% in 2004 to 2.4% in 2015 thanks to the conditional cash transfer program Bolsa Familia (Annex 1). However, even though research had found that children from families benefitting from Bolsa Familia had a cognitive development 65% above average, cash transfers were not enough to break the poverty cycle and overcome the challenges of violence in the country in the long run. With 15 million children under the age of four and high rates of poverty (Annex 1 & 2), there was a great need for a transformational intervention like PCF which involved regular home visitations as the basis for multisectoral early childhood development support. Now operating at full scale after just two years, PCF has made it possible for nearly 500,000 children and 85,000 pregnant women in Brazil to receive home visits every week, a total of almost 2.4 million visits a month in over 2,000 municipalities.

To implement such an instrumental program in such a short period of time, Terra relied on his ‘educational’ political style. He believed that by explaining the evidence underlying policymaking to people, he could gain their support for his cause. However, he knew that this would take time and so he began laying the groundwork for what would become PCF more than a decade prior, in 2000.

Using Evidence to Create Opportunity

The year 2000 was a turning point for research on early childhood development. James J. Heckman won the Nobel Prize of Economics for his work demonstrating long-term returns on investment in early childhood programs for children under five and Carlsson, Greengard, and Kandel won the Nobel Prize of Medicine for their research on the critical neural connections and learning formed during early childhood. These new advances laid an evidence-based foundation for investment in stimulation, quality care, and security of children to support their emotional and cognitive development, and ultimately their education and economic attainment as adults.

At this time, Osmar Terra was the coordinator of the social development program Comunidade Solidária under President Cardoso. There was a clear opportunity for Brazil to take note of this research, as local studies had shown that child-recipients of social aid were 35% less cognitively developed than the average Brazilian child and only 8% of poor families in Brazil had any books in their homes. In response, he seized the opportunity to create the Committee on Integral Development of Early Childhood (CODIPI), where he brought together actors from civil society and across government to educate every single relevant stakeholder on the importance of early childhood interventions. The process for building a movement for early childhood in Brazil (that would eventually lead to PCF) had begun.

1 This ministry was combined with the Ministry of Sports and the Ministry of Culture to form the new Ministry of Citizenship in January 2019 that continues to manage PCF and is led by Minister Terra.

Prioritizing a Common Goal Together

By 2002, Terra had not succeeded in building as much support for his ideas as he had hoped and due to a change in government, the CODIPI was dissolved. Nevertheless, Terra kept his vision in the back of his mind, and when he became Secretary of Health of Rio Grande do Sul state in 2003, he knew it would be his priority. In April 2003, Terra launched a new version of the CODIPI for his state, which included 17 large civil society organizations and representatives from the Secretariats of Culture, Education, Health, Work, Citizenship, and Social Assistance. He knew that intersectoral collaboration was key to his effort and bringing different actors on board from the beginning, particularly his secretarial counterparts, would be critical to his success.

With the help of the new CODIPI, Terra launched the Primeira Infancia Melhor (PIM) program, the first home visitation program in Brazil (Annex 3). Intersectoral and inter-ministerial collaboration was at the center of this initiative since any home visit could yield a variety of challenges. If, during a home visit, a child was found with a medical condition, the Secretariat of Health had to intervene. If a child had a learning disability, the Secretariat of Education had to get involved. If the family belonged to a particular ethnic group, the Secretariat of Culture would ensure that the home visitor had culturally relevant activities for the child. If a family struggled with employment, then the Secretariat of Work needed to act. The underlying idea was that the government would not act in siloes, but rather work in a deeply coordinated way, since any child in an underprivileged environment would need the concerted efforts of different parts of government to achieve his or her full potential.

The spirit of collaboration was also present in the partnership that Terra started with Celep. They were the center responsible for implementing Educa a tu Hijo, the Cuban program that had inspired PIM. This partnership provided both technical support and legitimacy to the undertaking of PIM.

Institutionalizing Collaborative Efforts

To date, PIM has survived governments from four different political parties and continues to serve around 65,000 children every week. Building on such a successful in-country intervention was critical to further expand support and collaboration for early childhood development interventions across Brazil. In 2006, national legislators passed the State Policy for the Promotion and Development of Early Childhood (Ley Estatal no. 12.544) and in 2007, thanks to the leadership efforts of the Bernard van Leer Foundation, the National Network for Early Childhood (RNPI) was created. It brought together a number of civil society organizations, government agencies, private sector entities, and others. It was a massive coalition with far-reaching technical and political power all across the country. The coalition demonstrated this power in 2010 when it managed to pass the National Plan for Early Childhood (PNPI) at the National Council for the Rights of the Child and Adolescent (Conanda).

The institutionalization of RNPI created conditions that would later allow for PCF to be successful.

Thus, in 2011, with early childhood already as a national priority, Terra began setting the ground for PCF. In May 2011, he created the Parliamentary Front for Early Childhood, a cross-party group with over 2000 deputies. The Parliamentary Front’s main goal was to achieve a Legal Framework for Early Childhood that would guarantee the rights of children in different public policy sectors, aiming to promote the integral development of the child. This would ensure that every municipality and every state would have an action plan, a budget, rules, and laws to guarantee the rights of children. With this goal in mind, the Parliamentary Front organized the 1st International Seminar: Legal Framework for Early Childhood in April 2013 to spread awareness and spark conversation across society. By December of that year, they were able to pass the Legal Project for Early Childhood (Projeto de Lei 6.998/2013). In the words of Minister Terra, “Everybody’s mandate is limited, but policies should be passed to stay.”

Using Evidence and Communication to Galvanize Support

Concurrently, Terra was working on developing an executive leadership course on early childhood development in partnership with the Maria Cecília Souto Vidigal Foundation, the INSPER business school and the University of Saõ Paulo, to be held at the Center for the Developing Child at Harvard University. His idea was that if politicians and senior technicians from the administration learned about early childhood from world experts, they would come back to Brazil as serious advocates. In most cases, the course was free of charge for Brazilian politicians and therefore few renounced the opportunity to receive training from Harvard.

Participants were required to stay at Harvard for a week during which time they designed a project that they were meant to present to Parliament and implement upon their return to Brazil. This single initiative proved to be incredibly effective. In the words of the spokesperson of the Parliamentary Front, “Everybody changed at Harvard.” Over the course of a few years, around 400 Brazilian politicians and bureaucrats went to Harvard and came back as champions for early childhood development.

In the following years, the RNPI, the Parliamentary Front, and a growing number of administrators and politicians advocated for early childhood programming – organizing a second international seminar with broad participation from civil society, four regional seminars and two interactive public audiences, among other initiatives. At the same time, there was a media campaign that was staged in partnership with national television channels to raise awareness about the importance of early childhood care. For instance, the Maria Cecília Souto Vidigal Foundation sponsored a documentary, O Começo da Vida (The Beginning of Life), which was screened in cinemas across 21 Brazilian cities in 2016 to more than 21,000 viewers. Bem Estar, a popular daytime television show, decided to increase parental awareness by dedicating five minutes of their show to early childhood education.

With such broad support and building on the ongoing success of PIM, the Legal Framework for Early Childhood was finally passed through the Federal Law no 13.257/16. Five years after creating the Parliamentary Front, and three years after launching the Legal Project for Early Childhood (Projeto de Lei 6.998/2013), the rights of the child were now hard law thanks to this Legal Framework. PCF began in October 2016 as a direct consequence of this Federal Law.

2 This program continues to this day with approximately 50 politicians participating every year.

Collaborating for Implementation across Government

Minister Terra knew that enacting a policy was just the beginning, implementation was the real test. He also knew that for PCF to really have an impact, he needed the involvement of different parts of government and different sectors of society (Annex 4). The Ministry of Social and Agrarian Development (now Ministry of Citizenship) would coordinate the efforts through the Secretariat for the Promotion of Human Development. However, to be implemented collaboratively, PCF needed a shared management structure. As such, a number of ad-hoc management committees were created at the national, state and municipal levels.

The National Management Committee housed representatives from the Ministries of Education, Health, Human Rights, Culture and Social Development in what they called the ‘interministerial government space.’ This space was a place where everyone was on board with the mission of implementing PCF and thus it served as a place to coordinate and solve technical issues, rather than arguing about objectives. This intersectoral committee was created by presidential decree, giving it the formality and gravitas to ensure that each ministry would take it seriously. The management committee had high-level representation from each ministry, and it was therefore a place for decision-making, rather than day-to-day collaboration. To get things done, they created the Technical Group, under which a number of inter-ministerial working groups would coordinate efforts.

An example of collaboration that has been achieved by the Technical Group and the National Management Committee is the redesign of the notebook that mothers receive when they have children. Traditionally, the Ministry of Health would give a notebook to the mother with child health tips. Now, since the creation of the National Management Committee, these notebooks include information about child development milestones and cultural specificities contributed by other ministries. Other examples of collaboration include a guide for visitors for children with disabilities and the development of training materials and workshops for both visitors and families.

Overall, the key roles of the National Management Committee are to strengthen the intersectionality of the program, to approve training and program resources, to make decisions about the stages of the program, and to agree on regulatory instruments that distribute responsibilities for different policies. One of its main responsibilities is to set the intersectoral budget. As coordinator of the program, the Ministry of Citizenship decides the home-visiting budget, which it distributes to the municipalities through the National Fund of Social Assistance. They decided to use this fund so that the funds would flow directly from the ministry to each municipality, avoiding intermediaries and countless individual contracts.

However, a budget for home-visiting is not enough to ensure the success of PCF. It is important that each ministry allocates funds to collaborate on the intersectoral needs that emerge from the visits. The National Management Committee is the place where the ministries negotiate the allocations that each ministry will contribute to PCF.

At the state level, similar Management Committees exist but are composed of representatives from State Secretariats. The role of States is to monitor the implementation and to give technical assistance to the municipalities. To achieve this goal, States hire multiplicadores (there are 89 across the country). They are professionals who are trained by National trainers, who in turn go on to train local coordinators, who train the local visitors. This modality of waterfall training has led to a number of implementation problems; however, it was the only way that Brazil could scale the program to over 2000 municipalities in just one and a half years.

At the municipal level, Municipal Management Committees are much more operational in scope. They discuss, support, and approve operational issues of the program. For instance, they identify the beneficiaries of home visits, hire and organize local training for visitors, follow up with different sectoral responses on the demands that they identify, and coordinate with local NGO networks. At the municipal level, intersectoral collaboration is often informal and they escalate any challenges to the state level.

A final component of Brazil’s interministerial implementation effort is its integrated information system, Cadastro Único, which allows different ministries to identify families and work from the same data. This has been an important tool because without it the registries of potential beneficiaries housed by each ministry varied, thereby leading to coordination problems and leaving people unattended. This has also allowed for more effective monitoring and evaluation of implementation across ministries.

Ongoing Challenges

No program is perfect and despite the strong inter-ministerial implementation structure in place, PCF continues to face some challenges. At the municipal level, some committees are more effective than others at implementation. One of the reasons for this is insufficient preparation. Brazil’s waterfall method of training managed by each State has created some disconnect between the original ideas and the actual practice, resulting in resistance from some municipalities. In one case, Terra’s involvement of civil society meant that NGOs like the Pitagoras Foundation were willing to collaborate with municipalities to support implementation. Another idea to bridge the informational gap between those at the core of PCF and each municipality is to develop an online education system that educates on the evidence base behind PCF and effectively communicates the different roles of actors across sectors and levels to allow for more effective and collaborative implementation.

Similarly, PCF has encountered some resistance from families themselves who thought they would lose their Bolsa Familia cash transfer or they suspected control from the Conselho Tutelar, an organizational structure that looks after the rights of children. Given the size and scale of Brazil’s 5,575 municipalities, this is likely to be an ongoing challenge, but it makes clear that communication is a critical component of successful implementation and that effective communication strategies must continue alongside implementation.

Conclusion

The successful implementation of PCF has been the consequence of a long-term undertaking. The ingredients for success were the following: a passionate, knowledgeable and energetic leader; a robust body of scientific evidence that backed the intervention; a number of successful in-country local home-visiting programs;3 a broad civil society coalition organized as a formal network; a parliamentary coalition with representatives from all political groups; constant efforts to align society under the flag of early childhood advocacy; and the articulation of shared management structures.

Minister Terra used a number of methods to create buy-in for his ideas such as organizing seminars and public audiences, developing courses, and creating audiovisual materials. The allies that he gained by opening up decision-making structures to stakeholders, as in the case of CODIPI, allowed him to achieve the necessary milestones that he needed, such as a legal framework, to implement PCF successfully.

Today, after almost three years, PCF has survived a change of president in Brazil and it grows day by day as more and more municipalities voluntarily sign up for the program (Annex 5). PCF has demonstrated the power of ideas and collaboration and as Brazil as a whole, both within and outside of government, grows more accustomed to debating ideas, building coalitions, and acting together, it is expected that more and more, different parts of government, NGOs, and the private sector will work together towards solving Brazil’s greatest challenges.

3 Although this case only mentioned PIM, several other state and local programs were implemented after PIM.

References

  1. Anderson, J. (2018). Brazil’s audacious plan to fight poverty using neuroscience and parents’ love. Quartz. Last visited in: https://qz.com/1298387/brazils-wildly-ambitious-incredibly-precarious-program-to-visit-every-poor-mother-and-change-their-childrens-destiny/
  2. Darlington, S. (2018). A Year of Violence Sees Brazil’s Murder Rate Hit Record High. The New York Times. Last visited in: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/10/world/americas/brazil-murder-rate-record.html
  3. Decreto No 42.199/2003, de 07 de abril. Estado Rio Grande do Sul, Secretaria da Saúde, Primeira Infância Melhor.
  4. Gullino, D. (2019). Bolsonaro cita dado incorreto ao comentar estudo sobre crianças do Bolsa Família. O Globo. Last visited in: https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/bolsonaro-cita-dado-incorreto-ao-comentar-estudo-sobre-criancas-do-bolsa-familia-23543432
  5. Harasawa, E., Pereira Grangeiro, G., et al. (2018). Manual do Pesquisador. Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social.
  6. Harvard Kennedy School Multimedia Case on Criança Feliz.
  7. Interview with Ely Harasawa, head of the Secretariat for the Promotion of Human Development in Brazil (2019).
  8. Interview with Gilvani Pereira Grangeiro, director at the Secretariat for the Promotion of Human Development in Brazil (2019).
  9. Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Agrario. (2017). Programa Criança Feliz, A intersetorialidade na visita familiar.
  10. Secretaria de Avaliação e Gestão da Informação. (2019). Avaliação de implementação do programa criança feliz relatório final. Ministério da Cidadania.
  11. Terra, O. (2016). Avanços do marco legal da primeira infancia. Frente Parlamentar Mista da Primeira Infância. Câmara do Deputados. Centro de Estudos e Debates Estratégicos.
  12. Verch, K. (2017). Primeira Infância Melhor: Transforming the Attention towards the First Years of Life in Latin America: Challenges and Achievements of a Public Policy in Southern Brazil. Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo.

Annex 14

Annex 2

Annex 3

Annex 4

Executive Summary

The purpose of this case study is to examine and compare evidence from five countries (Bangladesh, Chile, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Thailand) across three regions to better understand the policies and programs they have implemented towards optimizing prospects of a demographic dividend.

Bangladesh, Chile, and Thailand are already at a mature stage, while Ethiopia and Rwanda are potentially on the edge of realizing a demographic dividend in the years ahead.

Despite vast differences in geography, culture, history, industry, etc. across the five countries examined in this case study, the common denominator is their progress in reducing child mortality and fertility rates, improving female educational enrollment and attainment, as well as diversifying economic models and increased economic participation by women. Each of these factors correlates with accelerated economic development, specifically GDP per capita growth. All countries examined integrated their social sector plans into their long-term economic development plans. This suggests an underlying recognition of the importance of social sectors as drivers of economic growth.

Demographic Dividend

The demographic transition is an academic concept used to describe changing patterns of fertility, mortality, and population growth exhibited by countries around the world over the past two centuries. It is most commonly used to identify the development stage and trajectory of a country as it relates to its population structure.

In Detail: The Four Stages of Demographic Transition

Figure 1 outlines the four stages of the classical model of demographic transition.

  • Stage 1 (High Stationary): Characterized by a high birth rate and a high death rate. This results in slow and sometimes fluctuating population growth, which has historically been due to wars or pandemics.
  • Stage 2 (Early Expanding): Characterized by a high birth rate and a falling death rate, which has historically been due to increases in access to medicine, sanitation, and nutrition, and particularly driven by decreases in child mortality. This stage leads to a period of high population growth.
  • Stage 3 (Late Expanding): The birth rate falls towards the death rate, often due to lower child mortality from the previous stage and an increase in family planning, resulting in moderate population growth.
  • Stage 4 (Low Stationary): Occurs when birth rates reach the same level as death rates and population growth slows. Resources are allocated towards greater investment in fewer children, resulting in smaller, more educated families with greater workforce participation.

Figure 1: The Demographic Transition Model

(Source: World Economic Forum, 2015, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/11/5-trends-for-the-future-of-economic-growth/)

The demographic dividend is used to describe an opportunity for accelerated economic growth that a country can experience as it moves through Stages 2 and 3 of the demographic transition. Specifically, when birth and death rates fall in succession they give way to a bulging youth cohort in a population’s age structure. This change yields a smaller child dependency ratio, or the proportion of the population under age 15 relative to the working-age population aged 15 to 64.

During this period, assuming an appropriate policy environment, there are more people in the labor force who, because they are better off financially, generally have smaller families and more resources to invest in their children. This moment is known as the demographic dividend – a period when a country can reap rapid economic growth if it makes the right policy and investment choices. The demographic dividend tapers off when the child dependency ratio ceases to decrease and the bulging cohort ages out of the workforce.

In Detail: World Progress Through the Demographic Transition

Historically, many developed countries have experienced changes in fertility, mortality, and population growth as outlined by the demographic transition but they have varied in terms of timing and pace. Most of these countries are in Stage 4 or some may have moved into a possible fifth stage of transition where birth rates fall below death rates resulting in population shrinkage. Conversely, many developing countries are moving slowly or stalled in around Stage 3 while the least developed countries remain in Stage 2.

Figure 2: Various Stages of Demographic Transition Across the World

Within a supportive policy environment, the economic benefits of the demographic dividend are driven by three key factors: labor supply, personal savings, and human capital. Labor supply increases both due to the increase in working-age population relative to dependents and also the increase in female workforce participation that comes with decreased family size. This is magnified by the fact that workers may be more educated having been brought up in smaller families. Personal savings increase because the healthier, working-age population invests less in their children as they age, and save more to prepare for longer retirements. As the population lives longer and healthier lives, human capital becomes an asset as people deepen their investment in the health and education of their children. Also, attitudes about education, family, the role of women, and other social and political issues evolve. It is important to note that the economic benefits of the demographic dividend can only be captured if there are sufficient employment opportunities to absorb the increase in labor supply and translate it into increased economic productivity. Furthermore, the long-term implications of achieving the demographic dividend must be considered. While an increase in working-age population can drive increased incomes, it is also accompanied by an increase in public costs, as the population ages and demand for healthcare and pensions increase.

The countries examined in this case study are at different stages of demographic transition. They have achieved varying successes and encountered challenges in their pursuit of the demographic dividend (Figure 3). Rwanda and Ethiopia’s population pyramids have wide bases signaling high population growth rates and high dependency ratios. Increased access to and acceptance of family planning can narrow these bases to reduce dependency ratios and allow for a demographic dividend in the future. Bangladesh has a visible working-age population ‘bulge’ and can achieve economic benefits from it if it can further narrow the base of its pyramid with stronger family planning programs. Thailand has an older working-age ‘bulge’ that is nearing retirement fresh from completing its demographic dividend while Chile has a more streamlined pyramid that has since completed the demographic dividend, but both countries will face challenges as their ageing workforces enter retirement while experiencing longer life expectancies.

Figure 3: Comparison population pyramids, 2018


Source: Gapminder, 2018. http://bit.ly/2Ea6Iwd

Investments to Achieve the Demographic Dividend

The ability of a country to achieve a demographic dividend and the extent to which it reaps economic benefits is dependent on the policy environment (Figure 4).

Figure 4: Policy Interventions Facilitating a Demographic Dividend

Source: Gribble JN, Bremner J. Achieving a Demographic Dividend. Population Research Bulleting, 2012.

Health

To facilitate the transition out of Stage 1 of the demographic transition, countries must support policies that reduce birth and death rates. Family planning is the starting point for any progress towards the demographic dividend because without it fertility cannot be effectively reduced. Men and women, especially the poor, need access to voluntary family planning information and services to avoid unintended pregnancies so they can invest more in the health and education of fewer children (Figure 5).

Ethiopia has experienced increased contraceptive use from 4.2% in 1990 to 34.2% in 2014 and reduced fertility from 5.9 children per woman in 2000 to 4.1 in 2014. A driving force behind this achievement was the implementation of the Health Extension Program (HEP) to train and deploy over 33,000 paid health extension workers to provide basic health services over 15,000 health posts in rural areas. This program has been credited with increasing contraceptive prevalence by 17% and is the foundation for Ethiopia’s Health Development Army (HDA) that promotes contraceptive use and other essential practices through social mobilization of volunteer ‘model families.’

Similarly, Bangladesh has experienced fertility declines from 6.3 births per woman in 1975 to 2.4 in 2015 which has been strongly linked to its increase in contraceptive prevalence rate (CPR) from 7.7% to 61.2% over the same time period. This progress has been largely driven by interventions such as increased contraceptive method mix, introduction of menstrual regulation, integration of maternal and child health services with family planning services at the sub-district level, increased community outreach activities to generate demand, and financial incentives to have fewer children until the mid-1990s as well as the involvement of non-state providers in the early 2000s.

Figure 5: Total Fertility (Babies per Woman) vs. GDP per Capita (US$, Inflation Adjusted), 1960 – 2015

Source: Gapminder, 2018. http://bit.ly/2C2WLim

Investments in child health are also critical because reduced child mortality motivates reduced fertility and increased desire for family planning information and services. Immunization and nutrition programs can be particularly beneficial because they address preventable illness, improve cognitive development, and prepare children to attend school more frequently, attain higher levels of education, and eventually contribute more to the workforce (Figure 6).

Rwanda has made significant progress in improving its child health, even achieving its MDG 4 goal to reduce under-five mortality by two-thirds between 1990 and 2015. One strategy it implemented to achieve this involved investing in systems-building approaches such as developing its community health workforce which now has over 45,000 community health workers (CHWs) countrywide, with one male and one female CHW providing care in each village. These CHWs are credited with implementing national prevention programs such as mosquito net provision, immunization campaigns, medical follow-ups, and family planning at the community and village levels.

While health and economic opportunity are quite interconnected, Thailand’s investment in increasing the quality of maternal and child health care along with its improving economic status in the 1980s helped significantly reduce infant and maternal mortality. The universal health insurance program that was introduced later in 2002 has been credited with increasing access to health care and reducing poverty through decreasing health spending by poorer populations and reducing families facing catastrophic illnesses.

Figure 6: Child Mortality (Under-5 Mortality Rate) vs. GDP per Capita (US$, Inflation Adjusted), 1960 – 2015

Source: Gapminder, 2018. http://bit.ly/2C4uaZW

Education

To capitalize on the changing population structure that results from reduced fertility and mortality, countries must support policies that prepare the dividend cohort to achieve maximal economic gains. Policies that increase access to education are critical for all children, particularly girls, for whom secondary school education can help delay marriage and pregnancy (Figure 7).

Rwanda has supplemented its improvements in child health by achieving near universal primary education, with net enrolment increasing by 30% to 95% between 2000 and 2015. Critical to this success is the fact that these enrollment rates are also nearly equal in terms of male and female enrolment. However, primary completion rates and enrolment in secondary and tertiary education are significantly unequal. Thailand has focused on increasing access to education in rural areas by expanding rural school coverage and rural teacher recruitment. However, Thailand continues to struggle with the quality of its education system and its graduates are generally not well equipped to compete in a knowledge-based economy.

Figure 7: Gender Parity in Education (Ratio Girls/Boys in School (%), Primary and Secondary Education) vs. GDP per Capita (US$, Inflation Adjusted), 1970 – 2014

Source: Gapminder, 2018. http://bit.ly/2C49UHT

Additionally, skills-training is essential to equip the future workforce to changing labor market needs. The type of skills-training required can change as economies grow and diversify.

Ethiopia’s Technical Vocational Education and Training (TVET) program is a good example of skills-training policy at work. TVET is a key part of the country’s capacity-building program, whose aim is to motivate entrepreneurship, create job opportunities, and train mid-level industry workers. Ethiopia aims to increase the number of trainees in its TVET program to over 600,000. Though implementation has been slow, Bangladesh also aims to support technical and vocational education but has a particular focus on increasing female enrolment and achieving gender parity in tertiary education and literacy.

Governance

As the demographic transition progresses and households become smaller and more educated, their disposable income and savings increase. Governance structures such as established legal and regulatory systems, particularly with regards to contract law and financial standards, can help attract domestic and foreign investments which can create jobs and stimulate economic growth. Conversely, systemic corruption can significantly hinder progress by diminishing trust in systems and discouraging investment. Gender equity policies, such as access to credit and property rights, can also foster the demographic transition by enabling women to achieve their desired fertility and free them up to participate in the workforce.

Bangladesh specifically aims to improve its governance through a legal aid program; enhanced integrity and corruption control regulations; improved Right to Information laws; and reforms to make the parliamentary process more effective. Ethiopia is working to improve governance by highlighting women and youth empowerment as a cross-cutting issue in its current national development plan. It aims to promote gender equity in education, employment, asset ownership, and access to capital; provide a supportive environment and financial aid for female students; increase the number of female teachers; eradicate harmful traditional practices; and improve access to capital for youth.

Chile ranks high in terms of democracy and rule-of-law which has fostered a very active private sector and supported its economic growth. It also has an independent central bank and special courts to oversee competition.

Rwanda has enshrined the importance of gender equity in its constitution and invested heavily to reach a ranking of fifth in the World Economic Forum’s 2016 Global Gender Gap Index. Nearly two-thirds of seats in Rwandan Parliament are filled by women, female labor participation is 54%, with the smallest salary gap between men and women in the world.

Economics

Effective economic policies can catalyze the demographic transition in a number of direct and indirect ways. These include labor market flexibility to respond to a diversified economy; openness to trade to bring local products to international markets and vice versa; incentives to encourage savings and investment; and physical and communications infrastructure to support domestic and international trade. Without the synergy of effective health, education, governance, and economic policies, countries cannot optimally take advantage of a demographic dividend as they move through the demographic transition.

Economic policies and programs to achieve the demographic dividend can vary based on the stage of a particular country. Rwanda and Bangladesh have implemented programs to support grassroots economic development such as Grinka (one cow per poor family) in Rwanda and “One House, One Farm” in Bangladesh which helps small hold farmers create village cooperatives to alleviate poverty and develop sustainably. Thailand’s shift from an agriculture to more industry-based economy increased economic productivity and subsequent production for export. Health insurance reduced the likelihood of workers being prevented from going to work due to illness thereby improving labor productivity. From a more outward-looking perspective, Chile has focused on reducing tariffs and signing numerous free-trade agreements to support international trade.

General Strategies

All countries examined have made an effort to integrate their social sector plans into their long-term economic development plans. Thailand included education but not health in its first two National Economic Development Plans but since the 1970s has continued to include both. This suggests an underlying recognition of the importance of social sectors as drivers of economic growth. Additionally, it suggests that they understand the intersectional nature of economic development and the role that social sectors such as health and education have to play. For example, Bangladesh explicitly states its goal of achieving the demographic dividend in its Five-Year Plan and considers its position in the demographic transition in its policy agenda.

Complementing vertical programs with horizontal, capacity-building efforts is a necessary approach. For example, Rwanda and Ethiopia have both invested heavily in human resources for health by strengthening their community health workforces. On their own investments such as these can increase the size of the health workforce, create jobs, promote health-seeking behavior, and improve health education among local populations. Arguably more important, however, is how these investments serve to support the implementation of vertical programs and magnify their potential effect. Ethiopia’s Health Development Army has even gone a step farther to actively generate demand for health care at the grassroots level. Horizontal, systems strengthening programs can be put in place at any time (even before a country is ready to capture the demographic dividend) as they can serve to support and magnify the impacts of vertical programs that are targeted to moving through the demographic transition.

Some issues that promote success do not fall into any particular sector but rather affect many sectors in different ways. These crosscutting issues need to be addressed in a targeted and collaborative way. For example, gender equity persists as an issue in primary school enrollment to secondary school attainment to age at marriage to labor force participation to access to capital and more. Tackling such an issue requires joint effort across sectors to ensure that progress made in one sector is complemented by policies in another. Gender equity is of particular importance to the demographic dividend given the potential economic benefits to increased female workforce participation, but policies to maximize this benefit must cross sectors and target females across their lifecycle. Ethiopia and Rwanda both explicitly state efforts to address gender equity in a comprehensive way while Bangladesh is more focused on tackling it within the working age population.

Subnational variation is a universal concern. High-level political commitment is necessary to drive national progress, but a top-down approach is insufficient to move the entire country forward. Inequalities between rural and urban populations as well as between the wealthy and the poor exist in every sector and can be exacerbated by policies that are not sufficiently pro-poor. Rwanda experienced this after completing implementation of its national policy in 2002 that led to reductions in infant and maternal mortality, but also increased inequality and similarly, Ethiopia’s 2010-2015 plans resulted in overall improvements, but no change in inequality.

Despite vast differences in geography, culture, history, industry, etc. across the countries examined in this case study, their progress in reducing child mortality, fertility, and improving female educational enrollment and attainment have all been correlated with economic development, specifically GDP per capita growth. Notably, all countries examined integrated their social sector plans into their long-term economic development plans. This suggests an underlying recognition of the importance of social sectors as drivers of economic growth.

The next section provides a more in-depth discussion of each country’s progress and policy efforts towards achieving the demographic dividend.

Country Cases

Bangladesh

Progress

Bangladesh is well into the demographic transition and its opportunity to take advantage of the demographic dividend is imminent. Bangladesh has already experienced decreased birth and death rates resulting in a dependency ratio of 54% and a population growth rate of 1.6% in 2014. To achieve this, Bangladesh maintained a significant drop in under-five mortality from 146 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1990 to 46 in 2015, fulfilling its MDG target.

The effect of these efforts is depicted by a bulging cohort in Bangladesh’s population pyramid that is about to enter working age. Over the next three decades, it is expected that the proportion of Bangladesh’s under-15 population will decline, the working-age population will stabilize, and the elderly population will increase as the bulging cohort moves towards old age. With declining fertility and increasing life expectancy, it is estimated that Bangladesh has a 10 to 20-year window during which to take advantage of a favorable dependency ratio.

It is estimated that by 2050 the elderly will make up almost 15% of the Bangladeshi population and old-age dependency will be greater than youth dependency.

Figure 10: Bangladesh Population Pyramids (1990, 2010, 2030)

Bangladesh has experienced declines in fertility from 6.3 births per woman in 1975 to 2.4 in 2015. In western regions (Rajshahi, Khulna), the number of births per woman has already reached replacement levels (2.1), and if current family planning methods are sustained, the national average is expected to catch up by 2025. This overall decline in fertility has been strongly linked to Bangladesh’s increase in contraceptive prevalence rate (CPR) from 7.7% to 61.2% over the same time period. However, eastern regions (Sylhet, Chittagong) experience lower levels of CPR and thus lag behind in reducing fertility.

Despite this overall progress, there have been some setbacks. Half of all teenage girls have at least one child, and early marriage remains common, with 52% of Bangladeshis married by the age of 18 – the second-highest rate of child marriage in the world. While this is a decline from 66% a few years ago, in 2017 Bangladesh relaxed the minimum marital age of 18 for women to allow for “special cases” in the “best interests” of the adolescent. There are concerns that this new legal loophole effectively reduces the legal marital age to zero.

Bangladesh has primary net enrollment above 90% and secondary enrollment close to 60%, with female primary enrollment exceeding male. On the supply side, poor quality and unskilled teachers persist as challenges. Bangladesh has a large migrant workforce that sends remittances exceeding $15 billion per year, and households receiving remittances are generally better off. However, this workforce is stunted by poor formal education, minimal English skills, and few industry-specific skills, particularly in technology, resulting in low wages and exploitative work conditions.

Policy Environment

Bangladesh has implemented Five Year Plans to drive development and growth since 1973 (except for a seven-year period from 2003 to 2010 where it switched to three-year Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers). The Sixth Five Year Plan, the first after the hiatus, spanned 2011 to 2015. It aimed to achieve 7.3% annual GDP growth but actually achieved 6.3%. By the end of this period, the poverty ratio had declined to 25%. Digital Centers for government services were established in all (approximately 4,500) Union Parishads as well as 13,000 Community Clinics to provide greater access to services for poor and rural populations.

More than 140 social safety net programs covering 25% of households have been implemented by the government and disbursed USD 1.6 billion to date. Additional programs such as “One House, One Farm,” which helps small hold farmers create village cooperatives, provides them with skill development training on management and farming, and offers grants to ultimately alleviate poverty and develop sustainably; and “Food for Work,” which since 1975 has been providing in-kind payments of wheat rather than cash to the rural poor during off-seasons for agriculture to provide them with food security and nutrition. Programs that disburse funds use e-payment systems to help recipients build credit and promote savings behavior, particularly among women.

Additional social programs that Bangladesh has implemented include “Asroyan,” which leases low-cost shelter in perpetuity to female household members; the ability to open bank accounts with only Tk 10.00 (equivalent of USD $0.125) and transfer of government assistance through those bank accounts; and the Rural Savings Bank where government contributes an equity fund equal to a household equity contribution and further matches it with a low-interest loan, thereby enlarging the trading capital of a household by three times.

The most recent plan, known as the Seventh Five Year Plan: Accelerating Growth and Empowering Citizens, covers 2016 to 2020. The key objectives of this plan are to increase annual growth in an inclusive, pro-poor, and environmentally sustainable way to 7.4% (which has since been exceeded); to reduce extreme poverty to 8.9%; and to eradicate unemployment and underemployment.

With regards to health, Bangladesh aims to reduce its under-five mortality rate from 41 to 37 by increasing immunization coverage to 100% and skilled birth attendance to 65%. It aims to reduce fertility to 2.0 by increasing the contraceptive prevalence rate to 75%. To achieve this it plans to improve service delivery and decentralization of the health system; to improve access to care for poor and marginalized populations; to improve regulations and supply to encourage public facility use (versus private); to more effectively train and deploy government-trained Community Skilled Birth Attendants; to educate the population about prevention of non-communicable diseases; to provide gender and adolescent-friendly services; and to address horizontal systemic issues such as health workforce, management and administration, finance, surveillance, drugs and equipment, and research.

For family planning specifically, key interventions include using mass communication efforts to promote delayed marriage, childbearing, and awareness of family planning methods as well as encouraging male participation in family planning decisions. (These efforts are at odds with the loophole introduced in 2017 to the Child Marriage Restraint Act that allows for younger brides and grooms in special circumstances, rather than the strict minimum marital age of 18 for women and 21 for men that was previously in place.)

With regards to education, it aims to achieve 100% net enrollment rate for primary and secondary school; to improve education quality at all levels through capacity building for teachers; to ensure 30% of primary public schools and 100% of secondary schools have a computer laboratory; and to increase grade five completion rate to 100% from 80%. The main focus to achieve the demographic dividend, however, is on secondary and tertiary education as well as vocational and technical education.

To support gender equity, it aims to achieve gender parity in tertiary education and literacy; to encourage female enrolment in technical and vocational education; and to increase female participation in government service to 25% by 2020 (though this quota has since been discontinued due to mass demonstrations but it did help female recruitment). To strengthen governance, it plans to give legal aid to at least 37,000 victims annually, enhance integrity and corruption control regulations, improve Right to Information laws, and make the parliamentary process more effective.

Bangladesh has been particularly successful at implementing policies that support sustained decrease in fertility. Between 1975 and the mid-1990s, strong political commitment supported interventions such as increased contraceptive method mix, introduction of menstrual regulation, integration of maternal and child health services with family planning services at the sub-district level, increased community outreach activities to generate demand, and financial incentives to have fewer children.

During this time period, contraceptive prevalence rate increased from 8% to 44% and total fertility rate decreased from over 6 to 3.5 children per woman. In the early 2000s, coordination between maternal and child health and family planning service providers weakened and service provision shifted from home-based delivery to clinic-based. Despite this and high contraceptive discontinuation, low use among young married women, and decreased use of long-acting and permanent contraceptive methods (LAPM), contraceptive prevalence rate increased by about 17% in four years, perhaps due to the involvement of non-state providers and the cultural legitimacy that family planning had acquired.

However, fertility decrease slowed to 3 children per woman by 2004. Similarly, since 2004 non-state providers have played a greater role than public providers and contraceptive use has exceeded 61% and fertility continues to drop. Despite its initially successful policies, Bangladesh’s current family planning program is mainly driven by short-term methods but would benefit from more LAPM and social policies to encourage delayed childbearing and wider birth spacing. Unmet family planning need remains high at 12%.

Chile

Progress

Chile has passed the period of demographic dividend and is in the mature stages of the demographic transition, facing a mostly ageing population. The combination of a declining birth rate from 23.5 per 1,000 of population in 1990 to 13.6 in 2015, and a stable mortality rate of 5.7 per 1,000 of population has resulted in a rapid shift in the population pyramid. The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) estimates that Chile experienced a positive demographic bonus between 1966 and 2011. From 1990 to 2015, per capita income increased by 5.3% per year. This effect has slowed in later years with a per capita income increase between 1998 and 2008 of 0.26% per year and 0.06% in the following decade.

Figure 12: Chile Population Pyramids (1990, 2010, 2030)

From 1960 to 1990, Chile’s infant mortality rate fell 87% from 128 per 1,000 births to 16. Since then it has fallen more slowly and stagnated around 7.2 in recent years. Fertility in Chile has declined from 5.1 children per woman in 1960 to 1.8 in 2015 despite the fact that contraceptive prevalence had only reached 64% in 2006 (from 43% in 1978). Life expectancy at birth in Chile has increased by 22 years from 57 in 1960 to 79 in 2015 and the current average age of the population is 35 years. The combination of these reductions in fertility and mortality rates has led to narrowing of the base of Chile’s population pyramid, a widening upper tip, and a visible working-age ‘bulge.’

Chile has achieved near universal primary education with net enrolment at 94% in 2015, though it has decreased by 3% since 2007. Similarly, secondary net enrolment is 88% in 2015, down 4% since 2007. Gender parity in gross primary and secondary enrollment has consistently hovered around 1 since 1970.

Policy Environment

Policymaking in Chile has not been motivated by achievement of the demographic dividend, largely because the bulk of the population transition happened many years ago. However, despite working without the demographic dividend framework, Chile has implemented policies that are well-aligned with it.

With regards to health care, Chile credits its progress in maternal and child health as well as overall life expectancy to expansion of birth control access in the 1960s when the fertility rate was 4.6 children per woman; robust sanitation policies introduced in the late 1960s; and a criticized, but ultimately effective health system. Chile credits its high life expectancy to the robust sanitation policies introduced in the late 1960s and an effective, though often criticized, health system.

Chile views education as a key instrument to improving income distribution and supporting economic growth. Education quality has been an ongoing challenge for Chile in the last decade. The government has increased state spending on education through a large tax reform process. The spending has been put towards increased teacher payments, implementing teacher evaluations, providing free tertiary education, and increasing access to preschool education.

Chile has undertaken some key economic policymaking to stimulate its growth and capitalize on its demographic dividend in the last three decades. Firstly, in 1975 it implemented an outward-oriented growth strategy that involved lowering tariffs significantly and signing numerous free trade agreements. Despite the fact that this strategy was briefly interrupted between 1983 and 1985, in the last 15 years Chile has signed more free trade agreements than any other country. Secondly, Chile’s macroeconomic management has been quite successful. It has one of the lowest public debt rates among emerging markets. In the 1990s inflation was gradually reduced to approximately 3% and has remained relatively stable since then. A floating exchange rate regime has served as a buffer and strict financial regulations have maintained a healthy banking system since a large crisis in 1982. Thirdly, Chile’s financial system is more similar to a developed country’s than an emerging market with a fully funded individual account pension system that began in the early 1980s and now manages more than 90% of GDP in assets plus a banking system with assets exceeding 80% of GDP. Important institutional developments have underpinned high savings and investment. Chile has a very independent central bank that has built strong credibility and special courts carefully guard competition. Public-private partnerships have been expanded in several areas. Finally, Chile ranks high in terms of democracy and rule-of-law when compared with other countries. This has fostered a very active private sector.

Due to its economic growth, Chile was able to reduce poverty rates from 45% in 1987 to 12% in 2015. However, inequality remains an overarching theme and the Gini coefficient still stands at 47 (down from 57 since 1987). Furthermore, as the bulk of Chile’s population ages, pension is becoming an increasing concern. A quasi-universal minimum pension funded out of general taxes has helped to reduce poverty in people over 65 years of age but the middle class is facing a sudden drop in income at retirement.

Ethiopia

Progress

Ethiopia is well poised to take advantage of the demographic dividend. The narrowing base and widening stem of Ethiopia’s population pyramid reflects reductions in death and birth rates. Currently over 70% of Ethiopia’s population is under age 30 and almost 50% is under age 15. Ethiopia achieved its MDG goal by reducing under-five mortality from 203 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1990, one of the highest in the world, to 61 in 2015.

Figure 9: Ethiopia population pyramids (1990, 2010, 2030)

Fertility has declined from 5.9 children per woman in 2000 to 4.1 in 2014 and contraceptive use has increased from 4.2% in 1990 to 34.2% in 2014. Despite national progress, significant subnational variation exists. In urban areas, fertility is near replacement at 2.2 children per woman, however 81% of the population still lives in rural areas where each woman has an average of 4.5 children. Similarly, while contraceptive use has increased at the national, these changes are not uniformly reflected at the subnational level where some states (Amhara, SNNPR) experienced a six-fold increase in contraceptive use while another (Somali) experienced a decrease to only 2%. Ethiopia must find ways to replicate and sustain its progress in richer, urban areas in poorer, rural areas to maximize the demographic dividend it can achieve as a country.

Ethiopia has made significant strides in net enrolment at both the primary and secondary levels. Net primary enrolment more than quadrupled to 86% from the 1990s to 2016 while secondary enrolment has reached 31%. However, significant subnational variations persist and as well as gender disparities in enrollment and completion at the secondary and tertiary levels. This contributes to the fact that one-half of women in Ethiopia are married before the age of 18, despite it being against the law. Improving gender parity will be critical to increasing women’s workforce participation and economic productivity outside the home to ultimately maximize Ethiopia’s demographic dividend.

Policy Environment

Ethiopia launched its first ever explicit multi-dimensional population policy in 1993. The main aim of the policy was to maximize the level of welfare of the population by synchronizing the rate of population growth with that of the economy and the capacity of the country for sustained socio-economic development. As part of this effort, significant progress was made in the areas of reproductive health service delivery, population data collection and research, training, and communication. Fertility, infant mortality, under-five mortality and maternal mortality all declined. As such, the population growth rate declined and life expectancy increased. Female participation in education and access to political power and decision-making improved and a range of legal, policy, and institutional frameworks were developed and implemented on gender equity, equality and empowerment of women. Legislative measures were also taken to remove harmful traditional practices.

More recently, Ethiopia’s main development agenda is poverty eradication. To this end, it implemented A Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) from 2005 to 2010. The main objectives of the PASDEP were to achieve Ethiopia’s MDG targets and to ensure sustained, accelerated, economic development. Under the PASDEP, Ethiopia experienced sustained 11% annual growth in real GDP and a reduction in poverty from 39% to 30%. A key achievement was the implementation of the Health Extension Program (HEP) to train and deploy over 33,000 paid health extension workers to provide basic health services over 15,000 health posts in rural areas. This program has been credited with increasing contraceptive prevalence by 17% and reducing under-five and maternal mortality. PASDEP implementation was challenged by financial constraints resulting from inadequate official development assistance, lower than expected domestic revenues, and unpredictable rainfall.

Building on PASDEP, Ethiopia introduced the first Growth and Transformation Plan (GTPI) for 2010-2015. The guiding vision for GTPI was to eradicate poverty and become a middle-income country by 2025. To this end, its key objectives were to: (1) maintain a minimum 11% growth rate and attain relevant MDGs; (2) improve access and quality in health and education services and attain relevant MDGs; (3) achieve stability in development and democracy; and (4) achieve macroeconomic stability to ensure sustainability of growth in all other sectors. During this time period, Ethiopia achieved 10% growth and reduced poverty from 30% to 23% while maintaining similar levels of inequality (0.30 Gini Coefficient). To improve quality and access to education, programs to improve teacher development, curricula, schools, and information and communication technology were implemented while repetition and dropout rates remained a challenge. Building on the success of the HEP, Ethiopia introduced the Health Development Army (HDA), made up of volunteer families who choose to adopt the majority of the government’s 16 priority interventions (e.g. mosquito nets, immunizations, contraception use) to become certified as “model families” and act as social mobilizers to encourage similar behavior within their communities. While HEP is credited with continued increase in contraceptive prevalence, lack of research and data is a key ongoing constraint to monitoring and evaluation of Ethiopia’s family planning programs.

Ethiopia’s GTPII was developed to take forward the overarching objectives of GTPI through 2020. Key targets related to achieving the demographic dividend include halving under-five mortality rate to 30 deaths per 1,000 live births; halving maternal mortality rate to 199 deaths per 100,000 live births; increasing contraceptive prevalence rate to 55%; universal primary school net enrollment; 79% lower secondary school (9-10) gross enrollment; 45% female students in undergraduate studies; and tripling number of Technical Vocational Education and Training (TVET) trainees to over 600,000.

Key implementation strategies in education include expanding teachers from emerging regions; aligning curricula to match development goals and technological skills; increasing the number of secondary schools; and encouraging private investment to improve quality of education. Additionally, TVET is a key part of Ethiopia’s capacity-building program whose aim is to motivate entrepreneurship, create job opportunities, and train mid-level industry workers.

Key implementation strategies in health include primary care provision at all health facility levels; continued investment in HEP and HDA programs; reduction in open defecation areas and increase in households with latrines; transparent promotion ladder to reduce health worker turnover; incentives to encourage private investment in health infrastructure; and implementation of a health insurance system.

GTPII highlights women and youth empowerment as a cross-cutting issue that is required to achieve the objectives of GTPII. It aims to promote gender equity in education, employment, asset ownership, and access to capital. Additional strategies include providing a supportive environment and financial aid for female students, increasing the number of female teachers, eradicating harmful traditional practices, and expanding access to capital for youth. Women and youth development armies will be mobilized to implement cross-sectoral approaches to the challenges these populations face.

Rwanda

Progress

Rwanda has been steadily moving through the demographic transition but it is still not yet poised to capture the demographic dividend. Rwanda has made progress decreasing death rates as indicated by the wider working age cohorts on its population pyramid (compared to previous years). It surpassed its MDG target by decreasing its under-five mortality from 151 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1990 to 41 in 2015. However, the pyramid’s wide base suggests that birth rates remain too high for population growth rates to slow.

Figure 8: Rwanda population pyramids (1990, 2010, 2030)

Fertility has declined from 6.5 children per woman in 2000 to 4.2 in 2015 and contraceptive access has increased from 10% in 2005 to 48% in 2015 but still falls well short of the national target of 70%. This progress needs to be accelerated to decrease the dependency ratio and motivate increased health and education investments in children.

Rwanda has achieved near universal primary education with net enrolment at 95% in 2015, up from 73% in 2000, with near equal gender parity. Secondary net enrolment is 27% and 52% of enrollees are female. Despite traditional gender roles that women and girls continue to struggle to overcome at more local levels, Rwanda is a global leader in gender parity with 54% female workforce participation, the smallest salary gap between men and women in the world, and nearly two-thirds of Parliamentary seats filed by women. In the World Economic Forum’s 2016 Global Gender Gap Index, Rwanda was ranked fifth in gender parity.

Policy Environment

Rwanda has implemented a number of policies to achieve its rapid progress in health and education over the past two decades. In 2002, it introduced the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), the national government’s first ever “systematic assessment and establishment of the actions needed to reduce poverty and generate pro-poor economic growth.” The PRSP was a four-year strategic plan focused on six priority areas: rural development and agricultural transformation, human development, economic infrastructure, private sector development, and institutional capacity building. The PRSP made good progress in social sectors such as health and education, achieving reductions in maternal and child mortality (20-30% decrease) and poverty (58.9% to 56.7%), but faced challenges in agriculture, infrastructure, and industry. Additionally, income inequality increased (0.51 to 0.52 Gini coefficient).

Building on this experience, the government introduced the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS 1) in 2008, a four-year strategy to target growth acceleration, job creation, and export generation through social programs such as Grinka (one cow per poor family), health insurance, and local development and rural growth programs. EDPRS 1 is credited with increasing economic growth (8.2% average), reducing poverty (56.7% to 44.9%), and reducing economic inequality (0.52 to 0.49 Gini coefficient).

As of 2013, the government is implementing EDPRS 2 with four key objectives:

  1. Economic transformation (average GDP growth of 11.5%).
  2. Rural development (less than 30% poverty).
  3. Productivity and youth employment (200,000 off-farm jobs per year, increased output per worker).
  4. Accountable governance (more than 80% service delivery, increased citizen participation).

Additionally, EDPRS 2 aims to continue to sustainably develop eight foundational elements from PRSP and EDPRS 1. Critical among these to achieving the demographic dividend are family planning (i.e. increasing access to contraceptives and reproductive health education and sensitization), education (i.e. increasing free education from nine years to twelve years and improving education quality through private sector partnership), primary health care (i.e. quality, access, and affordability of health care).

Additionally, EDPRS 2 directly addresses horizontal, systemic issues such as capacity building and gender equity that need to be addressed across all programs. For example, Rwanda has invested in developing its community health workforce and now has over 45,000 community health workers (CHWs) countrywide, with one male and one female CHW providing care in each village. These CHWs are credited with implementing national prevention programs such as mosquito net provision, immunization campaigns, medical follow-ups, and family planning at the community and village levels.

Thailand

Progress

Over the past few decades since 1970, Thailand has seen rapid demographic change. It went from a country with a high birth rate and the majority of its population below 15 years of age in the 1950s to a country that has been rapidly ageing since the late 1990s and now has a life expectancy at birth of 75 years. Thailand experienced a demographic dividend between 1975 and 2005 when the percentage of population in active labor rose from 56% in 1980 and peaked at 66% in 2005, leading to an average growth rate of approximately 0.8% per year. This bulging cohort can be seen ageing through its working years in the population pyramids below.

Figure 11: Thailand population pyramids (1990, 2010, 2030)

Thailand has seen significant progress in fertility and mortality over the last half century. Infant mortality in Thailand dropped 80% since 1960 from 102 deaths per 1,000 live births to 20 in 2000. Since then, it has continued to drop steadily and almost halved to 11 in 2016. Similarly, Thailand’s fertility rate declined from 6.2 children per woman in 1960 to below replacement level at 1.7 in 2000. The rate has continued to fall but less drastically to 1.5 by 2015 and is expected to continue to decline in the near future despite periodic policy advocates from pro-natalists.

Thailand had achieved near universal primary education with net enrolment at 96% in 2009, but enrolment dropped to 87% in 2015.

Policy Environment

While Thailand reaped a dividend from changes in its demographic structure, lack of focus on effective policy implementation (i.e. education enrollment increases vs. quality improvements) meant that the dividend was not maximized as much as it could have been.

Prior to the 1970s, health had not been an integral part of Thailand’s National Economic Development Plan (NEDP), but population reduction policies were introduced in the 3rd NEDP in 1971 as a strategy to attain sustainable economic growth. Intensive population growth-reduction policies were continuously implemented between 1977 and 1996, resulting in over 70% reduction in fertility rate to below replacement level. In addition to family planning, maternal and child health received priority focus in the overall health policy and strategies. The concomitant development of integrated health service infrastructure based on primary health care helped to improve access and health outcomes in general.

From 1975 onwards, the government began many efforts to improve equity in health starting with the indigent card policy to provide free health services to the poor. In an effort to support health systems strengthening in rural areas, village health volunteers (VHWs) were introduced in 1979 and the program has since exceeded 1 million VHWs across the country. Between 1982 and 1986, it reallocated capital investments from urban hospitals to rural areas, particularly with regards to training and employing health workers of various cadres. In 2001, it established the Health Promotion Fund using tobacco and alcohol tax to fund health promotion activities.

One of Thailand’s most significant health reforms is the establishment of the Universal Coverage Scheme (UCS) in 2002. UCS uses tax revenue to purchase health services from both public and private sectors to ensure financial risk protection for the 70% of the population uncovered by any other health insurance scheme. Since its launch, UCS has been credited with increasing access to health care for infants and women of reproductive age, especially among the poor. UCS was also found to have reduced the likelihood of workers being prevented from going to work due to illness, thereby improving labor productivity. Finally, UCS was found to reduce financial risk with an 81% reduction in catastrophic health spending between 2000 and 2009.

Thailand began systematic education investments in 1950 with the establishment of the National Education Plan. Unlike health, education investments were later integrated into the first NEDP in 1961 with a focus on increasing infrastructure to expand coverage of schools and production of teachers. Subsequent NEDPs supported education investment aimed at improving economic productivity, equity, rural expansion of schools, rural teacher recruitment, and vocational education. While rural school coverage did expand significantly, quality was not prioritized. In 1992, Thailand extended mandatory education to early secondary level (from 6 years to 9 years of school) and increased government spending in education to 20% of the annual government budget. While this increased budgetary allocation towards education has been maintained (aside from during the Asian economic crisis), quality of education continues to be a concern, particularly with regards to Thailand’s ability to compete globally in a knowledge-based economy. To this end, enrollment rates and quality in higher education and dropout rates in primary and secondary school remain an ongoing challenge.

In addition to its investments in health and education, Thailand’s economic growth has been supported by two unexpected bonuses. The first was the sharp drop in petroleum prices in 1986. The second was the reversal of the trend in exchange rates with the dollar beginning to depreciate. At this point, the government changed the basket of currencies that determined the value of the baht and increased the share of the dollar in that basket to about 90%, resulting in the baht moving down in value with the dollar. These two bonuses, along with the shift from an agriculture to a more industry-based economy, led to an unprecedented economic boom with double-digit growth rates for three consecutive years starting in 1987. During this time, concurrent booms in manufactured export goods drove industrial production, inflows of portfolio investment drove the stock market, and real estate interest drove construction and increased land prices. While the speculative bubble burst in 1991, economic growth in production continued at a rate of 7 to 8%, fueled by the industrial sector.

Sources

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Executive Summary

“If the agricultural sector does not invest enough, the cases end up in the hospital and the burden goes to the health sector to treat malnutrition”

Dr. Kesetebirhan Admasu served as Minister of Health of Ethiopia from 2012 to 2016. Upon entering office, Ethiopia had been making progress toward reducing stunting from 67% in 1992 to 44% in 2011, but significant rural-urban and regional variations meant that malnutrition persisted as one of the leading causes of infant and child mortality.

The Government of Ethiopia had already begun on a path towards heavy investment in nutrition including the reduction in stunting, wasting, anemia, and dietary diversity outcomes, beginning with the establishment of the National Nutrition Program I (NNP I, 2008-2015). Further recognizing the importance of nutrition as a pillar for human capital development and economic growth, Minister Admasu, along with Deputy Prime Minister, H.E. Demeke Mekonnen, launched the Seqota Declaration in July 2015, a high-level commitment by the Ethiopian government to end stunting in children under two years by 2030. Minister Admasu knew that incorporating nutrition goals and actions into existing programs across sectors could enhance their nutrition sensitivity and thus their likelihood of improving nutrition outcomes. Thus, the Declaration was accompanied by the launch of the National Nutrition Program II (NNP II, 2016-2020) and the National Nutrition-Sensitive Agriculture Strategy (2016-2020).

The causes and consequences of suboptimal nutrition span many sectors (such as agriculture and health) and thus the improvement of nutrition outcomes necessitates multisectoral coordination. Despite their expressed interest, policymakers struggle to create sustainable multisector policies and continue to address these issues in a siloed fashion, missing the opportunity to create even greater outcomes from the integration of these spheres. This case study will examine the Seqota Declaration to show how Ethiopia has made nutrition a national and inter-ministerial political priority, enabled consensus-building across sectors, and established coordinating bodies at the national and regional levels to implement.

NNP I: Preliminary Efforts towards Intersectoral Collaboration

Agriculture, health, and nutrition are mutually reinforcing sectors. Agriculture constitutes 40% of Ethiopia’s GDP and 80% of exports, and 75% of Ethiopians’ livelihoods depend on rain-fed agriculture. While agriculture and health are often administered as disparate entities, nutrition serves as the link between these two, with dietary intake closing the value chain from agricultural productivity to improved health outcomes. As part of this more multisectoral approach, the sector has shifted from purely nutrition-specific interventions, such as exclusive breastfeeding and optimal complementary feeding, to include nutrition-sensitive interventions, such as water, sanitation, and hygiene, and food fortification.

The NNP I that Minister Admasu inherited was focused on “immediate causes of suboptimal growth and development” and the effects of nutrition programs on malnutrition. In particular, there was a focus on integration and coordination across nutrition-specific interventions that were supported by “evidence-enhanced decision making.” Nutrition programs were scaled up and an implementation platform was created in the form of the National Nutrition Coordinating Body (NNCB) and the National Nutrition Technical Committee (NNTC).

The NNCB involves 13 government sectors and is primarily led by the Minister of Health, with the Ministers of Agriculture and Education as co-chairs. It meets every six months and develops an annual work plan to ensure that various sectors are mainstreaming nutrition activities into detailed sector-specific plans, allocating budget to nutrition interventions, and assigning focal persons to work on nutrition. The NNTC, which also involves 13 government sectors and nongovernmental stakeholders, has three steering committees on program management, food fortification, and monitoring and evaluation. In addition to the NNCB, the Ethiopian government established Regional Nutrition Coordinating Bodies (RNCB) in most regions, as well as coordinating bodies at the woreda level.

Nutrition interventions under NNP I were intended to cut across sectors through the “Nutrition-Sensitive Agriculture Strategy, National Food Security Strategy, National Health Sector Transformation Plan, National Food Fortification, and the National School Health and Nutrition Strategy.” This multisectoral coordination was able to demonstrate some improvement in outcomes but was not fully effective in creating the intended outcomes.

The Seqota Declaration: Interministerial Support for Transformational Change

Improving nutrition to achieve sustainable development was the core vision of the Ethiopian government. However, it could not be done using traditional methods and did not pertain to only one sector. There was a need to tackle the issue from several angles by engaging different sectors in order to deliver high impact nutrition-specific, nutrition-sensitive, and infrastructure-smart interventions. Thus, the Seqota Declaration was unveiled by the Ethiopian government, led by Minister Admasu, in July 2015 to end stunting in children under two years by 2030. The Seqota Declaration builds on and supports the implementation of NNP II which highlights the “Five Building Blocks of Effective Nutrition Governance” as consensus building and coordination, political commitment, financing, service delivery capacity, and transparency and accountability.

Due to its ambitious nature, the Seqota Declaration Implementation Plan is divided into three distinct phases (Figure 1) to be executed over a 15-year period. Although they each have different specific goals, they are all part of a bigger picture, which intends to promote and ensure a smooth transition/path to success. During the innovation phase (2016-2020), new and innovative ideas are being tested out in order to generate evidence for interventions, while the expansion phase (2021-2025) involves increasing the coverage of the lessons learned from the innovation phase to reach more vulnerable communities. Finally, the scale-up phase (2026-2030) will involve national scale-up throughout the country. The innovation phase is being implemented in 33 select woredas (districts) in Amhara and Tigray regions where stunting prevalence is high and over 4 million people are entirely dependent on rain-fed agriculture and animal husbandry.

Figure 1. The Three Phases of the Seqota Declaration

The Seqota Declaration has ten multisectoral strategic objectives as outlined below and is implemented by six federal sectors (Ministry of Health; Ministry of Agriculture; Ministry of Water, Irrigation and Energy; Minister of Labor and Social Affairs; Ministry of Education; Ministry of Women, Youth, and Children). In addition to these six ministries, development partners and community organizations are also involved.

Strategic Objectives of the Seqota Declaration

  1. Improve the health and nutritional status of adolescents, women, and children.
  2. Ensure 100% access to adequate food all year round.
  3. Transform smallholder productivity and income.
  4. Ensure zero post-harvest food loss.
  5. Enhance innovation around the promotion of sustainable food systems (climate-smart).
  6. Ensure universal access to water supply, sanitation, and adoption of good hygiene practices.
  7. Improve the health and nutrition status of school children.
  8. Improve the nutritional status of pregnant and lactating women and children through PSNP interventions.
  9. Improve gender equity, women’s empowerment, and child protection.
  10. Improve multi-sectoral coordination and capacity.

Interministerial Collaboration in Practice

The Seqota Declaration has only recently been implemented and is still in its preliminary innovation phase. Thus, it is not yet known if Ethiopia will reach its goal of reducing stunting among children under two by 2030. However, there is still much to be learned from its ambitious approach to harnessing the efforts of six different ministries to address one significant challenge. This section will highlight certain elements of inter-ministerial collaboration that have been put into practice in Ethiopia as part of its journey towards achieving the Seqota Declaration.

Demonstrating Political Leadership and Commitment

The bold ambition of the Seqota Declaration would never have occurred without strong political leadership and commitment. However, equally important was the consultative process that was used to inclusively develop the Declaration and create local ownership and buy-in. At the federal level, this commitment to making the Seqota Declaration a priority could be seen through the political capital spent by the Deputy Prime Minister to get the commitment of the two Regional Presidents of Amhara and Tigray. At the regional level, this leadership commitment could be seen through the financial investment made towards the Declaration, at an amount which was higher than that of the federal government. This latter shows the deep interest of the Regional Presidents for the successful implementation of the initiative in their respective regions.

Both governmental and non-governmental officials highlighted four salient drivers of this political prioritization and movement toward nutrition-related multisectoral collaboration:

  1. The international community’s emphasis on reducing undernutrition, specifically the MDGs, SDGs, and increased donor funding towards these priorities.
  2. The 2012 Cost of Hunger in Africa study which showed that 16.5% of Ethiopia’s GDP was lost to child undernutrition through healthcare costs, loss in education, and workforce absenteeism.
  3. Field trips to learn from the experiences of other countries, particularly Brazil and Israel, at implementing inter-ministerial nutrition strategies.
  4. Nutrition champions within Ethiopia like Minister Admasu, the Minister of Agriculture, and former first lady H.E. Roman Tesfaye.

For an initiative as ambitious as the Seqota Declaration, leadership commitment is key. The political leadership exhibited by the federal government through the consultative process at all levels facilitated local ownership of the Seqota Declaration. This latter has resulted in the Seqota Declaration becoming a higher priority for leaders at both the federal and regional levels. The meeting between the Deputy Prime Minister and African Development Bank president to mobilize more resources for the initiative.

Identifying Relevant Actors and Roles

Stakeholder mapping was a critical first step to effective collaboration both internally and with external government partners. It is impossible to mobilize and utilize all actors towards a common goal in a complementary fashion without knowing who they are and what they can do. Thus, the implementation of the Declaration began with a stakeholder mapping exercise to understand which actors were at play across various sectors. Figure 3 outlines the results of the stakeholder mapping exercises conducted in Tigray and Amhara.

Figure 3. Stakeholders Mapping in both regions (Tigray and Amhara).

Clearly Defining Collaboration in Context

Minister Admasu noted that in the past, “interventions in agriculture, health, and other sectors were not properly contextualized” and that everyone in government acted separately without keeping an eye on what was actually necessary to get the job done. To ensure that everyone actually knows what collaboration looked like, they adopted a clear collaboration framework known as the “Three Ones” which meant that there is “one goal, one plan, and one monitoring and evaluation system” in place for better coordination across sectors.

Key interventions that make up the overarching plan include:

  1. Increase production and consumption of locally available, nutrient-dense crops.
  2. Increase small-scale livestock ownership.
  3. Expand irrigation potential to improve water-use efficiency and extend growing seasons.
  4. Improve water supply quality and quantity in households, health facilities, and schools.
  5. Improve access to hygienic sanitation facilities to address open defecation.
  6. Improve delivery of direct nutrition interventions through the public health system.

These priority interventions were also supported by each sector’s individual response to nutrition, some examples of which are outlined in Table 1.

Table 1. Key Examples of Sectoral Contributions to Nutrition

Sector Key Contribution to Nutrition
Ministry of Health Strengthen and integrate nutrition-smart interventions (e.g., WaSH, environmental health, and health extension services) with other nutrition-specific interventions.
Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources Pilot the establishment of 20 hectares modernized demonstration farms called Agricultural Innovation and Technology Centers.
Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries Improve access to animal feed and support regulations that promote farmer productivity.
Ministry of Water, Irrigation, and Energy Establish the Tekeze River Basin Authority to address the institutional vacuum for water resources planning and management.
Ministry of Education Incorporate national school health and nutrition strategy in education programmes to better health and nutrition services for school-age children.
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs; Ministry of Women, Youth, and Children Improve the resilience of families in the Tezeke River Basin to economic shocks through the expansion of the Productive Safety Nets Program while improving the nutrition status of children as well as pregnant and lactating women.

Building on Existing Collaborative Efforts

It was critical to build on existing government structures to catalyze progress. At the national level, multi-sectoral coordination is ensured by the two national nutrition committees, known as the National Nutrition Coordination Body (NNCB) and National Nutrition Technical Committee (NNTC). These two national entities have different goals as the NNCB is responsible for providing policy and strategic decisions related to the NNP. However, the NNTC works under the NNCB, and is responsible for the technical work related to the federal level NNP coordination.

At the regional level, there is a similar structure, known as the RNCB and RNTC. Figure 4 shows the level of integration and coordination built into the organizational structure below both the NNCB and NNTC.

Figure 4. Inter-ministerial Coordination Structure for both the NNCB and NNTC

Institutionalizing Flexibility and Coordinating Mechanisms

Traditional methods of governance and coordination, such as the top-down approach, were insufficient for this ambitious initiative. In fact, in the past, there had been concerns about issues related to the bureaucracy of government, which limited intersectoral coordination mechanisms to exist only horizontally at federal and regional levels. Moving forward with the Seqota Declaration, establishing entities with people from different sectors that would be fully dedicated to the initiative was required.

Thus, the creation of Program Delivery Units (PDUs), three in total, are a tangible “embodiment of intersectoral government.” PDUs are small teams of multisectoral experts placed in the federal, Amhara, and Tigray President’s offices to secure higher-level political commitment to regional nutrition activities, to ensure accountability to the highest level of the regional government, and to provide technical leadership and performance management support.

Figure 5 shows the composition of a single PDU and demonstrates how it can operate horizontally across sectors as well as vertically through different levels of government to ultimately form a team with diverse nutrition expertise proximal to executive power.

Figure 5. Program Delivery Unit (PDU) Composition

Innovating to Support Collaboration

Minister Admasu once said that “intersectoral collaboration is rooted in innovation” and that innovation relies on “learning by doing.” To this end, high-level delegations that traveled abroad to learn from other country experiences were able to bring back home some of the innovative ideas they learned and adapt them to the Ethiopian context. They realized that everything they learned could be translated to all of the sectors involved in the Seqota Declaration. For example, using technology to effectively manage water (i.e. Tekeze River Basin) would not only improve food productivity all year round (i.e. related to MOANR), but also increase coverage of safe and adequate water supply to households as well as the adoption of good hygiene through implementation of WASH strategies (i.e. related to MOH, & MOE). Improving water techniques was integrated through Agriculture Innovation and Technology Centers (AITCs), which provided the MOANR and its agencies with a platform to serve as demonstration sites for innovation. Lessons learned from the AITCs were intended to benefit MOANR directly but also with the expectation that new agricultural technologies would increase productivity and thus produce economic gains.

Monitoring and Evaluating Collaboratively

The “Three Ones” collaborating framework dictates that all nutrition-related monitoring and evaluation activities should be assessed under one integrated and unified system. The different sectors involved in the Seqota Declaration each have a list of key performance indicators that they are responsible for. These indicators are cross-cutting across sectors where relevant. For example, WaSH key indicators showed that the MOH needed to do more in terms of promoting hygiene and sanitation practices along with the MOE for targeted interventions at school. Another example is the dietary diversity score which falls under the health sector but baseline data showed that the score could not be moved by greater health promotion. This suggested that the score’s progress was being limited by factors controlled by other sectors such as the availability of diverse foods, gender inequity, or sociocultural factors.

With regards to monitoring, routine service and administrative records collected through sectoral information systems are used to provide information for timely monitoring, supervisory visits, and review meetings. Currently, the FMOH and UNICEF are working together on a pilot Unified Nutrition Information System (UNISE), a performance management tool that allows all sectors and partners to upload their targets and results so as to generate scorecards at the federal, regional, zonal, and woreda levels. This unified system is extremely important for progress towards the Seqota Declaration as it facilitates robust and continuous nutrition data management and becomes useful when seeking further investment. Dr. Sisay Sinamo, Senior Program Manager of the Seqota Declaration based in the FMOH, noted that having access to clear management performance indicator data during review meetings has allowed them (sector administrators and development partners) to make informed decisions at all levels.

With regards to evaluation, the Ethiopian Public Health Institute (EPHI) and Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research are charged with conducting official evaluations and undertaking “periodic assessments, operational research, and surveys to help identify program strengths, weaknesses, and key challenges.” Regional PDUs support this effort through the recruitment of data collectors and overseeing local data collection. Furthermore, regular “performance reviews” are part of the routine. The Deputy Prime Minister chairs quarterly meetings to assess the performance of all implementing sectors and development partners. The PDUs meet quarterly to share outcomes amongst each other and with relevant political leaders. Regional Presidents chair biannual meetings with regional actors and kebele and woreda administrators lead monthly meetings to share their performance with zonal and regional representatives.

Ongoing Collaborative Challenges

Today, approximately two years into the implementation of NNP II and the Seqota Declaration, it is clear that the NNCB has played an important role in bringing together various ministries. However, ongoing challenges with accountability and ownership persist – there is a persistent perception that nutrition is primarily a Ministry of Health (MOH) issue and that a lack of accountability across Ministries is the primary barrier to successful multisectoral coordination.

Even as nutrition has grown in national importance and public awareness, Ministry staff feel that with no cross-ministry reporting structures, there has been a lack of ownership and clarity about responsibilities for nutrition outcomes.

A separate but related challenge is how to improve coordination at the regional level. While many interviewees at the national level spoke about the leadership of the NNCB in nutrition governance, the Regional Nutrition Coordination Bodies (RNCBs) were rarely discussed. The function of the RNCBs in different regions appears to be variable, with ongoing work needed to strengthen them as coordination platforms.

A key component of accountability is the clear delineation of roles and responsibilities for all stakeholders. However, this role-definition for each sector is a challenge in the setting of multisectoral collaboration for nutrition governance. Deciding where the work of one Ministry starts and ends, and how it interfaces with other Ministries at the national, regional and local levels is a dynamic process with implications for political interests, leadership, budgeting, and accountability.

Key Takeaways

While Ethiopia is a unique context and has very specific cultural considerations, there are a few salient points which may be derived from this case and applied to a broader context:

  • Making nutrition a national political priority is a key component of fostering multisectoral collaboration and improving nutritional outcomes. Though funds may be limited, political commitment and thoughtful programs can often attract donor organizations to contribute resources. Additionally, political pressure can help to drive budget decisions towards investment in nutrition.
  • Multisectoral collaboration has contributed to a reduction in undernutrition rates in Ethiopia, largely due to the shift from nutrition-specific to nutrition-sensitive strategies. This approach is preferred as it addresses all determinants of nutritional status, including social and economic determinants.
  • Accountability structures are vital to effective coordination, monitoring and evaluation in multisectoral nutrition governance. Multisectoral collaboration holds great capacity to improve population nutrition by simultaneously addressing multiple determinants of nutritional status. However, implementation and evaluation of coordinated efforts are difficult without accountability structures at the local, regional and national levels.

Overall, while challenges remain, collaboration from the initial development of the Seqota Declaration has allowed for more effective coordination across all sectors. Fighting a common “enemy” together is always more valuable and effective than doing it alone and without a clear agenda.

References

  1. World Bank Ethiopia Country Profile. Retrieved from http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia/overview
  2. Ethiopia Profiles. Why Nutrition Matters? 2006.
  3. Ethiopia Demographic and Health Survey 2011. Central Statistical Agency, Addis Ababa & ICF International, Calverton, MD.
  4. World Food Programme. (2013). The Cost of Hunger in Africa: Implications for the Growth and Transformation of Ethiopia. Retrieved from
    WFP Report
  5. Copenhagen Consensus. (2014). Nutrition: What’s the smartest post-2015 target? Retrieved from
    Copenhagen Consensus
  6. European Union External Action. (2016). Implementation Plan (2016-2030): Summary Programme Approach Document. Retrieved from
    EU External Action
  7. Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. (2018). The Seqota Declaration: Innovation Phase Investment Plan (2017-2020).
  8. Ruel M., Alderman H., The Maternal and Child Nutrition Study Group. “Nutrition-sensitive interventions and programmes: how can they help to accelerate progress in improving maternal and child nutrition?” Lancet. 2013;382(9891):536–551.
  9. USAID. (2018). Ethiopia: Nutrition Profile.
  10. WFP. (2013). The Cost of Hunger in Africa – United Nations World Food Programme – Fighting Hunger Worldwide. Retrieved April 29, 2019, from
    WFP
  11. Glandon, D., Meghani, A., Jessani, N., Qiu, M., & Bennett, S. (2018). Identifying health policy and systems research priorities on multisectoral collaboration for health in low-income and middle-income countries. BMJ Global Health, 3(Suppl 4), e000970.
    BMJ Global Health
  12. U.S. Department of State. (2018, August 10). U.S. Relations with Ethiopia. Retrieved April 26, 2019, from U.S. Department of State website:
    U.S. Department of State
  13. NNP. (2016). National Nutrition Program 2016 – 2020. Ministry of Health.

Introduction

The Program for Education, Health and Nutrition (PROGRESA) was established in 1997 as a response to the political and economic crisis that unraveled Mexico in 1994. It aimed to improve the wellbeing of families through the increase in consumption capacity and the creation of human capital to break the intergenerational poverty cycle. Studies and evaluation on the program have shown its relevant impact in improving access to health services, nutritional benefits and the education status of Mexico’s poorest populations. The program provided cash transfers1 directly to poor families under three conditions:

  1. School attendance for children between third year of primary and third year of secondary (with higher subsidies provided to households with girls).
  2. Utilization of a package of preventive health interventions, health educational talks and provision of diet supplements for children and pregnant women.
  3. Participation in health consultations and educational sessions.i

In 2002, in addition to its original components, the program widened its benefits to include factorsii such as:

  • Educational scholarships for children
  • Money for school supplies
  • Additional support for households with elderly members over 70
  • Medical services and health education
  • Savings accounts for youth who finish secondary school
  • Support for household energy consumption

The most recent expansion of the program under the name of Prospera aimed to promote access to higher education and formal employment opportunities to its beneficiaries. Additionally, Prospera strived to increase access to financial services and foster increased social inclusion to the poorest citizens.iii Federal administrations have changed the program’s name throughout its period, though its basic structure remained the same. It was initially called Progresa (1997-2001), then Oportunidades (2002-2012) and, finally, Prospera (2012-2018) (referred to as P-O-P). The Mexican model of a conditional cash transfer (CCT) program has been replicated in more than 50 countries across Latin America, Africa and Asia.

1Equivalent to one-third of their household income.

Program Impact

Impact on Poverty Alleviation

The program has achieved notable results in helping to alleviate poverty throughout Mexico. P-O-P substantially improved the household income distribution in the country as well as strengthened other poverty indicators. Evaluations showed that expanding the program significantly reduced the poverty rate by 1.8 percentage pointsiv. Figure 1 shows the decreasing trend in the poverty headcount ratio from the mid-1990s. Other indicators such as poverty incidence, poverty severity and inequality decreased dramatically due to the programv.

The program also helped in increasing overall labor participation, especially for women. Labor market effects that were found included an increase in women’s profitability from working, a rise in the total number of work hours per woman and improvements in women’s labor earningsvi. Additionally, the program led to higher paying jobs for men as well as gains in employment benefits such as health insurancevii.

Improvements in Health

Evaluations of P-O-P showed that the program “increased the number of antenatal care visits, reduced infant mortality rates and improved postnatal care provided by trained personnelviii”. Due to program efforts, P-O-P beneficiaries received 12% more prenatal proceduresix and utilized public clinics more than non-beneficiariesx. Due to increased visits and less frequent illnesses, there was a reduced demand for curative care and a decrease in the number of hospital inpatient stays. The health effects also proved strongly positive among children. The incidence of illness among children in recipient households diminished by nearly 23 percent. Children also recorded a reduced rate of anemia and an increased percentage in heightxi.

Increased Access to Education

The program conditions resulted in direct educational attainment benefits in Mexico. An analysis on the program’s educational components found significant effects on student learning, particularly among indigenous childrenxii. There was also increased enrollment at the telesecondary and high school levels, especially for young girlsxiii. Younger children who benefitted from P-O-P were also found to be less likely to repeat a grade and more likely to progress to the next gradexiv. The program was also shown to reduce school dropouts and encourage reentry among those who were out of school.

Key Factors of Success

Coordination Across Ministries

The coordination of P-O-P was administered by a deconcentrated unit from the Ministry of Social Development (SEDESOL) responsible for the program’s execution. Most decisions were taken at the national level, but offices were opened in the states to coordinate daily operations and establish relationships with the states. The central level also had a National Technical Council and National Technical Committee which consisted of representatives of SEDESOL as well as Ministries of Financing, Public Education, Health and Social Security.

Though the program was under the administration of SEDESOL, its origin is accredited to the policy efforts of the Ministry of Finance, particularly with former Deputy Finance Minister Santiago Levy being the architect of the programxv. Once the administration implemented Levy’s report on poverty alleviation, it increased “funding to be allocated to state governments for distribution to municipalitiesxvi” and executed a successful pilot program. Based on initial observations of the pilot program, the former deputy finance minister advocated for better monitoring and increased interagency coordination before the scaling of the programxvii.

P-O-P represented a significant paradigmatic change in the development of anti-poverty programs which implied not only the creation of the program, but the transformation and cancellation of existing programs and institutions, the creation and strengthening of others, as well as reallocation of public budget. The comprehensive approach, with each ministry having a ‘stake’ in the program’s success, has been attributed as one of the factors that helped the program survive through changes in administrationxviii.

Evaluation Project

For the first time in Mexico, the government incorporated an ambitious, long-term impact evaluation project during the rollout of the CCT program. This component has played a vital role in constructing evaluating practices and institutions in Mexico over the last few decadesxix. The rigorous evaluation approach emphasizes the need for clear data to measure effectiveness and ensure the program could adapt through political changesxx.

Since evaluation was prioritized from the beginning, evaluators were able to collect baseline data used to construct quasi-experimental designs. The positive results of the evaluation project have helped in obtaining support for the expansion of the program. Progresa has been heralded as “one of the few poverty-reduction programs that has been able to prove its impactxxi”.

Finance Mechanisms

One of the key decisions made by the Mexican government during the beginning of the program was to gradually reallocate food subsidies that had previously been ineffective towards Prosperaxxii. This not only re-designated funds that were being used inefficiently but also helped diminish additional pressures on the federal budget.

The program began with an initial coverage of 300,000 families and a budget of $58 million (USD)xxiii, accounting for 0.004% of the country’s GDP. The budget was progressively raised over a decade to represent 0.47% of GDP in 2016. While P-O-P was one of many programs in the state policy against poverty, it was the program that concentrated the highest budget. In 1997, it represented 1.67% of the overall budget of anti-poverty programs and, by 2017, reached 21.3%. These numbers demonstrate that P-O-P represented a key program in the social policy by dominating one-fifth of the total budget allocated to combat poverty in Mexicoxxiv.

Challenges

Targeting

P-O-P used geographical and household targeting to maximize efficiency in its allocation of resources to the poorxxv. The underlying design of this approach resulted in high, unexpected targeting errors that left an extensive proportion of poor families uncovered by the cash transfer mechanism.

Implementation evaluations of the program showed that the “targeting mechanism failed to identify households with a small number of members or households without young childrenxxvi.” It has been estimated that 24% of those who qualified were not covered and 22% of those who were not qualified received coveragexxvii. The program’s focus on rural areas, particularly in places that already had school infrastructure and health services, effectively excluded the poorest with no access to public services as well as the urban poorxxviii. An attempt to correct these deficiencies was made in 2016 when poor families without access to schools and health centers were incorporated into the program. Single families received an extra budget that represented around 12% of the budget that year.

Social Tensions

The household-focused method of distribution of cash transfers led to social tensions in some communities. Since certain households received benefits while others did not, it became easy for neighbors to tell who was or was not a beneficiary of the program. In a focus group with CCT recipients, 90% of the respondents believed that the selection process was ‘unfair’ as they perceived that those who needed benefits the most seldom received themxxix. This perception of unfairness prompted “contempt, resentment or envy” within some communitiesxxx. Although these types of problems were considered important by the general coordination, the rationale of selecting families did not change over the period of P-O-P’s existence as those decisions were based on a technical rationale.

References

  1. Gertler, Paul, and Simon Boyce. “An Experiment in Incentive-Based Welfare: The Impact of PROGESA on Health in Mexico.” Working Paper, April 2001.
  2. IFPRI, 2011. “The Impact of Oportunidades in Mexico”. International Food Policy Research Institute.
  3. The World Bank, 2014. “A Model from Mexico for the World”. Accessed via worldbank.org website.
  4. Debowicz, Dario et al, 2013. “The impact of Oportunidades on human capital and income distribution in Mexico: A top-down/bottom-up approach”. Journal of Policy Modeling.
  5. Debowicz, Dario et al, 2013. “The impact of Oportunidades on human capital and income distribution in Mexico: A top-down/bottom-up approach”. Journal of Policy Modeling.
  6. Parker, Susan, 2018. “The long-term effects of cash transfers: Mexico’s Progresa.” VoxDev.
  7. Parker, Susan, 2018. “The long-term effects of cash transfers: Mexico’s Progresa.” VoxDev.
  8. Servan-Mori, Edson et al, 2019. “Improving the effective maternal-child health care coverage through synergies between supply and demand-side interventions: evidence from Mexico.” Journal of Global Health.
  9. Barber, Sarah, 2009. “Empowering women to obtain high quality care: evidence from an evaluation of Mexico’s conditional cash transfer programme.” Journal of Health Policy Plan. National Institutes of Health.
  10. J-PAL, 2001. “The Impact of PROGRESA on Health in Mexico”. Accessed online via povertyactionlab.org.
  11. J-PAL, 2001. “The Impact of PROGRESA on Health in Mexico”. Accessed online via povertyactionlab.org.
  12. World Bank. 2019. “Impacts of PROSPERA on Enrollment, School Trajectories, and Learning (Spanish)”. Policy Research working paper.
  13. Ibid.
  14. Behrman, Jere, 2005. “Progressing through PROGRESA: An Impact Assessment of a School Subsidy Experiment in Rural Mexico.” The University of Chicago Press Journals.
  15. Brookings, 2020. “Brookings Institute – View All Experts.” Accessed via brookings.edu website.
  16. Teichman, Judith, 2003. “The Politics of Freeing Markets in Latin America: Chile, Argentina, and Mexico.” University of North Carolina Press.
  17. Bate, Peter, 2004. “The story behind Oportunidades.” The Inter-American Development Bank.
  18. Greene, Meghan, 2012. “Extending Oportunidades: A Look into Mexico’s Model Conditional Cash Transfer Program”. Center for Financial Inclusion.
  19. Alderman, Harold, 2018. “The 1.5 Billion People Question: Food, Vouchers or Cash Transfers?” The World Bank Group.
  20. Greene, Meghan, 2012. “Government Steps in Youth and Finance”. Center for Financial Inclusion.
  21. Bailey, Stephanie et al, 2007. “Conditional Cash Transfer Programs in Latin America”. University of Michigan Paper.
  22. Nino, Miguel, 2017. “Mexico’s Progresa-Oportunidades-Prospera and the raise of social assistance in Latin America”. United Nations University.
  23. Levy, Santiago. “Progress Against Poverty: Sustaining Mexico’s Progresa-Oportunidades Program.” Brookings Institute.
  24. Ibid.
  25. Adato, Michell, 2000. “The Impact of Progresa on Community Social Relationships”. International Food Policy Research Institute.
  26. Azevedo, Viviane, 2013. “Multidimensional Targeting: Identifying Beneficiaries of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs.” Social Indicators Research.
  27. Ibid.
  28. Nino, Miguel, 2017. “Mexico’s Progresa-Oportunidades-Prospera and the raise of social assistance in Latin America”. United Nations University.
  29. Adato, Michell, 2000. “The Impact of Progresa on Community Social Relationships”. International Food Policy Research Institute.
  30. Ibid.

Summary of Findings

Investing in health improves health outcomes and arrests the vicious cycle of poverty and illness.

The relationship between health and the economy runs both ways, lasts throughout an individual’s lifetime, and is intergenerational.

In 2000-2011, improvements in health contributed to an estimated yearly growth in full income of 1-2% across low- and middle-income countries.

Five core mechanisms explain how health affects poverty and the economy:

  1. Financial protection: Removing financial barriers to access enables the use of health services when needed, and helps at-risk households avert impoverishing expenditures and poverty.
  2. Education: The prospect of longer, healthier lives induces people to invest more in their human capital, as they are better able to realize future long-term gains in employment and income.
  3. Productivity: Productivity is enhanced through the contribution of better health to increased worker capacity, lower rates of absenteeism, and less workforce turnover.
  4. Capital investments: Heightened longevity in lifespan and higher incomes mean people save more for retirement – boosting the economy-wide capital available for increased investments.
  5. The demographic dividend: With the right conditions in place, changes in population age structure with a growing and educated workforce create the opportunity for economic growth.

Case studies of three countries show how different policies were used to strengthen health systems, expand healthcare access, improve health outcomes, reduce poverty, and achieve economic growth:

  • Ethiopia: Investments expanded primary health care facilities to enhance access to health services and improved financial protection by launching a community-based health insurance scheme.
  • Brazil: Universal health coverage was achieved through primary care and family health teams by decentralization, expansion of human resources for health, and health system strengthening combined with welfare programs to stimulate demand for health and education.
  • Turkey: The Health Transformation Program scaled up family medicine-centered primary health care, increased health expenditures, extended insurance coverage to the poor, and created a unified health insurance system with equal benefits to improve health outcomes, diminish impoverishing expenditures, and contribute to economic growth.

The success of reforms in these countries was enabled by sustained political leadership, effective use of fiscal space, a focus on universal health coverage and financial protection, an emphasis on primary health care, and the combination of supply- and demand-side interventions in the health system.

Though very successful, these countries face the rapidly growing burden of non-communicable diseases that will place demands on the government health budget. Judicious investments will be needed to develop strong health systems underpinned by comprehensive primary health care designed to manage chronic illness. Only then can the achievements in health outcomes, poverty alleviation, and economic growth be sustained.

Investing in Health for Economic Growth and Sustainable Development

Health is a catalyst and a critical ingredient for achieving economic, social, and environmental goals, including alleviating poverty and economic growth. Targeted investments can produce improvements in health outcomes, provide financial risk protection to citizens when they are ill, and produce substantial societal benefits beyond health to help achieve Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Conversely, ill health produces poverty and hinders economic growth, while poverty drives ill health in low-, middle-, and high-income countries alike (Deaton, 2016), creating a vicious cycle.

This report provides an overview of the evidence of the benefits of investing in health, including the mechanisms that link health, poverty alleviation, economic growth, and human development. Using case studies of Ethiopia, Turkey, and Brazil, the report presents real-world examples to illustrate how better health translates into improvements in human development. The report draws on the evidence and country cases to discuss implications for policy makers.

Evidence from Ethiopia, Turkey, and Brazil points to several important characteristics that enabled the simultaneous introduction of large-scale health and social sector reforms, including sustained political leadership, effective use of fiscal space created by economic growth, a transition towards universal health protection and coverage, an emphasis on primary health care, and a combination of supply- and demand-side interventions in the health system to expand simultaneously financial coverage and access to healthcare services.

Multidimensional Nature of Poverty

Poverty has a multidimensional character. While level of wealth or income is often used as measures of poverty, poor quality of life also characterizes poverty, including access to affordable, quality health care and education, food security, employment prospects, and the availability of water, electricity, and adequate transportation infrastructure. Inequality in health, education, and employment opportunities hinders human development.

The multidimensional poverty index (MPI) and the human development index (HDI) are designed to capture the multi-faceted nature of human development and enable comparison across countries. Health is at the core of both the MPI and HDI. The MPI provides a comprehensive picture of poverty by bringing together multiple dimensions of human development. It uses severe, overlapping deprivations in health, education, and living standards to assess individual-level poverty (Alkire, Conconi, and Seth, 2014). Individuals deprived in three or more of 10 indicators (including nutrition, child mortality, and school attendance) are considered ‘MPI poor’. The HDI also incorporates the multidimensional nature of poverty, using three core indicators: life expectancy at birth, mean years of schooling compared to expected years of schooling, and gross national income per capita.

Health and Macroeconomic Growth

Investing in health may ultimately impact macroeconomic growth and other important economic indicators (Floud et al., 2011). A rich, long-standing literature explores the relationship between health and the economy, with many economists contending that health fuels economic growth (Fogel, 1994; Gallup and Sachs, 2001; Sachs, 2001; Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla, 2004). Fundamentally, economists and other researchers agree that the relationship between health and the economy runs both ways and lasts throughout an individual’s lifetime and between generations (Deaton, 2003; Floud et al., 2011). Health status has shown to be a significant predictor of economic growth, with improvements in population health spurring increases in gross domestic product (GDP) above and beyond other drivers (WHO, 1999).

The magnitude of the effect of health on macroeconomic indicators is substantial. The Lancet Commission on Investing in Health estimated that across low- and middle-income countries, improvements in health contributed to yearly growth in full income by 1-2% per year from 2000 to 2011 (Jamison et al. 2013). In South Asia alone, the yearly value of mortality decline was equivalent to 2-9% of average growth in income per person – half as large as the value of the total increase in GDP. The effects were even larger in sub-Saharan Africa, where major improvements in health have been achieved since 2000. In high-income countries, such as the UK, improvements in nutritional status alone account for an estimated 20-30% of GDP growth between 1800 and 2000 (Fogel, 1994; Floud et al., 2011).

The Relationship Between Health, Poverty, and Economic Growth: Global Evidence

Mechanisms for Achieving Poverty Alleviation and Economic Growth Through Investing in Health

Investments in health drive economic growth and poverty alleviation in a dynamic manner and over a long time horizon. The five core mechanisms through which health affects poverty and the economy are:

  1. Financial protection: Ensures access to health services while preventing impoverishing expenditures.
  2. Education: Longer, healthier lives encourage greater investment in human capital.
  3. Worker productivity: Better health leads to increased workforce capacity, reduced absenteeism, and lower turnover.
  4. Capital investments: Higher life expectancy and incomes result in greater savings and economic investment.
  5. The demographic dividend: Changes in population age structure, combined with an educated workforce, drive economic growth.

A model of the dynamics of health, poverty, and economic development

Figure 1. Source (Report Authors 2016)

  • Financial protection: Financial protection when receiving care for illness impacts economic growth and poverty in two key ways. First, removing financial barriers to healthcare improves access to health services, and ultimately, enhances health outcomes. There is considerable evidence of the negative effect of user fees on access to health services, especially for the poorest segments of the population (Newhouse 1993). Removing user fees has been shown to immediately improve access to basic health services, including curative and preventive services, helping those in need to access services when they need them (Lagarde and Palmer, 2008). Second, financial protection reduces impoverishment by minimizing catastrophic health expenditures, which push households into poverty by forcing them to use savings, contract loans, or sell livestock and personal goods to cover health costs (Wagstaff 2008). Each year, an estimated 100 million people fall below the poverty line because of catastrophic health expenditures (WHO, 2010). Rates of catastrophic spending for health are usually higher in countries with limited prepayment systems or limited resources (Xu et al., 2003; Siroka et al., 2015). Investments in health systems that improve health and provide financial protection (through universal health coverage for example) reduce the incidence of impoverishing expenditures, decreasing the number of new cases of poverty.
  • Education: The prospect of higher life expectancy induces people to invest more in their human capital, including education. Better health translates into better attendance at school and better cognitive functioning. The prospect of longer, healthier lives incentivizes people to commit to years of schooling up-front, as they are better able to realize future long-term gains in employment and income. (Reference)
  • Productivity: Productivity is enhanced through the increased capacity engendered by improved health (Strauss and Thomas 1998; Straus 1986). High disease burden leads to higher rates of absenteeism and high turnover in the workforce, eroding productivity. Poor health in childhood – and even during pregnancy – can have long-term impacts on productivity (Buckles, Buckles, and Hungerman, 2008; Bleakley, 2010). A healthy, educated workforce is better able to use capital investments efficiently, thereby increasing total factor productivity across sectors. Workers’ contributions – whether in manual and non-manual tasks – increase, as physical and mental capacity increases with improved health. (Ref)
  • Capital investments: Better health translates into higher capital investments in countries with suitable institutional and economic conditions. Heightened longevity in lifespan means people save more for retirement – savings that boost economy-wide capital available for increased investments to spur economic growth. As incomes rise with higher education and enhanced productivity, the savings rates increase (Bosworth, Bryan, and Burtless 2004). Better health means people expect to be able to reap returns in future periods, inducing them to allocate more income to capital investments. (Ref)
  • The demographic dividend: As health outcomes improve, mortality falls and fertility declines, life expectancy of populations increases, providing an opportunity to reap the benefits of the demographic dividend. Demographic transition provides an opportunity to yield substantial economic benefits (Bleakley, 2010b; Bloom, Canning, and Fink, 2014). As fertility holds steady while life expectancy rises, the number of dependents initially rises. However, as this group grows older, a bulge in the working-age population emerges, leading to better dependent-working person ratios that broadly benefit the economy.

Health and Poverty Alleviation

Poverty is a critical step in the pathway that links health with economic growth. The relationship between poverty, the social determinants, and health has been extensively studied and analyzed: the impoverished often live in poor conditions, without proper access to water, sanitation, food security, or decent housing. Conversely, improved health plays a role both at individual, household, and societal levels in reducing poverty, ultimately boosting economic growth. Investing in health systems can improve health outcomes and also break the vicious circle of poverty and poor health (Wagstaff, 1987; Sachs JD, 2008).

At the microeconomic level, several studies support the conclusions of macroeconomic studies on the mechanisms through which health affects both the economy and poverty reduction (Thomas et al., 2003; Miguel and Kremer, 2004; Almond, 2006; Bleakley, 2007; Almond, Edlund, and Palme, 2009; Field, Robles, and Torero, 2009; Bleakley 2010a; Cutler et al., 2010; Lucas, 2010; Kremer et al., 2011).

Health and Sustainable Development

In 2015, the United Nations member states adopted the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the successor to the Millennium Development Goals. SDG 3 aims to “ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages” and is underscored by several health targets, including for communicable and non-communicable diseases, maternal and infant mortality, and universal health coverage. While many of the SDGs focus on climate change and environmental degradation more broadly, health is a key link between these environmental factors and human development. Health investments put countries on the path to reaching several of the SDGs, as benefits of investing in health extend beyond health system performance, by affecting poverty reduction, economic growth, and human development.

Evidence from Ethiopia, Brazil, and Turkey

Simultaneous progress in health, poverty alleviation, and economic growth make Ethiopia, Brazil, and Turkey suitable case studies for illustrating the mechanisms linking health, economic growth, reduced poverty, and sustainable development (Tables 1 and 2).

Since 2000, average yearly GDP growth has been substantial in the three countries, reaching between 2006 and 2011 to 10.9% in Ethiopia, 3.4% in Brazil, and 4.25% in Turkey. From 2000 to 2011, average life expectancy at birth rose in the three countries, from 51.9 to 62.1 years in Ethiopia, 70 to 73.6 years in Brazil, and 70 to 74.5 years in Turkey. Health spending per capita also increased between 2000 and 2011, on average rising each year by 16.2% and 10.5% in Ethiopia and Turkey respectively, and 9.9% in Brazil. (Tables 1 and 2)

Table 1. Socioeconomic Data

Demographics

Ethiopia (2000) Ethiopia (2014) Brazil (2000) Brazil (2014) Turkey (2000) Turkey (2014)
Total population (millions) 66.4 97 175.8 206.1 63.2 75.9
Life expectancy at birth 51.9 63.44 (2013) 70.0 74.12 (2013) 70.0 75.18 (2013)
Total fertility rate (births per woman) 6.53 4.52 (2013) 2.40 1.80 (2013) 2.45 2.04 (2013)
Age dependency ratio (% of working-age population) 98.37 83.57 53.21 45.1 58.01 50
Urban population (% total) 14.74 19 81.19 85.43 64.74 72.89

Epidemiology

Prevalence of HIV (% of population ages 15 to 49) 3.2 1.2 NA NA NA NA
Incidence of tuberculosis (per 100,000 people) 421 207 61 44 37 18
Estimated malaria cases 8,900,000 3,800,000 (2013) 1,200,000 230,000 (2013) 12,000 <50 (2013)
Diabetes (% burden of disease) 0.40 0.73 (2013) 2.43 3.56 (2013) 2.39 4.15 (2013)
Hypertension (% burden of disease) 0.23 0.49 0.55 0.70 0.70 0.98
Probability of dying between ages 30-70 from cardiovascular disease, cancer, diabetes, or chronic respiratory disease 15 19 (2012) 25 19 (2012) 18 24 (2012)

Economic

GDP at market prices (US$) $8,242 $55,612 $657,216 $2,346,076 $266,568 $798,429
Poverty headcount ratio ($1.90/day 2011 PPP, % of population) 36.31 (2004) 33.54 (2010) 13.62 (2001) 4.87 (2014) 2.12 (2002) 0.26 (2012)
Antiretroviral therapy coverage 0 50
Under-five mortality rate 145.1 61.8 32 16.2 39.6 17
Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000) 897 378 66 46 79 14.3

Source: World Bank Open Data, 2016. All US$ current prices for years 2000 and 2013 unless otherwise stated. Available online: http://data.worldbank.org/

Asterisk * represents data from the World Health Organization’s Global Health Observatory data repository. Available online: http://www.who.int/gho/database/en/

Asterisk ** represents data from IHME’s Global Burden of Disease. Available online: http://vizhub.healthdata.org/gbd-compare/

Between 2000 and 2011, the share of out-of-pocket expenditures as a proportion of total health expenditures fell in Brazil by 8.1 percentage points and in Turkey by 12.6 percentage points. In Ethiopia, out-of-pocket expenditures remained relatively stable, with a small decrease of 0.5 percentage points from 2000 to 2011.

The three countries also achieved substantial improvements in reducing poverty levels. Poverty – measured as the proportion of the population living on less than $1.90 per day – declined by 26 percentage points in Ethiopia between 2000 and 2011. In Brazil and Turkey, the poverty headcount ratio fell 2.4 and 1.6 percentage points, respectively, between 2006 and 2011. (World Bank 2016; Tables 1 and 2)

Table 2. Socioeconomic Data

Ethiopia Brazil Turkey
Year 2000 2013 2000 2013 2000 2013
Financing
Health expenditure per capita (current US$) $5.4 $24.5 $264.7 $1,084.6 $197.2 $607.7
Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP) 4.45 5.06 7.16 9.67 4.95 5.59
Government Health Expenditure (% total health expenditure) 54.6 60.96 40.3 48.19 62.93 77.41
Out-of-pocket health expenditure (% of total) 35.95 35.38 37.95 29.93 27.65 14.98
Coverage
(All social insurance) 30.10 (2006) 28.34 (2012) 29.4 (2004) 34.6 (2012)
External resources for health (% of total expenditure on health) 16 32.3 0.54 0.06 0.06 0.04
Service Delivery
Human resource density (physicians per 1000 population) 0.021 0.022 (2010) 1.15 1.89 1.3 1.711 (2011)
Human resource density (nurses and midwives per 100 population) 0.236 (2010) 3.84 7.6 2.93 (2006) 2.402 (2011)
Skilled-birth attendance (% of total) 5.6 23.1 96.45 (2001) 98.1 (2011) 95 (2009)
DPT coverage (% of children ages 12-23 months) 30 77 98 93 85 98

Source: World Bank Open Data, 2016. All US$ current prices for years 2000 and 2013 unless otherwise stated. Available online: http://data.worldbank.org/

All the three study countries were able to improve health outcomes very substantially and demonstrated between 1995 and 2013 (the latest data available) high performance in key population health outcomes relative to GDP per capita and health spending per capita, and in relation to comparator peer countries (Figures 2A and 2B).

Figure 2A. Data sources: World Development Indicators, WHO National Health Accounts 2016

a) Infant mortality rate and b) under-5 mortality rate relative to health spending and GDP per capita

Figure 2B. Data source: World Development Indicators, WHO National Health Accounts 2016

c) Maternal mortality ratio and d) life expectancy at birth relative to health spending and GDP per capita

Ethiopia, Brazil, and Turkey achieved these improved health outcomes in different ways. The various paths pursued to improve health in these three countries, achieve economic growth, and reduce poverty provide valuable insights on how progress can be made across a variety of contexts.

Ethiopia: Ethiopia invested considerably in the health system to expand population coverage of primary health care facilities and improve financial protection through the launch of a community-based health insurance scheme.

Brazil: In Brazil, expansion of universal health coverage was facilitated by decentralization of decision-making (with community participation) and provision of health services to municipalities with financial incentives to expand primary health care, substantial investment and prioritization of primary health care through the “Family Health Strategy”, and the expansion of human resources for health.

Turkey: In Turkey, a comprehensive approach was adopted to improve the health system through the Health Transformation Program (HTP), with increased total health expenditures, the creation of a unified general health insurance system, expansion of financial protection for the poorest population through a non-contributory health insurance scheme financed by budget contributions, scale up of family medicine-centred primary health care, as well as improved access to public and private hospitals.

Ethiopia Case Study

In the 1990s, Ethiopia faced deep-rooted challenges in its health system. Low per-capita health expenditures characterized the health financing landscape. Out-of-pocket spending was above the sub-Saharan Africa average, contributing to already high rates of poverty. Population coverage of health services was low. A persistent budget deficit in the health sector hampered effective functioning of the health system (Dibaba et al., 2014).

Recognizing the shortcomings in the health system, the Government of Ethiopia launched the Health Care Financing Strategy in 1998, followed by substantial reforms to improve the functioning of the health system and population health (Ethiopian Health Insurance Agency 2015). Reforms focused on:

  • Enhancing government investments in the health system: The Government of Ethiopia expanded its investments in the health sector considerably. The government more than doubled its health spending between 2000 and 2011 from $5.6 in 1999-2000 fiscal year to $7.1 in 2003-04, to $16.1 in 2007-08 and $20.8 in 2010-11 (The Ethiopian Federal Ministry of Health 2010), with government health spending growing from 2.4% to 3.7% of GDP (WHO 2016). In real terms, government health expenditure rose 38% over this period (The Ethiopian Federal Ministry of Health 2010).
  • Fee waiver system: A fee waiver system was instituted to protect the “poorest of the poor” against the financial barriers to accessing health care. Eligibility of citizens for the fee waiver system is determined through community participation, with beneficiaries issued a certificate entitling them to free healthcare services (USAID, 2011). A majority of health facilities in the regions where the scheme has been implemented have revised their fee schedules (Health System Financing Reform Project 2011). Exempted services that do not charge fees include, but are not limited to: family planning, delivery, pre- and postnatal care, TB, leprosy, expanded program on immunization, voluntary HIV counselling and testing, antiretroviral therapy, and services to prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV (USAID, 2011). Over 2.2 million waiver beneficiaries have been enrolled in the program in eight regions (USAID, 2011). While there have been some implementation challenges across regions, where the fee waiver and exemption system was fully implemented in Amhara, poor households now have better access to health services (Health System Financing Reform Project, 2011).
  • Community-based insurance scheme: As part of the health financing reforms, in 2011 Ethiopia also introduced a community-based insurance (CBHI) scheme. Supported by the Federal Ministry of Health, USAID, and local and international NGOs, the scheme is designed for people working in the informal sector, representing 89% of the total population (Derseh et al., 2013).

The CBHI has been implemented in three states that have a total population of more than 60 million (National Population and Housing Census of Ethiopia, 2007). A year after implementation, 45.5% of target households had taken up the scheme and more than 40,000 households have been enrolled to date (USAID, 2011; Derseh et al., 2013). Similar to the fee waiver system, enrollment is decided collectively at the community level (as opposed to the household level). Each member pays 5 Ethiopian Bir (ETB) registration fee (around US$0.25) and an annual contribution of ETB 180 (almost US$10). The federal government provides funding for the schemes. Local and regional governments provide a subsidy for poor households unable to afford the contribution. The federal government also provides financial support to the health facilities that provide healthcare services to CBHI members.

In 2013, an assessment of the CBHI program showed that the scheme led to increased utilization and intensity of care. This, in turn, generated more financial resources for the facilities providing healthcare services for CBHI members to expand service provision. Risk of impoverishment due to OOP fell by one half for those enrolled in the CBHI scheme (Ethiopian Health Insurance Agency, 2015).

Health Outcomes, Macroeconomic Growth, and Human Development

By 2011, major changes in healthcare delivery were apparent. Ethiopia has expanded coverage of health services with an eighteen-fold increase in health posts and a seven-fold increase in the number of health centers (Ethiopian Federal Ministry of Health, 2011). Primary health care coverage increased from 51 percent in 2000 to 92 percent in 2011.

There has been substantial improvement in population health outcomes (Derseh et al., 2013). Average life expectancy at birth rose one year per year from 2000 to 2011, increasing from 52 years to 63 years (World Bank 2015). Child mortality dropped from 166 in 2000 to 88 by 2011. Maternal mortality declined from 871 to 676 per 100,000 live births. Prevalence of stunting dropped from 58% to 44% from 2000 to 2011.

Macroeconomic indicators have also been strong since 2000. Ethiopia has achieved yearly per capita growth rates of 8.3% in the last decade (World Bank, 2016), with substantial investments in infrastructure and market development, including expanded road networks and more integrated markets.

Poverty Reduction and Financial Protection

Ethiopia has made remarkable progress in reducing poverty. In 2000, 56% of the Ethiopian population was living under the $1.25 poverty line (World Bank, 2016). By 2011, this proportion had fallen to less than 30%, a rapid decline in the share of the population living in poverty.

As health has improved, school attendance has increased substantially in Ethiopia. The proportion of the population without education declined 20 percentage points from 2000 to 2011 (from 70% to 50%). The Net Attendance Rate for primary education rose from 30% to 62% over the same time period.

The contribution of health to improvements in quality of life is best captured through a decomposition of the declines in the multidimensional poverty index (MPI). Figure 3 presents how much deprivation in education, health, and living standards contributed to the MPI in Ethiopia in 2011 as compared to the cross-country average. Among those classified as poor by the MPI, health contributed 28% of deprivation, lower than the cross-country average (34%), but more than the contribution of deprivation in education (26%) in Ethiopia in 2011.

Percentage contribution of deprivations in education, health and living standards to overall poverty, 2011

Figure 3. Source (Alkire, Conconi, and Seth, 2014)

From 2000 to 2011, the MPI for Ethiopia declined by 10%: less than the fall in the poverty headcount (33%) – a divergence driven by slower progress on living standards in the MPI than is reflected in the poverty headcount. Figure 4 compares the contribution of living standards, education, and health to the decline. Health contributed 18%, almost double the contribution of living standards, but less than the impact of education.

Percentage improvement in proportion deprived in education, health and living standards (2000-2011)

Figure 4. Source (Alkire, Conconi, and Seth, 2014)

Employment, Retirement, and Workforce Productivity

The Government of Ethiopia instituted improvements in its health system as part of a concerted state effort to pursue a “developmental state” model, which placed poverty reduction at its core. In doing so, Ethiopia has effectively used Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) to rapidly achieve government goals.

Since 2000, public investment in health and education has been a central feature of Ethiopia’s development strategy, augmented by ODA (World Bank, 2015). These efforts have led to major improvements in health, education, economic growth, and human development.

Notwithstanding successes, Ethiopia faces three interlinked future challenges. The first relates to an effective transition to a health system funded predominantly from domestic sources by reducing dependence on ODA. Strong economic growth and prudent fiscal management should help this transition. The second is the rapid demographic and epidemiological transition that will bring NCDs that will have to be effectively managed while addressing the infectious disease burden. The third relates to continued investments to achieve UHC, which must be underpinned by strong primary care to ensure access to comprehensive health services designed to address simultaneously infectious diseases, maternal and child health, and the rising burden of NCDs to sustain the gains in health, economic growth, and human development.

Brazil Case Study

Creation of the Brazilian Unified Health System (Sistema Único de Saúde) was part of a social movement, which underpinned the population’s fight against the military dictatorship to secure democratization and citizens’ rights. The 1988 Constitution, shaped by a democratic struggle and the Movement for Sanitary Reform (Movimento de Reforma Sanitaria), established health ‘as a fundamental right and a responsibility of the State’, with provisions to create a unified national health system (Atun et al., 2015).

The Unified Health System was established to achieve universal health coverage – part of a series of post-dictatorship social sector reforms in Brazil – aimed at improving health outcomes, providing financial risk protection, alleviating poverty, and reducing socioeconomic inequalities (Atun et al., 2014). Social sector reforms combined demand-side interventions, such as conditional cash transfers, and multisectoral action aimed at alleviating poverty by targeting social determinants of health. Reforms also combined supply-side changes to strengthen the health system in order to improve access for citizens, especially the most disadvantaged populations (Atun, 2015; Monteiro de Andrade et al., 2015).

The Unified Health System aimed to address high levels of infant and child mortality (especially from vaccine-preventable diseases), infectious diseases such as dengue, HIV, and tuberculosis, the rising prevalence of cardiovascular disease, and high levels of violence. Primary health care was strengthened as the platform for introducing multisectoral interventions and enhancing access to immunization and prenatal care, primary health care services, emergency care, and essential pharmaceuticals (many of which were manufactured in Brazil) (Paim et al., 2011; Atun, 2015; Monteiro de Andrade, 2015).

Alongside the prioritization of primary health care, the major characteristics of Brazil’s health system reform were:

  • Social participation and advocacy
  • Decentralization across a geographically, environmentally, and socio-economically diverse country
  • Expansion of human resources for health

These changes led to substantial improvements in average life expectancy at birth, which rose from 67.7 and 63.0 years for women and men in 1990, to 78.4 years for women and 71.6 years for men respectively in 2013. Infant mortality fell from 58 per 1,000 live births in 1990 to 15 per 1,000 live births in 2015.

However, in spite of these achievements, inequities in income distribution, levels of poverty, violence, and regional variation in health outcomes persist (Atun et al., 2015). Compared with 1990, premature mortality due to diabetes, as measured by years of life lost (YLLs) in 2013, increased by 43%. Furthermore, years of life lived with disability (YLDs) as a result of diabetes increased by 123% in the same time period (IHME 2013). In addition, alcohol misuse, tobacco smoking, undernutrition, and obesity have subsequently risen (Paim et al., 2011; Atun et al., 2015). These trends are concerning and, without concerted action, have major implications for the economic growth of the country.

Socioeconomic Welfare and Human Development

Between 1991 and 2008, Brazil’s gross domestic product (GDP) almost doubled from $608 billion to $1 trillion (constant US$), and per capita gross national income rose from $3,887 to $5,048 (World Bank 2016). The economic growth enabled the Government of Brazil to introduce ambitious welfare reforms, with policies aimed at stimulating and accelerating prosperity.

In 2008, five years after its establishment, the “Bolsa Família” conditional cash transfer program distributed over US$7 billion to 10.5 million families. In 2014, this amount increased to US$11.2 billion, accounting for 0.5% of GDP and covering one in four Brazilians (Paes-Sousa, 2013). Bolsa Família was an important contributing factor to the reduction in poverty by 27.7% during the administration of President Lula da Silva (Brandao Junior and Aragao, 2007).

Brazil has systematically increased the legal minimum wage since 2000. In 2010, the Brazilian Social Security System distributed pensions, retirement benefits, health benefits, and welfare assistance to 28 million Brazilians each month, amounting in total to US$153 billion, equivalent to 6.9% of GDP that year. The Social Security System offers financial protection to workers and their families in times of crisis precipitated by illness, accident, and imprisonment, and during periods of pregnancy and old age.

In addition to the Unified System for Social Assistance (Sistema Único de Assistencia Social), the Federal government’s anti-poverty program “Brasil sem Miséria” (Brazil Without Extreme Poverty) provides integrated support for the country’s poorest families – in particular those residing in the north and northeast regions of Brazil. Launched in 2011, Brasil sem Miséria expands Bolsa Família with the aim of eradicating extreme poverty by targeting 15 million of the country’s most neglected persons (Paes-Sousa, 2013). The program provides support for welfare, nutrition, health, education, housing, alongside employment and income support in order to raise per capita household income, enhance access to public goods and services, and improve access to employment and economic opportunities.

Policies go beyond cash transfers, seeking to develop capacity and skills for Brazilians to contribute more fully and more productively to the labor market. Together, these and other social and health initiatives (see Appendix Table 1 and Table 2) simultaneously invest in health and development, in an effort to create socioeconomic conditions conducive for economic growth.

Health, Poverty Alleviation, and Financial Protection: Achievements and Challenges

Social protection programs and financial protection have contributed to consistent improvements in alleviating poverty and reducing inequalities in Brazil (Paes-Sousa, 2013). Compared with other countries in Latin America (Appendix Table 3), Brazil has achieved lower levels of catastrophic health expenditures (Knaul et al., 2011), although out-of-pocket expenditures approaching 30% of total health expenditures in 2013 are relatively high (World Bank, 2013).

However, despite poverty alleviation and improvements in coverage of health services that are free at the point of delivery in the Unified Health System, some citizens incur catastrophic health expenditures (Montoya Díaz et al., 2012) when purchasing medicines. The assistance towards the cost of drugs is limited to specific diseases and treatments. In addition, two federal programs (Program for Sexually Transmitted Infections Treatment and Prevention, and the Program for the Dispensation of Special Medications for chronic conditions) provide assistance for costly medications. In 2012, one in four Brazilians had purchased an additional voluntary health plan or health insurance, but few of these covered costs of prescription drugs (Montoya Díaz et al., 2012).

Inequities persist in coverage of primary health care, with low coverage in the Northeast region and the Amazonian North, which have high levels of poverty, low-income levels, low educational attainment, high burden of communicable and non-communicable diseases, and segregation by race and ethnicity.

Employment, Retirement, and Workforce Productivity

Described as an “economic time bomb” (The Economist 2012), Brazil has 35 pensioners for every 100 contributing workers, and 13% of GDP is spent on pensions – more than any G7 country with the exception of Italy. This presents substantial challenges to Brazil as it faces an aging population with an increasing number of chronic conditions (Romero 2015).

Improvements in longevity bring challenges. In the 1950s, 90% of Brazilians aged 60-64 years were contributing to the workforce. In 2000, just 65% of the same age group remained in active employment. This shift was most evident in the public sector, which in 2002 had an average age of retirement and exit from employment of 52 years, compared to the official retirement age of 65 years for men and 60 years for women (Queiroz 2007). The average age of retirement across all sectors in Brazil is around 55 years (Queiroz, 2007).

Challenges in Productivity and Economic Growth

Productivity and investment are the cornerstones of economic growth. However, pension obligations and rapidly rising non-communicable diseases that bring chronic illness place a heavy burden on the government budget, reduce productivity, and limit economic growth in Brazil – which has experienced difficulty sustaining productivity growth, including total factor productivity, with declining investments as a proportion of GDP compared to other countries of South America (Palma, 2010).

Brazil needs greater public investment in cross-sectoral policies to improve health, education, and sustainable development – alongside pension reform – to boost productivity and address emerging adverse trends.

Turkey Case Study

During the 1990s, Turkey experienced political instability, an underperforming economy with rampant inflation, wide income inequalities, and few improvements in its health system (Atun et al., 2013). As a result, by the end of the 1990s, the Turkish health system faced major gaps in financial coverage and access to healthcare services. Only 66.3% of the population was covered by health insurance in 2003.

Inequitable and inadequate financing impeded access to health services for the poorest segments of the population who suffered impoverishing health expenditures, worsened by maldistribution and absolute shortage of human resources and infrastructures. As a result, although average life expectancy at birth increased through the 1990s, geographic and social inequities in health outcomes persisted (Atun et al., 2013).

To address the shortcomings in the health system and poor health outcomes, Turkey introduced the Health Transformation Program (HTP) in 2003. The HTP combined supply- and demand-side interventions to expand coverage of health financing and service delivery, enabled by economic growth that created the fiscal space to increase total health expenditures. Rapid scale-up of family medicine-centred primary health care was accompanied by expansion of health insurance coverage and the creation of a unified general health insurance system that brought together four separate health insurance schemes for blue-collar workers, civil servants, retired civil servants, and the self-employed, with aligned benefits for all population groups.

Contracts were used to source human resources for underprivileged areas of the country and to increase hospital capacity by engaging the private sector (Atun, 2015).

Health system reforms were effective in improving key health outcomes and providing financial protection, especially for the most disadvantaged population groups (Atun, 2015). Improved financial protection diminished catastrophic expenditures and contributed to poverty reduction at the national level. Although the evidence remains mixed, recent studies suggest a positive relation between increased health expenditures and economic growth in Turkey (Arisoy, Ünlükaplan, and Ergen, 2010; Kurt, 2015).

Health Outcomes, Socioeconomic Welfare, and Human Development

Maternal, child, and neonatal mortality are sensitive indicators of health system performance and are closely related to the availability of health resources (Dickson et al., 2014). In Turkey, between 1998 and 2009, neonatal mortality declined from 26 per 1,000 live births to 10 – a decline achieved by OECD countries in 30 years (Demirel et al., 2013). Infant and maternal mortality also declined (Baris et al., 2011; Atun et al., 2013).

Between 2000 and 2010, Turkey was ranked first among 113 low-income and middle-income countries in the rate of decline of under-five mortality (Verguet and Jamison, 2014). Between 2000 and 2008, average life expectancy at birth rose from 70 to 73 years (Baris, Mollahaliloglu, and Aydin, 2011). The HTP significantly reduced health inequities between different social groups (Atun et al., 2013).

Poverty Alleviation and Financial Protection

Expansion of the green card scheme led to an increase in insurance coverage for the poorest groups from 2.4 million in 2003 to 10.2 million people in 2011 (Ökem and Çakar, 2015). This enhanced financial protection led to a decrease in the share of out-of-pocket payments out of total health expenditures, especially for lowest-income households, and a decline in catastrophic health expenditures between 2003 and 2011 (Atun et al., 2013; Yardim et al., 2014).

Some studies argue that high-income groups benefited more from the decrease of out-of-pocket health expenditures (Erus and Aktakke, 2012), and between 2004 and 2010, the percentage of households who incurred catastrophic health expenditures may have increased (Özgen Narcı et al., 2015). While the HTP had a clear impact on financial and geographic equity, further studies are needed to eliminate regressive out-of-pocket patterns (Ökem and Çakar, 2015).

Health and Macroeconomic Growth

Studies examining the relationship between health expenditures and macroeconomic growth in Turkey since the 1960s show mixed results (Kurt, 2015). One study finds a positive impact of economic growth on total health expenditures, with a 10% increase in per capita GDP associated with an 8.7% increase in per capita health expenditures between 1984 and 2006 (Sulku and Bernard, 2012).

Two other studies suggest a positive impact of social and health investments on long-term macroeconomic growth: one study shows the positive effect of health and education expenditures on the Turkish economy for the period 1960-2005 (Arisoy, Ünlükaplan, and Ergen, 2010), and the other, which analyzes the impact of general government medicine and health expenditures on the Turkish economy between 2006 and 2013, finds a positive effect of government health expenditures on total expenditures, aggregate demand, and total production, and a negative impact of the expenditures in other sectors (Kurt, 2015).

Employment, Retirement, and Workforce Productivity

As with Brazil, the demographic and epidemiological shifts mean that Turkey faces a rapidly rising burden of non-communicable disease, an ageing population, and growing pension obligations. The rising chronic illness will place demands on the government health budget, and if not effectively managed, will have adverse consequences on population health outcomes, financial well-being, and economic growth.

To build on its success, Turkey needs to maintain the momentum in health systems reform and develop multisectoral policies to further strengthen primary health care and to establish a comprehensive set of services designed to prevent NCDs and effectively manage chronic illness (Atun et al., 2013).

Policy Implications

The three case studies from Ethiopia, Brazil, and Turkey examine the impact of investing in health systems on several health outcomes, economic growth, and sustainable development.

While the evaluation of the impact of the reforms is ongoing, direct and indirect effects of health investment in these countries are already apparent, with regards to improved health outcomes, financial protection, and poverty reduction.

Although implemented at different stages, and in different contexts, investments in health in these countries share several common characteristics:

  • Sustained political leadership: Political stability and sustained political leadership helped to introduce decisive and comprehensive reforms that combined social sector and health system reforms, with support across the government, which was crucial to achieve improvements in health, financial protection, improved economic growth, and development.
  • Effective use of fiscal space: The three countries used the fiscal space created by economic growth effectively to invest in the health system, especially in primary health care to improve coverage, efficiency, effectiveness, equity, and responsiveness of health services.
  • A transition towards universal health protection and coverage: Expanding access to health services and reducing catastrophic expenditures, especially for poor households, was an explicit goal of all three countries for improving financial protection.
  • An emphasis on developing strong primary health care: Although each country adopted a specific set of interventions, all placed a great emphasis on improving access to primary health care, either through the strengthening of family medicine, such as in Turkey, or through the expansion of decentralized primary health care in Ethiopia and Brazil with the use of health extension workers and community health workers.
  • A combination of supply- and demand-side interventions in the health system: As governments designed and implemented the reforms, policymakers recognized the need to simultaneously address both supply- and demand-side barriers to healthcare by introducing policies and interventions to stimulate demand and expand supply to enhance access to health services.

Though very successful, these countries face the rapidly growing burden of non-communicable diseases that will place demands on the government health budget. Judicious investments will be needed to develop strong health systems underpinned by comprehensive primary health care designed to manage chronic illness. Only then can the impressive achievements in health outcomes, poverty alleviation, and economic growth be sustained.

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Appendix


Table 3. Socioeconomic Data (Source: World Bank Open Data, 2014)

Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru Venezuela*
GDP (US$, billions) 537.7 2,346.1 258.1 377.7 1,294.7 202.6 381.3
GDP (US$, per capita) 12,509.5 11,384.4 14,528.3 7,903.9 10,325.6 6,541.0 12,771.6
Health Spending (US$, per capita) 1,074 1,085 1,204 533 664 354 520
Total Health Expenditure (%GDP) * 7.3 9.7 7.7 6.8 6.2 5.3 3.6
Out-of-Pocket Health Expenditure (%THE) * 21.1 29.9 31.7 13.9 44.1 34.9 65.8
Literacy (Female %) 98 92 97 94 93 91 95
Literacy (Male %) 98 91 97 93 95 97 95
Life Expectancy at Birth (Female) 79.6 78.4 81.7 78.9 78.7 78.7 79.3
Life Expectancy at Birth (Male) 72.3 71.6 76.3 72.3 72.2 75.5 71.8
Life Expectancy at 50 Years (Female) 32.3 31.6 33.5 32.0 31.7 32.0 32.2
Life Expectancy at 50 Years (Male) 26.4 27.5 29.5 28.4 27.7 30.0 28.1
Health-Adjusted Life Years at Birth (Female) 69.4 67.0 70.8 67.6 67.8 67.2 68.2
Health-Adjusted Life Years at Birth (Male) 64.2 62.8 67.3 63.2 63.8 65.0 63.3

Source: World Bank Open Data, 2014. All US$ current prices, unless otherwise stated. Available online: http://data.worldbank.org/

Life expectancy data source: Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, 2013. Asterisk * represents data from 2012-2013.

The Reform Challenge

In the wake of the covid-19 pandemic your country is facing national debt totaling 50% of annual GPD – which the IMF judges to be almost unsustainable – and persistent deficits, which reached 8% of GDP in 2020, and remained at 3% of GDP in 2023. Those deficits have reflected increased spending – owing to the pandemic and high global fuel and food prices – as well as reduced revenues. Your country does not have access to significant resource revenues, with the economy reliant on agricultural production, a nascent but small industrial sector, a large but relatively simple services sector and a recently growing construction and real estate sector.

Prior to the pandemic non-resource tax collection was 14% of GDP – somewhat above average for LICs – but revenue fell to 12.5% of GDP during the pandemic, and has only recently returned to 13% of GDP. Revenue collection in the country is heavily dependent on the VAT and excise taxes (7% of GDP), with the remainder made up of trade taxes (1.5%), corporate income taxes (2.5%) and personal income taxes (2%). Prior to the pandemic revenue collection had increased from 11% of GDP to 14% of GDP over a decade, which included the creation of a semiautonomous revenue authority, significant improvements in pay for senior tax officials and progress with digitalization, with the government having introduced several core modules of the international SIGTAS IT system.

You are facing major pressure to expand revenue collection, which was an important priority in recent elections, held six months ago. The newly elected President emphasized three possible areas for strengthening tax collection. First, strengthening the taxation of the informal sector and broadening the tax net. Second, curbing corporate tax abuse by multinational companies. Third, strengthening the taxation of the wealthy. She has not focused on raising or strengthening value added taxes, owing to a concern that they may unpopular with her political base in the aftermath of the pandemic.

In each area she emphasized that these reforms were about improving fairness, so that everyone pays their fair share. She promised that new revenues would be translated not only into reduced debt, but expanded spending on health and education. Backed by those promises, her push for stronger tax collection appeared to enjoy significant public support.

Setting Priorities

The President has asked you to build a strategy for strengthening revenue collection. You have asked your advisors to assess the revenue potential of the alternative approaches, and to offer advice on potential strategies.

With respect to revenue potential they have advised that:

  • Taxing the Informal Sector: While there is a large informal sector which could be taxed more, there is a need to target the small subset of larger firms and wealthier individuals in the informal sector with significant revenue potential. Otherwise, you risk devoting scarce administrative resources to very small taxpayers with limited revenue potential.1
  • Corporate Tax Abuse: There is a clear need to strengthen taxation of multinational corporations. However, because of the small number of such firms the achievable revenue potential is likely not more than about 0.75% of GDP at best, while success may be challenging owing to the complexity of administering international tax rules.2 There is also some evidence that tax exemptions and incentives have been granted to influential businesses with little justification, which could offer immediate revenue potential and be publicly popular. That said, the overall revenue potential is unlikely to exceed about 0.25%, or at very best 0.5%, of GDP.
  • Taxing the Wealthy: More effectively taxing the wealthy holds the greatest revenue potential. Personal income tax collection is dramatically below levels in higher income countries (about 9% of GDP) and also well below other high-performing LICs and LMICs (4-5% of GDP). In turn, almost all personal income tax revenue (94%) is collected through withholding on salaries, with negligible collection from capital gains, self-employment income, rental income or inheritance taxes. Property taxes are also extremely weak (0.05% of GDP vs 2% of GPD or more in high performing OECD countries), despite high levels of investment in the real estate sector.

They have recommended a primary focus on strengthening taxation of large and wealthy taxpayers, noting both revenue potential and the potential to increase equity – an important priority for the President. To do so, they have recommended (a) renewed efforts to identify large taxpayers in the informal sector, to expand the tax net, (b) strengthening collection of existing taxes on the wealthy – especially personal income taxes and property taxes – for which there is evidence of major gaps in collection, and (c) a specific effort to investigate existing tax incentives and exemptions to large firms to identify unjustified revenue losses.

Existing Challenges

Following that initial advice, you asked your advisors to conduct an assessment of the drivers of weak existing taxation of the wealthy. Their assessment highlighted the following:

  1. Policy: Policy around personal income taxes – including capital gains taxation and rental income taxation – underwent a significant update in 2019 and is consistent with what is considered international best practice and with regional norms. The policy framework for property taxes is similarly aligned with international practice, and could support reform modelled on that pursued successfully by neighboring countries.
  2. Gaps in registration and compliance: Collaborative research between the national revenue authority and an external think tank that was conducted in 2018 highlighted major gaps in registration and compliance by wealthy individuals in the country, even where those individuals were well known or easily identified. Illustratively, they found that3:
  • Only 5% of company directors in the country remitted any personal income tax.
  • Of 16 individuals who paid more than $150,000 in customs duties in the prior year, only 2 remitted any personal income tax.
  • Among the 60 top lawyers in the country, as identified by the industry association, only 17 remitted any personal income tax.
  • Among 71 top government officials who were known to own significant commercial assets, only a single person paid any personal income tax.
  1. Limited data sharing: Many countries rely on data sharing both with other government bodies (e.g. public procurement, land ownership, construction) and private actors (e.g. banks, digital financial services, stock exchanges) to identify wealth and income for tax purposes. However, existing legislation in your country sets very high standards of evidence to be able to access data. Meanwhile, other government institutions have often not prioritized, or been resistant to, sharing data. This has made data sharing very limited in practice.
  2. Weak property taxation and knowledge of property assets: Heavy investment in real estate by elites is believed to be a major driver of rising real estate prices, and a major source of untaxed rental income. However, government knowledge of land ownership and values is limited by an incomplete and out of date national cadaster, highly ineffective property valuation and extremely weak property tax administration. As a result, property tax revenue are extremely low even by regional standards, while limited knowledge of property ownership and values has affected the ability of the government to identify wealthy taxpayers and to collect rental income taxes.
  3. Challenges accessing overseas wealth: Cross-country data suggests that a significant share of the wealth of national elites is held offshore, as the average for similar countries is estimated at 30-40% of wealth.4 Recent leaks from tax havens have, in fact, highlighted the names of several wealthy individuals from your country. However, as of now no action has been taken against those named in recent leaks, while the country does not have systems in place to participate in automatic exchange of information (AEOI) for tax purposes in order to access data about wealth held overseas by citizens.
  4. Limited audit capacity: Tax authorities struggle to bring cases against wealthy individuals given limited internal audit capacity, and the ability of those wealth individuals to rely on complex avoidance schemes. This is exacerbated by significant challenges with staff retention, as auditors are often targeted for recruitment by accountancy and legal firms.

Reform Options

In light of that analysis your advisors have highlighted several potential priority actions, highlighting some of the opportunities and costs of alternative approaches.

  1. Creating a High Net Worth Individuals (HNWI) Unit: In recent years a number of countries have created specialized units for taxing wealthy individuals, alongside existing Large Taxpayer Units that focus primarily on large businesses. They have aimed to provide more personalized engagement with wealthy taxpayers, while also strengthening audit capacity and data collection/sharing. International experience suggests significant immediate success in identifying wealthy taxpayers, but that increasing compliance also requires new technical capacity, improved data sharing and political support.7
  2. Building an international tax unit to participate in international tax data exchange: Recent reforms to international tax rules call on all countries to voluntarily share information with home countries about accounts held overseas by their residents. However, significant investments are needed in order to participate. Countries need to be able to receive, ensure the security of and use international information. And they need to be able and willing to share data reciprocally. A small number of lower-income countries have begun putting in place that infrastructure. However, progress has been slower than hoped and actual revenue gains so far very limited amidst challenges in meeting minimum standards for participation and difficulties in successfully using new information and enforcing compliance.8
  3. Strengthening audit and enforcement capacity: Special investment may be made in recruiting and retaining audit and enforcement capacity through expanded staffing, higher recruitment or other retention strategies.
  4. Investing in digitalization of tax administration: Digitalization can play a key role in improving data sharing, identification of under-reporting and audit selection. The government could focus, in particular, on strengthening data sharing with key public and private actors and on improving identification of high-risk cases for audit. This would build upon initial digitalization undertaken in recent years.
  5. Strengthening property mapping, identification and valuation: New investments in property mapping, identification and valuation could contribute to (a) improved collection of property taxes, (b) improved identification and collection of rental income taxes and (c) improved ability to identify high net worth taxpayers via improved information about property wealth. This would only target one category of wealth, and related income, but recent reform success in other low-income countries points toward the potential for significant improvements in outcomes.9
  6. Reviewing existing tax incentives and exemptions: Many countries in the region have recently reviewed their incentive regimes and made efforts to (a) ensure that the Ministry of Finance approves all incentives, (b) ensure that all incentives are documented in legislation, and (c) introduce annual published assessments of the revenue impact of incentives, by firm. In many countries this has led to greater coherence and monitoring, and the elimination of poorly designed or monitored incentives.
  7. Study the potential for a new wealth tax: In response to growing international interest, the country could launch a study of the potential of introducing a wealth tax. In favor of a new tax, your advisors note that your country faces very high levels of inequality, with a number of large intergenerational families controlling significant parts of the economy. However, they note that (a) collecting a wealth tax in practice could be difficult given limited data about assets, and concerns about wealth being moved offshore, and (b) that there may be other more immediate and simpler opportunities for improving collection from wealthy individuals.
  8. Building popular support: Given the likelihood of resistance from elite taxpayers, and their supporters, the government could seek to build a popular base of support for reform. One question surrounds framing: should these efforts be presented as a progressive effort to tax the rich, as an effort to ensure that everyone pays their fair share under the law, or something else? A second question is what measures the government can take to build public confidence that new revenues will be used effectively, including options like increased budgetary transparency, explicit new spending initiatives or earmarking of new revenues.
  9. Addressing collusion and political interference: Alongside these specific recommendations your advisors note that because existing weaknesses have been significantly driven by collusion/corruption and political interference the success of any strategy is likely to depend on developing a strategy to address those broader challenges.

Guiding Questions

You have decided to establish two working groups, each of which you will lead, to discuss next steps in reform planning. Their mandates are as follows:

  1. Broad Strategy: Given limited capacity, which options among those proposed by your advisors should be prioritized first – and what should be key elements of the strategy for making those initiatives successful?
  2. Digitalization Strategy: The government has already committed to – and has international support for – further investing in digitalization in order to improve data sharing, identification of underreporting and audit selection. Given that the technology itself is already in place, what will be the key elements of your strategy to ensure that those key functions are improved in practice?

References

1 https://www.ictd.ac/publication/why-mass-tax-registration-campaigns-do-not-work/

2 Moore, Prichard and Fjelstad (2018). Taxing Africa. Zed Books. Chapters 3 and 4.

3 Data derived from an actual study conducted in Uganda in 2015 (Kangave et al. 2016 – https://www.ictd.ac/publication/boosting-revenue-collection-through-taxing-high-net-worth-individuals-thecase-of-uganda/)

4 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0047272718300082

5 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00220388.2016.1153072

6 Data derived from an actual survey conducted with taxpayers in Sierra Leone in 2020 and 2021 (van den Boogaard, Orgeira and Prichard 2023). The share of respondents who indicated that revenue for recovery should come from more taxes on the richest was 55% prior to the pandemic, and 83% at the end of the pandemic. By contrast, support for broad based taxes rose from 24% to 35%, while for large businesses support rose from 41% to 72%. When taxpayers were limited to selecting one revenue source to prioritize 27% selected taxes on the rich, 33% selected taxes on large businesses and only 10% selected broad based taxes.

7 https://www.ictd.ac/publication/what-can-we-learn-from-the-uganda-revenue-authoritys-approach-totaxing-high-net-worth-individuals/; https://www.ictd.ac/publication/small-nets-for-big-fish-tax-enforcementon-the-richest-evidence-from-uganda/, https://www.ictd.ac/publication/small-nets-for-big-fish-tax-enforcement-on-the-richest-evidence-from-uganda/

8 https://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/documents/new-african-voices-help-amplify-international-effortsfor-tax-transparency.htm

9 https://www.ictd.ac/blog/freetown-new-property-tax-system-quintuple-revenue/

Introduction

Investments in health and health systems can create value in two distinct but related ways: by generating “value for money” and “value for many”.1 Policy makers have the opportunity to prioritize budgets in order to improve efficiency and effectiveness of health investments and expenditures thereby generating value for money, and target investments to improve equity and responsiveness to users’ needs, thereby achieving value for many.

The size of health budget and its allocation directly and indirectly impact on population health.2, 3 Low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) with similar per capita Gross Domestic Products (GDP), health expenditures as a proportion of GDP, and per person expenditure on health have different health systems outcomes in relation to population health (such as life expectancy, infant mortality, maternal mortality), financial protection (impoverishing expenditures for example) and user satisfaction.4 Beyond improvements in health system outcomes (better population health, financial protection and user satisfaction) investing in health brings distinct economic benefits for countries 5-10 and political benefits for the policymakers who choose to prioritize health to benefit citizens of a country who have electoral power.

This article draws on a framework (Figure 1) used at Harvard University’s Ministerial Leadership in Health program, to discuss questions policymakers should consider when determining how to generate greater value by prioritizing health budgets. These questions include:

  1. What values underlie the government’s priorities for the country?
  2. Based on these values, what goals for the healthcare system does the government hope to achieve?
  3. Based on these goals, where should the government allocate its financial resources for health?
  4. How should the government allocate its financial resources for health?

These questions have direct relevance for Ministers of Health, Ministers of Finance, and other ministries whose decisions impact the health systems, and can provide a shared approach when discussing and setting priorities in order to achieve government goals.

Figure 1: Framework for aligning values and outcomes when setting priorities for health

What values underlie the government’s priorities for the country?

Although a broad range of values can drive the government’s approach to resource allocation, these value sets generally fall into three broad categories: utilitarian, liberal, and communitarian, discussed below.5, 11, 12

Utilitarians

Utilitarians are consequentialists and typically focus on the value, or utility, that a decision will have. Utilitarians generally believe “the ends justify the means” (assuming “the means” involve ethical and legal decisions). Policy tools such as cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit analysis reflect the utilitarian concerns of generating the greatest outcome for the greatest number of people using the fewest possible resources – ‘greatest good for the greatest number’. Utilitarians differ in how they choose to measure total utility. Subjective utilitarians argue that value is subjective to the individual and that individuals must directly judge their own happiness for themselves. In contrast, objective utilitarians argue that individual’s choices are not always rational and that greatest impact for the available resources can be achieved by defining (and measuring) individual well-being in objective terms (for example using a universal measure or index, such as Disability-Adjusted Life Years [DALYs] and Quality-Adjusted Life Years [QALYs] to objectively measure and compare everyone’s well-being) and by agents (such as policy makers, experts) and allocating resources to maximise these measure.

Liberals

Liberals take a rights-based approach to allocation of health resources. Liberals believe that all humans have the capacity and obligation to display mutual respect to each other, and this mutual respect endows individuals with rights. Some liberals, known as libertarians, focus on negative rights, which guarantee individual freedom. For example, libertarians might focus on the rights of the individual to buy health insurance or choose their physician. In contrast, egalitarian liberals also emphasize the importance of positive rights, or a minimum level of resources and services, which can guarantee the ability for an individual to exercise his or her free choices. Accordingly, egalitarian liberals tend to favor redistribution of resources in order to ensure that the entire population has access to basic positive rights. However, with regards to prioritizing health, egalitarian liberals differ in their views on whether individuals have a right to health services (i.e. provision of and access to care) or health status (i.e. the achievement of general well-being).

Communitarians

Communitarians do not focus on the level of the individual in assessing a policy, but rather on the level of the community or society. As such, communitarians evaluate the merit of a policy based on whether it adheres to a community’s value set and whether the policy promotes a society consistent with that value set. Communitarians would typically oppose a health policy which achieved positive population health outcomes with an intervention that defied local cultural norms or values. Communitarians fall into two broad categories: those who believe in a single set of values which would promote a better society (universal communitarians), and those who argue that each society should set its own values and norms based on the context-specific factors (relativist communitarians).

These value sets are not mutually exclusive. Policymakers might include both a utilitarian and communitarian perspective in an analysis where they prioritize health interventions based on their objective utility but exclude any that overtly defy local norms. Further, governments can modify their ethical values as they learn more about a population’s needs and their ability to meet those needs. However, it is important to maintain adequate “coherence and explicitness” when articulating one’s values; doing so creates transparency for the population and gives others the opportunity to agree with the government’s choices because they can understand the rationale behind these choices.

Based on these values, what goals for the healthcare system does the government hope to achieve?

Policymakers must consider which outputs and outcomes to prioritize when allocating resources for health. In this context, the term outputs refers to how well the health system performs its delivery of personal and public health services to the population, whereas outcomes, refer to the ultimate goals the health system aims to achieve. These goals include health status, financial protection, and user satisfaction. In many cases, strong delivery of health systems outputs is necessary but not sufficient for strong performance in relation to health system outcomes.

A policymaker needs to balance four key objectives for the outputs achieved by a health system:13

  • Equity refers to the differences in how a policy affects people of different groups. An analysis of a policy’s “vertical equity” takes into account its differential impact across different populations (e.g. income or wealth levels, or different diseases), whereas an analysis of “horizontal equity” looks at whether the policy treats individuals at the same income level (or individuals that are similarly situated in relation to a health problem) the same.5
  • Efficiency has been defined many ways in the fields of policy analysis. For the purposes of health systems analysis, we draw on economic definition of technical efficiency, in which society is producing the most goods and services for the least cost.5
  • Effectiveness refers to whether interventions are evidence-based and safe.13 In other words, an effective intervention will achieve the desired health outcomes.
  • Responsiveness refers to whether the health system meets the public’s legitimate non-medical expectations. Responsiveness is a highly subjective measure and depends on the perceptions among citizens of a health system’s functioning. 14

Policymakers’ values will influence which health system outputs they prioritize. For example, pure utilitarians will likely care most about efficiency and effectiveness, to achieve ‘value for money’, and they will less likely prioritize equity. They might also disregard the importance of responsiveness as an objective, unless they believe that a health system’s responsiveness generates value for the population. Liberals, who focus on individuals’ rights, will prioritize equity and responsiveness of the system, to achieve ‘value for many’, with libertarians emphasizing the importance of responsiveness (for example choice of health service providers) and egalitarian liberals emphasizing equity in access to positive rights (e.g. basic health services and medicines). Communitarians, who emphasize society’s values, will prioritize the objectives most relevant for achieving the best possible society. Accordingly, they will likely emphasize responsiveness and equity of the system at a societal level, although the emphasis could vary depending on the specific values of the society.

In addition to setting output objectives, policymakers must also pay attention to the health systems outcomes, or the overall goals, these outputs produce for a country’s health system: 5, 13

  • Health status refers to the actual health of a population. Measurements of population health status include life expectancy, burden of disease, mortality rates for specific groups (e.g. infant mortality and maternal mortality), and prevalence of specific diseases.
  • Financial risk protection refers to helping people avoid large and unpredictable payments for health, also known as catastrophic (or impoverishing) expenditures. Mechanisms to provide financial risk protection typically involve insurance schemes with risk-pooling functions, or tax funded health systems where services are typically ‘free’ or have low levels of cost sharing at the point of care delivery.
  • Citizen satisfaction refers to the degree with which users of the health system rate the system as satisfactory.

As with outputs, health systems outcomes also derive directly from the values described earlier. For example, objective utilitarians might concern themselves most with the population’s average health status, whereas egalitarian liberals might focus most on the distribution or range of health statuses in the population (as a measure of equity levels). Egalitarian liberals will also emphasize the importance of financial risk protection as a means for ensuring economic opportunities for all. Subjective utilitarians might place a high value on citizen satisfaction, as would libertarians (in the sense that satisfaction relates to an individual’s level of choice.)

Based on these goals, where should the government allocate its financial resources for health?

Once the government has identified its objectives for the outputs and defined its goals for the health system, it can invest in specific programs or interventions accordingly. A health system has four main functions which a government can prioritize for investment: 13

  • Governance and organization encompasses the organizations and institutions involved in delivering products and services to citizens15 such as hospitals, primary care clinics, and supply chains which provide medicines to providers. A government could choose to invest in the governance and organization of the health system by improving accountability, increasing transparency of decision making, updating management policies for health facilities, changing the referral network of the system, or improving processes for decision-making at the programmatic level.
  • Health financing involves mobilizing, pooling and allocating financial resources. Funds can be mobilized through taxes, insurance or direct out-of-pocket payments, pooling could be achieved through pooling of contributions by the government or through insurance schemes – such as social health insurance, and community-based health insurance.3 A government could choose to invest in health financing by creating a new insurance scheme, expanding coverage of existing insurance to new patient populations, or by expanding the range of services covered under existing schemes. Finances can be allocated using budgets or other provider payment methods linked to individual patients (per capita payment), activity (fee-for-service or case mix payments), or outputs (performance related pay for achieving targets for example)
  • Resource management entails overseeing the inputs, such as human resources and labor, pharmaceuticals, and medical technologies, that are used to produce outputs, for example provision of personal health care or public health services,. 15 The government can invest in the management of resources by purchasing these resources (e.g. by procuring medicines or by employing or contracting doctors), or by improving systems that oversee resources (e.g. budgeting tools, and health information systems) or that deliver them (e.g. through supply chain management systems) or by investing in infrastructure and human resources to strengthen health system by developing primary health care which enhances allocative and technical efficiency, improves population health outcomes at lower cost, achieves equity and improves user satisfaction. 16
  • Personal healthcare and public health services refer to all of the activities actually involved in delivering care to patients. Strong health systems enable delivery of these services. Governments also invest in specific services that generate value for money and value for many – for example by investing in primary health care to deliver highly cost effective interventions that have population impact. Several investment cases have been made for “good buys” that can be delivered in an integrated manner at primary care level in an efficient and effective way, for example those identified by the Lancet Commission on Investing in Health 17; UNAIDS HIV Investment Framework 18; STOP TB Strategy 19; the Global Strategy for Women’s and Children’s Health spearheaded by the UN Secretary General 20; interventions identified in the Global Malaria Action Plan 21, and; the Package of Essential Noncommunicable Disease Interventions (also known as WHO-PEN) 22.

How should the government allocate its financial resources for health?

There is no formula for determining which health interventions or areas to prioritize, and while important limiting analyses to comparisons of cost-effectiveness is insufficient for policy making as values an priorities need to be considered carefully for each country.

Without universal consensus on the principles for prioritization, governments need to adopt an approach to make resource allocation decisions and justify their policies.23 Accordingly, ethicists at Harvard University have proposed a framework known as “accountability for reasonableness” (A4R) to guide this decision-making process. A4R which is a process grounded in democratic principles aimed at legitimizing decision-making among “‘fair-minded’ people who seek mutually justifiable terms of cooperation” has four conditions 24:

  1. Publicity condition: Decisions that establish priorities in meeting health needs and their rationales must be publicly accessible.
  2. Relevance condition: Policymakers should provide reasonable rationales which appeal to evidence, reasons, and principles accepted as relevant by fair-minded people when justifying their decisions. Rationale should be relevant for a broad range of stakeholders in decision-making.
  3. Revision and appeals condition: There must be mechanisms for challenge and dispute and, more broadly, opportunities for revision and improvement of policies in light of new evidence or arguments.
  4. Regulative condition: There must be public regulation of the process to ensure that conditions 1, 2, and 3 are met.

While A4R does not identify the priorities for government investments, it establishes a transparent deliberative process for publicly and legitimately determining these priorities in order to guide investment decisions. The principles of A4R have influenced priority setting for health in several places such as: UK, where the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) takes social value judgments into account when making recommendations about coverage for new treatments 25; Mexico, where decisions about which diseases the public catastrophic insurance should cover involve working groups that evaluate the clinical, economic, ethical, and social considerations 26; and Oregon where, in 2008, a Health Fund Board made a plan to insure all legal residents of the state involving a wide group of stakeholders and extremely transparent decision-making / information-sharing 27.

The impacts of Government Health Spending

Health system outcomes

Changes in government health spending can directly impact on cause-specific mortality. For example, in low-income countries a 1% decrease in government health spending is associated with an increase of 18 deaths for every 100,000 live births in the neonatal period and 98 deaths before the age of five for every 100,000 live births, controlling for populations size, population structure, and inter-country differences in health care infrastructure. The statistical significance of this result holds even when controlling for economic conditions, infrastructure, infectious disease rates, and private health spending rates. 28

From 1999-2004, a 10% increase in per capita total health expenditure was associated with a 22% reduction in infant mortality rate and 10% increase in per capita public health expenditure was associated with a 21% infant mortality rate. 29 Globally, a 1% increase in government health spending is also associated with a significant decrease in cerebrovascular deaths.30

Increasing government health spending and improving the efficiency of spending can further overall life expectancy in a country. 9 For example, among nations below the regional average for GHS, increasing government health spending to the regional average would improve health adjusted life expectancy (HALE) by:

  • 1.2 years in Africa
  • 0.9 years in Asia / Pacific
  • 4.1 years in Middle East / Central Asia

In addition, among nations below the regional average for efficiency in government health spending, increasing efficiency to the national average would result in an increase in HALE by:

  • 1.5 years in Africa
  • 1 year in Asia / Pacific
  • 1.3 years in Middle East / Asia

Achieving the health systems goal of financial risk protection through universal health coverage (UHC) can also improve population health status. Cross-country analysis on the influence of insurance coverage on health outcomes suggests that financial coverage has a causal influence on health, especially for low-income individuals, who gain better access to necessary care when they receive coverage. 31

Examination of individual countries’ experiences implementing UHC supports this finding. For example, Thailand’s Universal Coverage Scheme included benefits such as inpatient and outpatient care, surgery, accident and emergency visits, dental care, diagnostics, prevention and health promotion, and medications, and universal coverage increased utilization of many health services, including inpatient and outpatient visits. 32, 33

Universal Health Coverage in Turkey rapidly expanded family medicine centered primary health care to improve ratio of nurses and physicians to patients across the country to address unequal distribution of human resources which helped to expand access to maternal and child health services, and resulted in a significant decrease in infant mortality and narrowed gaps in health outcomes between the rich and the poor. 13

Similarly, across many Latin American countries, where health has been established as a constitutional or legal right, several countries such as Brazil have expanded primary care as part of the platform universal health coverage, for improving efficiency of health budgets and to achieve equitable access to healthcare services. 34 The expansion of universal health coverage has led to significant declines in infant mortality, under-5 mortality, and maternal mortality across most Latin American countries between 1990 and 2010. 34

Economic outcomes

Evidence strongly suggests that improved population health has positive economic impacts for a country. Government health spending positively impacts on population health, and provides a sound “return on investment” in the form of stronger economic output and economic growth for the country. Evidence for the linkage between health and increased economic output exists at both the microeconomic and macroeconomic level.

Box 1. Case study of investments in antiretroviral treatment

Expenditures on antiretroviral treatment for people living with HIV/AIDS provide a useful case study of a health investment with significant health and economic returns. 39 By the end of 2011, 3.5 million patients were receiving antiretroviral treatment co-financed by the Global Fund, and 80% of those patients lived in 20 African countries. The total cost of treating these patients from 2011 to 2020 was estimated at $14.2 billion. This health investment was projected to save up to 18.5 million life-years. Further, the investment was estimated to yield up to $34 billion in economic benefits (for a net benefit of up to $19.8 billion) through three primary channels: $31.8 billion in labor productivity improvements, $0.83 billion in orphan care costs averted, and $1.4 billion from the delay of end-of-life care.39

Microeconomic Impact

At the microeconomic level, better health can improve the financial prospects for individuals and households. 6 In particular, malnutrition, frequent illness, and an unstimulating home environment can limit the physical and cognitive development of a child. Conversely, proper nutrition and health allows for the adequate physical development of children and improved performance in school. Thus, investments at an early age “help to raise the potential for long-term academic and workplace success and lifelong well-being.” 6

Interventions targeting specific diseases and conditions, such as deworming for school children, iron supplements and iodine to treat malnutrition, and malaria prevention can all lead to improved education or income outcomes for individuals. 7 Among working individuals, illness can have direct, negative consequences for their income. The mechanisms linking ill health to reduced income and wealth include impoverishing health expenditures, reduced education opportunities, decreased productivity at work, long-term separation from the work force, and disengagement from other economic activities.

Macroeconomic Impact

Macroeconomic evidence also supports the idea that investing in health generates positive economic returns.7 In particular, there are four channels through which investments in health might improve the overall economic state of a country, corroborated by the microeconomic evidence described above:

  1. Labor Productivity: Ceteris paribus, a healthy workforce will have higher labor productivity than an unhealthy workforce due to increase energy and reduced illness-related absenteeism, whereas illness in an individual can lead to loss of income, impoverishing expenditures, reduced productivity and loss of employment.
  2. Educational Opportunities: A healthy population has increased educational opportunities, and education levels have a direct impact on income growth for a country.
  3. Savings and Working Years: Populations with high life expectancies will tend to save more for the future and likely will have more working years. These increased savings can lead to increased investable capital, an important driver of growth.
  4. Demographic Dividend: Health investments that change mortality rates and total fertility can lead to a “demographic dividend,” in which the ratio of working-age to non-working-age people in the country increases and productive capacity increases on a per capita basis. Assuming that the country has or can create certain conditions to enable productivity of this working-age group (e.g. proper educational opportunities), the country will experience a “demographic dividend” that leads to its growth. This demographic dividend accounts for up to one-third of the economic boom that many East Asian countries experienced between 1965 and 1990.

Political outcomes

The process of formulating health policy and allocating resources to health depends on the political structure and climate of a country, and, as such, has implications for the country’s political outcomes. For example, the transition towards universal health coverage (UHC) has had distinct positive political benefits in many countries over the last several decades. 35 In addition, health policy in countries such as Turkey, the UK and Brazil has significantly influenced political landscape and political outcomes.

In Turkey, after a regime change in 2002, the government implemented a Health Transformation Program (HTP) with significant commitment from the political leadership of the country, and this transformation led to increased levels of public satisfaction with the government (Box 2) 13, 36 and have influenced voter intentions in favour of the government.i

After the re-democratization of the Brazilian government, the 1988 constitution formally defined health as a “citizen’s right and obligation of the state” and established the Unified Health System (SUS), which sought to unify the fragmented care delivery network into a national health system under the purview of the MoH. 37 Today, 75% of Brazil’s population, or 195 million people, receive services and coverage from SUS. 38

Box 2: Turkey’s Health Transformation Program

In the 1990s, Turkey faced three distinct but related problems related to its health system: inadequate and inequitable financing of the system, an absolute shortage and inequitable distribution of physical infrastructure and human resources, and disparities in health outcomes, especially between the east and west.13 Under-5 mortality rates in 1998 were 75.9 deaths per 1000 live births in the less-developed east and 38.3 deaths per 1000 live births in the more developed west. A major earthquake in 1999 left 17,000 dead and another 500,000 homeless, exposing major faults in the government’s ability to respond to emergencies and deliver services.

Turkey’s 2002 elections resulted in a majority for the Justice and Development Party, ending a decade of ineffective coalition governments. In 2003, as part of a broader objective to improve the economy and welfare, the Ministry of Health (MoH) introduced a Health Transformation Program (HTP) to help achieve UHC. Motivation to enact these changes, including improvements in the health system, came directly from public pressure, and a failure to achieve these goals would have resulted in public backlash. 36 Further, the public expressed high levels of dissatisfaction with the health system, with only 39.5% of people indicating they were satisfied with quality of care in 2003. Accordingly, the government displayed high levels of political commitment to this effort, with the Minister of Health visiting 81 provinces at the beginning of the HTP to meet with local government and agree to HTP implementation plans.

The HTP aimed to address several health system challenges, including organization, financing, service delivery, human resources, and pharmaceuticals. The government adopted a flexible approach when implementing HTP, combining incremental and tactical changes, with high visibility to citizens, with long-term, strategic shifts that required structural changes to the system. A transformation team continuously monitored progress of the HTP; with an emphasis on citizen satisfaction with the transition, conducting focus groups, stakeholder analyses, and annual household surveys.

The HTP led to significantly improved access to and usage of health services, resulting in improved health outcomes on a number of important measures such as infant and maternal mortality. User satisfaction with quality of care also increased to 79.5% by 2011. The successful rollout of HTP served as a blueprint for the expansion of other social services by the Turkish government, and public satisfaction with the process contributed to the government’s re-election in subsequent years.

i See for example Esen B. Myths and facts about Turkey’s welfare regime. Sabah. http://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/2014/08/26/myths-and-facts-about-turkeys-welfare-regime (Accessed April 7, 2016)

The UK Experience

In the UK, the National Health Service (NHS) receives broad public support, with 89% of the public agreeing with the idea of a tax-funded national health system, which is managed by the government. However, projections show that by 2030, the NHS will have a £65 billion funding gap. Therefore, UK policymakers will have to balance the competing health, financial, and social demands placed on the NHS in order to maintain its relevance going forward.

Conclusion

This article aims to introduce a framework for policymakers to consider how their values influence priority setting for health, and the potential impacts that these priorities will have on health systems, economic, and political outcomes.

By clearly articulating values and priorities, policymakers can develop a transparent and deliberative process to better discuss and engage their constituents in health systems decisions and to set priorities that create greater value for money by improving efficiency and effectiveness of budget allocation decisions and more value for many by enhancing equity and responsiveness in the health system.

References

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Executive Summary

This case study examines the efforts led by Minister George Werner to create fiscal space in Liberia’s education sector through a teacher vetting and testing project. By February 2018, a third-party audit confirmed that Liberia’s education ministry had removed 83% of 2,046 ghost teachers; generated US$2.3 million in annual savings; and hired 1,371 new and qualified teachers. In addition to sharing the details of this implementation success story, this case study shares reflections from key actors, highlights unique political and funding relationships, and looks ahead to what remains to be done to improve education outcomes in Liberia.

Introduction

In 2013, all 25,000 high school graduates in Liberia who applied to the University of Liberia failed the entrance exam.1 This wasn’t entirely surprising given that the average high school classroom in Liberia had 158 students; the estimated qualified teacher-to-pupil ratio ranged from 33:1 to 90:1;2 and Liberia ranked 177th out of 199 countries on the UNDP education index.3 Furthermore, more than 90% of Liberian teachers did not have a university degree and 36% were untrained and unqualified.4 So when President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf appointed George K. Werner as Liberia’s Minister of Education in 2015, he knew there was work to be done.

Werner came to the Ministry of Education with experience in the education sector. He had studied education and social work, taught at the university level, and more recently served as the head of the Liberian Civil Service Agency where he worked to clean up government payroll. In his new role, Werner knew that education outcomes were poor and that Liberia was not seeing any progress despite the amount of aid that was being received. Starting his term in the shadow of the Ebola crisis, he was primarily charged with reopening schools, setting the school calendar, and making sure teachers and students were prepared to go back to school. However, from his time at the Civil Service Agency, he knew that education was the largest and most troubled government sector and that it comprised 40% to 45% of employees on government payroll in Liberia. Looking ahead, he saw the impending likelihood of donor fatigue and realized that in order to make any significant long-term progress in improving education outcomes, he would also have to address fiscal space for education domestically.

Problem: From listening to legacy

As a trained social worker, one of Werner’s first acts as minister was to conduct a listening tour around the country. In his words, “To know a problem, you first have to assess it.” Notebook and pen in hand, Werner traveled from community to community around the country, shadowed by some staff and members of the media, to meet with parents, students, teachers, school administrators, and more. In this capacity, Werner got a first hand account of the challenges in the education system in Liberia. He learned about the day-to-day problems of different stakeholders; he learned that ‘free education’ was not really free because of uniforms and learning materials; he saw the involvement of volunteer teachers who cared more for community than their salaries; he saw what schools looked like after months of abandonment during the Ebola crisis; and more. Most importantly, however, he got a sense of what children wanted for themselves.

With this knowledge in hand, Werner put together a list of 15 priorities he wanted to accomplish during his time as minister. The top five were 1) quality learning outcomes, 2) teacher training, 3) school infrastructure, 4) free early childhood education, and 5) increasing girls enrolment and completion rates. The cost of implementing his priorities was US$100 million. At the time, Liberia’s national annual budget was US$500 million, of which US$40 to $44 million was allocated to the Ministry of Education and approximately 92% of that was budgeted for payroll expenses. Werner had no funds to put behind his priorities. The education ministry applied for a US$11 million grant from the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) to support its work over four years but GPE required that the Liberia’s domestic financing for education show progress towards reaching 20% of government budget. Werner needed to show that Liberia was taking steps in that direction.

Funding: It takes money to get money

When Werner came in to office, a pilot project (funded by USAID and implemented by FHI 360) to identify “ghost workers” and unqualified teachers was already in place. Ghost workers were defined as “teachers who never showed up for their jobs but still received pay, or who were fraudulently included on the payroll.”5 Their presence in the education system used up government budget, affected education outcomes, and affected the government’s ability to implement other programs. The pilot was being conducted in three of Liberia’s 15 counties as part of the Liberia Teacher Training Program and President Sirleaf wanted Werner to complete the removal of ghost workers across the country. This was well-aligned with a 2014 government-wide pay-reform strategy that Werner had led as part of the Civil Service Agency but also an opportunity for Werner to free up domestic funds that could be leveraged to generate more external funds and used to implement his priorities.

Werner knew that the ghost worker removal strategy would eventually free up domestic funds but it would require significant initial funds to be implemented. As such, he decided to share Liberia’s story internationally and from that a series of fortunate meetings ensued. In September 2015 at the annual United Nations General Assembly in New York City, Werner shared his plan to remove ghost workers to free up personnel costs and implement his education sector priorities with Robin D’Alessandro, CEO of Vitol Foundation. A few months later in November 2015, D’Alessandro invited Werner to speak at a conference in London. Jamie Cooper, Chair & President of Big Win Philanthropy and Dr. Muhammad Pate, CEO, were at that same conference. Cooper and Pate were intrigued by Werner’s goals. After sending a delegation to visit the education ministry in January 2016 for a feasibility assessment, Big Win approved a US$1 million grant for the ghost worker removal program as well as mandatory competency testing for all teachers. This grant was made directly to the education ministry on the condition that the Liberian government committed to reinvesting any recouped funds back into the education sector. To verify Liberia’s commitment and efficient use of Big Win’s grant, President Sirleaf authored a letter to Big Win confirming reinvestment, PricewaterhouseCoopers was brought on board as a third-party auditor, and arrangements were made to release funds on a quarterly basis (based on achieving implementation targets). This grant from Big Win was critical as the ministry leveraged it to generate additional funds to support vetting and testing across the country.

Context: The challenge of finding ghosts

In Liberia, the Ministry of Education is responsible for supervising the education sector; the Civil Service Agency is the human resources arm of the government that sets policy for pay and benefits of all government employees and informs the Ministry of Finance of personnel costs; and the Ministry of Finance makes funds available for pay and benefits. The challenge of identifying and removing ghost workers was particularly challenging because of this joint governance structure and the presence of three payrolls.

Despite the fact that Liberia’s civil war had ended more than a decade prior, its effects lingered. During the war, thousands of teaching posts were abandoned as people lost their lives or fled and often community members who stayed behind filled in. To compensate these substitute and often under qualified teachers, the government instituted a “supplementary” payroll in addition to its “regular” payroll for qualified teachers and its “general” payroll for non-teaching government employees who worked at schools.

All three payrolls were managed by the Civil Service Agency and funds were disbursed by the Ministry of Finance. The Civil Service Agency crosschecked payroll numbers with the education ministry’s formal personnel listings, however the ministry’s listings were often incorrect because the ministry had neither the capacity nor resources to verify the teacher lists it received from district and county education officers.

By the time Werner came into office, the personnel listings had not been spot checked in years, the payrolls had not been integrated, and the distinctions between the different cadres of workers were not as clear. Anecdotally, it was well known that many teachers abandoned their posts or had intermittent attendance but continued to collect paychecks. It was also not uncommon for lower level decentralized staff within the ministry to add their family or friends to personnel listings. These acts of dishonesty were magnified by flawed policies. New teachers that were hired to replace old teachers automatically took their spot on whichever payroll, regardless of qualifications or experience. This replacement policy combined with the government’s inability to check qualifications meant that unqualified teachers could get hired on the higher paying regular payroll and qualified teachers could get hired on the lower paying supplementary payroll. Furthermore, the Civil Service Agency often took months to add new names to payroll so some new teachers chose to receive their salary in the name of the teacher they were replacing to avoid any lag in payment. And to top it all off, an additional cadre of unpaid volunteer teachers had emerged.

Ultimately, the three payrolls contained duplicate names and payroll numbers, incorrect names, and missing names. All of this exacerbated the ministry’s lack of control and potential for corruption. As of November 2016, the ministry of education had 13,403 teachers on the regular payroll, 6,024 teachers on the supplementary payroll, and 7,299 unpaid teachers.6

Implementation: From planning to action

With funding in hand, the teacher vetting and testing project was officially launched in July 2016. The deadline for the project was August 2017, two months ahead of the October 2017 presidential election when President Sirleaf’s term was due to expire. Political support for this project under a new administration was not guaranteed and thus time was of the essence.

To focus exclusively on this project, a project implementation unit was created within the ministry consisting of a project manager, financial manager, field operations manager, and an administrative assistant. This unit was additionally supported by staff from the education ministry’s human resources and teacher education departments.

Appendix A outlines the specific implementation steps of the teacher vetting and testing project.

Results: Changing the status quo

The teacher vetting and testing project is the most comprehensive assessment Liberia has ever done of its education workforce. It has communicated to teachers, principals, and staff that the ministry is making an effort to keep track and hold people accountable and that abandoning one’s post will result in removal.

By February 2018, a third-party audit confirmed that almost all of Liberia’s 19,500 teachers had their qualifications vetted and 73% of them wrote the competency test. Through this process, 2,046 ghost teachers were identified, 83% were removed, and US$2.3 million in annual savings were recouped. The outstanding 17% of ghost teachers were identified in the last six months of the program and will be removed shortly leading to an additional US$800 thousand of annual savings. Gbilia noted that while reaching higher levels of domestic financing can trigger other financing options, an added benefit is a changed mindset within the ministry that they can achieve things domestically over time going forward.

As a result of the fiscal space created within the ministry’s budget and the physical spots available for hire, the ministry of education was able to hire 1,371 new and qualified teachers who were recent graduates of Liberia’s teacher training institutes that provided ministry certification. Furthermore, at least 2,000 qualified teachers who were previously on the supplementary payrolls were transitioned to the higher paying regular payroll, reducing the supplementary payroll from approximately 6,000 to 3,762 teachers. Looking ahead, the data collected has allowed the ministry to estimate that it needs to hire an additional 10,782 principals and teachers to ensure that across the country every classroom has an appropriately paid and qualified teacher. However, despite these significant successes, the last field visits conducted by the ministry found that 15-20% of teachers that had been vetted were not present. It is evident that spot checks will be necessary going forward and norms need to be eroded to communicate to staff that showing up is mandatory and that monitoring is ongoing. Essentially, teacher vetting is important but it must be accompanied by a strategic plan for robust accountability and monitoring with district and county education officers going forward.

The teacher testing component of the project yielded jarring results. Only 6% of teachers passed with a combined score on the math and English papers above 70%. Forty-five percent received a conditional pass between 40% to 69% and 49% failed with less than 40%. While these results make the challenge ahead of improving education outcomes apparent, the data will be a valuable tool for the ministry to design customized training programs to better meet their needs. Werner notes that having this evidence base within the ministry means that they are owning their own data, rather than relying on donors, and that there is intrinsic pride in this. Sheeler adds that data had always been perceived as “for donors” but ministry ownership of data has changed the way the ministry views its role in collaborating with donors. In fact, the new administration now plans to use the results of the test assessment to design its first teacher training and implement it during the next school break for teachers.

As the data continues to be analyzed, it is now becoming apparent that missteps did occur with regards to data management. The project implementation unit prioritized data consolidation but in many cases inconsistencies in data collection and formatting meant that efforts are still being made to reconcile data to create the final consolidated personnel listings. This was likely magnified because of the change in management between the pilot study by USAID and FHI 360 and the remainder of the project by the education ministry.

The results above refer to public school teachers on the regular payroll but analysis to confirm the number of ghost teachers on the supplementary payroll is ongoing. The Civil Service Agency implemented a policy that ghost workers removed from the regular payroll could be replaced but that ghost workers removed from the supplementary payroll had to be deleted. The ministry still needs to analyze how many supplementary deletions occurred so that they can reallocate those funds to hire new teachers to the regular payroll. They estimate that for every two to four supplementary ghost workers deleted they can hire one new teacher on the regular payroll, and ultimately they aim to use the data to migrate all qualified supplementary teachers to the regular payroll.

Reflections: Blinded by the urgency of the moment

Based on conversations with a number of key stakeholders with various levels of involvement in the teacher vetting and testing project, some key reflections on political risk, funding relationships, and transformational leadership emerged.

Looking back as Werner reflects on his feelings at the conclusion of his listening tour, he says, “I was blinded by the urgency of the moment. What I saw in the field pains me and blinded me to the degree that I really wanted to solve problems in the here and now.” Perhaps this naiveté was a blessing as the political risk associated with undertaking the project was much higher than the technical risk. Jamie Cooper, President and Chair of Big Win Philanthropy, comments that “George may not have appreciated the potential political risk…but the upside of that is that he was focused on changing the system and not about protecting himself.” She also notes that Werner’s relationship with President Sirleaf and his efforts to nurture it were critical to her willingness to provide political cover when needed.

The funding relationship upon which this project was built is particularly unique. Toby Eccles, Cofounder and Development Director of Social Finance, reflects that, “In a place with as few resources as Liberia, room to use imagination is extremely limited because there are only incremental changes you can make to the budget.” However, distrust of government, especially those with a history of corruption, is a common sentiment in the international philanthropic space. While the story of Liberia’s project may be appealing to other countries, a key challenge to replicating this experience within a ministry is identifying funders who are willing to give funds directly to government. One of Werner’s clear successes was his ability to attract and develop a relationship with a funder that was open to such an arrangement. While a series of fortunate events led to their meeting, Werner’s plan to campaign externally for funding; President Sirleaf’s willingness to commit in writing to reinvesting funds; and the amenability of both the Liberian government and the Big Win Philanthropy team to negotiate terms of a target-based, incremental funding deal with a third-party auditor in place are all intentional factors that contributed to this unique funding arrangement. Government efforts to recreate some of these elements may be a foundational step to generating trust and allowing such funding relationships to occur more commonly in other settings.

One critical element associated with the aforementioned funding relationship that may not be as easily replicable is the need for a transformational leader. When asked about what attracted her to Werner’s mission, Cooper immediately noted his earnest commitment. She said, “What’s more unique about George than almost any minister I’ve met is his ability to think outside the box, to try something that is really different but can have a tremendous upside.” While his leadership and public speaking skills are well admired, Werner admits that he didn’t prioritize communication domestically as much as he could have. In hindsight he would have had a better communications architecture in place and made use of ‘palava,’ traditional Liberian peace huts, to increase communication with teachers, settle disputes, and promote inclusiveness. Despite the successes, the opportunities for improvement, and the work ahead, Cooper’s final reflection on Werner is that “he resonates with integrity” – and that basic quality may be the key to why the teacher vetting and testing project worked.

Appendix A: Detailed Implementation

The following sections outlining the specific implementation steps of the teacher vetting and testing project were obtained from “Managing the Business of Education: Liberia Cleans up its Teacher Payroll, 2015-2017,” an in-depth case study by Princeton University’s Innovations for Successful Societies.7

Winning Support

The implementation team’s first challenge was to work with Gbovadeh Gbilia, Deputy Minister of Education, to secure buy-in from two crucial stakeholders: the Civil Service Agency and the National Teachers’ Association. A lack of coordination between the education ministry and Civil Service Agency was a longstanding problem, and Werner hoped his past role as head of the agency would pave the way for better collaboration.

The Civil Service Agency initially did not see the vetting project as part of its responsibility, arguing that it was up to individual ministries to ensure that personnel listings were accurate. However, because the agency had to sign off on any changes to the listing, the education ministry felt it was vital for agency officials to see the vetting process was legitimate. “In response to the initial lack of cooperation, Werner’s ministry elevated [its lobbying efforts] to another level by going directly to the finance ministry,” said David Baysah, a sociologist and education planning strategist hired to lead the vetting project’s implementation unit.

By explaining that the vetting and testing exercise could save up to US$7.5 million per year—reducing the annual amount spent by the education ministry on salaries from US$34 million to US$26.5 million—the project team secured support from the finance ministry. The team also relayed to the agency and the finance ministry that President Sirleaf had agreed up front that the funds recovered would be earmarked for reinvestment in education, and would not be put into the government’s general coffers.

Convinced by the outreach effort, officials from the Civil Service Agency agreed to have their officials accompany the vetting team as they traveled around the country. The ministry also agreed to pay additional per diems to enable staff from the Civil Service Agency who became part of the team that traveled throughout the country.

In another step to address the disjuncture between the Civil Service Agency and other government departments, the finance minister worked with the agency to introduce a policy amendment in the cabinet. Whereas the agency previously had overarching responsibility for—and substantial control over—ministry payrolls, there was now “a policy, endorsed by the cabinet, that ministries will handle their own payroll and be held accountable for it,” Baysah said. In addition to smoothing the path for the project’s implementation, the finance ministry’s creation of the draft policy promised to give greater power to individual ministries to maintain their own payrolls.

Next, the education ministry turned to the teachers’ association. In negotiations with Werner and senior officials, the association’s main concerns were that no teacher should be fired summarily based on the outcome of the competency testing, that those who failed but held at least a high school qualification should receive training, and that the government should pay adequate severance to any teachers who lost their jobs because they were determined to be “untrainable” for various reasons.

The ministry used an existing forum to open a dialogue with the teachers. Under the teacher training program that ended in 2015, the ministry had established a committee that brought together the teachers’ association, senior education officials, donor partners, and nongovernmental organizations as well as civil society groups. In response to resistance that had emerged among some teachers during the USAID pilot, the ministry framed the new project as one that would remove cheaters and improve payroll management, leading to better salaries. The team presented its plan to the committee in the hope of winning the association’s support.

Despite initial resistance, the teachers’ association’s long-serving president, Ellen Varfley, ultimately agreed to the planned vetting and testing, and the ministry agreed to provide future training opportunities to all teachers deemed trainable, and severance packages to others. In addition to being the teachers’ association president, Varfley also worked in the ministry’s teacher-training division, a position that allowed her to be involved in drafting the test.

In championing the project, Varfley said she hoped that the competency testing in particular would lead to further gains. “After doing the test, we would know if people need content or pedagogical training, which would allow us to design better training” plans, she said. “… We knew that one size does not fit all. Teachers would [ultimately] benefit by receiving better training.”

Managing Data

Before the team could begin collecting data, they needed a way to manage it. They decided to use a common software product, Microsoft Access, to create a database of information that would allow users to see the big picture as well as to focus on specific schools, districts, and counties. Data would enter the system both electronically and manually. After a teacher’s fingerprints were digitally scanned, a computer would generate a unique enrollment number. Using the same number, the team would manually upload information—including digital copies of the teacher’s qualification documents, photo, and ID materials—to the corresponding file in a database, which the team named the Payroll Data Access Tracking System.

When all the information on any particular person was in the system, “you can see the person’s face as well as all their bio data, their current status, their salary history, their health information and also all their academic credentials,” Baysah said. “It’s a one-stop shop.” The cost of setting up the system was minimal because the human resource team was able to use the ministry’s existing computer systems and worked with the ministry’s in-house IT specialist to design the platform.

Once completed, the database was a valuable management tool. In addition to forming the backbone of an integrated future payroll system, the ministry could use it for professional development and to track replacements and transfers between schools. Further, the ministry could use the database to predict how many teachers were set to retire in coming years, enabling the ministry to anticipate future costs and recruitment needs.

Gbilia’s team recognized that keeping the database up to date was crucial to its long-term effectiveness. After completion of the countrywide vetting and testing, education officers in each of the 15 counties would gain access to the database. The plan required the education officers to update the system whenever a teacher was hired, transferred, or otherwise changed status in their region. The national human resources department in Monrovia would then audit the central database every calendar quarter. The ministry’s hope was that, over time, the Access Tracking System managed by Gbilia “would not just be a data management system but also a planning system,” Baysah said.

Getting the Word Out

The team’s next task was to inform teachers about the planned project. In a nation where roads were poor and comparatively few people, particularly in isolated or densely forested rural areas, had access to television and less than half the population had cell phones,8 radio was the go-to communications medium. Aware of the need to assuage potential fears among teachers and to inform parents and the general public, the education ministry produced a series of radio spots that played on some of the more than 60 FM radio stations across the country. (Radio jingles and other productions were often used as tools to make public service announcements in Liberia). The education ministry’s radio spots aimed to head off any knee-jerk opposition among teachers by emphasizing that the vetting and testing would not lead to any arbitrary firings. At the same time, the messages reached the wider community, potentially galvanizing public support.

Prior to kicking off the vetting process in any specific county, the field team also distributed flyers at schools and engaged with community leaders and county authorities during town hall meetings. Their aim was not only to encourage public and parental support for the vetting project but to help teachers understand that they ultimately stood to benefit because the cleanup would free up more money for salaries.

“The communication was very clear that the process will lead to results and consequences: At the end of this process, teachers will have better salaries and access to training opportunities. But also, those that cannot be trained will be removed from the system,” Baysah said. “But no one will be just kicked out. … There will be severance packages.”

Public sentiment was on the side of the project team. Many parents were deeply concerned about the quality of education. Afrobarometer research network survey showed that half of all respondents felt the Liberian government handled education “very badly” or “fairly badly.”9 “When the teachers heard [the president saying that] if you want to boycott the vetting exercise or test you will be removed, protests stopped immediately,” Gbilia recalled.

The team also worked closely with local district education officers and their county-level supervisors. The local officers, who were well known in their communities, provided additional information to teachers in other areas of their counties. Before they traveled, the project unit and local education officers jointly decided on a feasible schedule and locations across a county (usually in public spaces like schools or town halls) to conduct the vetting and testing.

Vetting and Testing

Teachers from each school received assignments telling them when and where their vetting and testing would take place. While teachers were responsible for their own travel expenses, the ministry paid accommodation and food costs, as needed. The project team divided the teachers—usually about 150—into two groups. One group took the competency test in the morning, while the other group went through the vetting process. In the afternoon, the tasks were reversed. Baysah pointed out that bona fide teachers who happened to be sick on their assigned days were “provided a window for them to come to one of the other vetting venues in the county, or they would have to travel to Monrovia.”

On the assigned day, the vetting process began when school principals submitted personnel lists to the project team. The team then compared each principal’s list to lists submitted separately by district and county education officers, who monitored all schools in their areas. If principals and local officials could not explain why a name appeared on one list and not on the other, the name moved to the “ghost worker” category. This step would enable the ministry, working with the Civil Service Agency, “to get rid of some ghosts,” Baysah said. “It was the first filter.”

The competency test, designed by the education ministry’s teacher training division, contained two papers, one on mathematics and the other on English. Both tests included questions on teaching methods. The test incorporated a combination of different types of questions, including multiple choice, short one-paragraph answers, as well as one longer essay or sample lesson plan based on a prompt. Kammi Sheeler, an economist from the Overseas Development Institute (an independent London-based think tank) who worked with the education ministry on data management, noted that the ministry eventually created four different versions of the test in order to prevent cheating.

While the tests were mandatory only for salaried teachers, the ministry encouraged volunteer teachers to participate. The ministry recommended that volunteers who did well on the test but lacked formal qualifications should attend a teacher training institute and then apply for formal positions. Volunteers who scored well and held teaching qualifications would be in line to replace ghost workers on the payroll. After teachers completed the tests, the team sent the papers to Monrovia, where 25 staff members from Varfley’s teacher training division graded them. The team then uploaded the results to the digital Access Tracking System.

During the vetting part of the day, teachers formed lines behind their principals (all principals and vice principals also had their identities and qualifications reviewed as part of the project). Teachers submitted their credentials to the vetting team, including their national identity cards as well as any documents proving high school and other educational qualifications. Because some Liberians, especially in rural areas, did not have national ID documents, the vetting team also accepted voting ID cards, birth certificates, passports or driver’s licenses. “Almost everyone had at least a voting ID card, but we accepted any of these documents,” explained field supervisor Veekie Wilson.

It was particularly important to confirm dates of birth and the exact spellings of names in order to stop the practice where some teachers received salaries made out in someone else’s name. If the team identified a fake document, they seized the document, and placed the offending teacher’s name on the same list as personnel who did not show up for the vetting process. Just as was the case for teachers who missed the exercise, those who submitted fake documents were given up to two months to provide the proper documentation before their names were submitted to the Civil Service Agency for removal from the payroll.

Similarly, when the team identified a ghost worker, they submitted the name to the Civil Service Agency for removal from the payroll. The agency then sent a letter to the school where the person supposedly worked, calling on the teacher to present his or her credentials to the national education ministry. If the person in question failed to do so during a specified period, the name was removed from the payroll.

The team also regularly encountered qualified teachers who were older than the mandatory retirement age of 65. In some counties, over 10% of the teachers were eligible for pension. When a teacher was older than 65, the team issued the teacher a pensioner’s ID card from the Civil Service Agency, and the Agency official that accompanied the field team recorded that the teacher was eligible for pension. But due to a lack of funding, it often took the Civil Service Agency a long time to issue pensions and remove pensionable teachers from the payroll. In the meantime, many kept teaching to continue earning an income. (The government calculated pension benefits based on length of tenure. For example, a 65-year-old teacher with 30 years of service and a monthly salary of US$100 would get a monthly pension of about US$60).10

Project staff next made copies of all supporting documents and uploaded digital scans to the Access Tracking System. At the end of the process, teachers who submitted all of the required documents had their fingerprints scanned and were issued special biometric ID cards. (The cards were issued only to qualified teachers who also took the competency test.)

The process was not foolproof. Despite the team’s efforts to work with district and county education officers, local officials still might collude with school principals to get ghost names added to the payroll. For example, if a district and county officer, as well as a local principal, agreed to add a person’s name to their personnel listing, that person could theoretically show up and undergo vetting and testing. In an effort to curb fraud, the team carried out follow-up spot checks a few weeks after completing the vetting process, in order to identify any ghost workers who slipped through the net.

In addition, the biometric system fell short of expectations. The USAID pilot had planned to install biometric card readers at all public schools. Teachers who had been vetted could then use their biometric cards to clock in and out of work every day, reducing the opportunities available for ghosts, tracking absenteeism, and generating useful data. When the project team took over, they found that about 400 card scanners had already been purchased by the education ministry as part of the Liberia Teacher Training Program. “But we have around 3,000 public schools, so that was not enough. Many of the machines were already quite old, so we didn’t know how many still worked,” Baysah said. Another problem was that “every year you would have to pay a license fee of US$20,000 to continue using the software, but that did not include maintenance costs.”

The field team also experienced problems with the machines used to capture biometric IDs, which meant that some fingerprints were not recorded. The project team also decided not to install the 400 scanners. For those teachers who did receive IDs, the cards were still useful in proving their identities. But the money spent on the scanners was effectively wasted, and the technical problems with some data-capturing machines meant that not all teachers had their biometric information captured.

Refrences

  1. David Smith, “All 25,000 candidates fail the Liberian university entrance exam,” The Guardian, August 27, 2013; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/27/all-candidates-fail-liberia-university-test
  2. Ministry of Education, Liberia education statistics report 2015-16; http://moe.gov.lr/documents/
  3. United Nations Development Program, Human Development Data: Education Index (2015 ranking); http://hdr.undp.org/en/data
  4. Ministry of Education and UNESCO, Assessment of teacher education and development needs to ensure education for all, June 12, 2014; http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0023/002330/233080E.pdf
  5. Leon Schreiber, Blaykyi Kenyah, “Managing the business of education: Liberia cleans up its teacher payroll, 2015-2017,” 2018, Innovations for Successful Societies, Princeton University; https://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/sites/successfulsocieties/files/LS_Liberia_Payroll_FORMATTED_27_Feb_18_LS-2%20TDedit2Apr17.pdf
  6. Ministry of Education, Liberia Education Sector Analysis, November 2016.
  7. Leon Schreiber, Blaykyi Kenyah, “Managing the business of education: Liberia cleans up its teacher payroll, 2015-2017,” 2018, Innovations for Successful Societies, Princeton University; https://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/sites/successfulsocieties/files/LS_Liberia_Payroll_FORMATTED_27_Feb_18_LS-2%20TDedit2Apr17.pdf
  8. The Mobile Economy 2014, GSMA Intelligence; http://www.gsmamobileeconomyafrica.com/GSMA_ME_SubSaharanAfrica_Web_Singles.pdf
  9. Afrobarometer, Handling addressing educational needs, Round 6 2014/2015; http://afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis/analyse-online
  10. Civil Service Agency, Guide to Civil Servants’ Pension, October 2013; http://csa.gov.lr/public/doc/Pension%20Brochure_CSA_Oct3.pdf

Executive Summary

High-quality delivery systems are effective at achieving outcomes, efficient at utilizing resources, equitable at providing services, and resilient in the face of challenges.

A high-quality health system should support the physical, mental, and social wellbeing of the people it serves and a high-quality education system should help students reach their full potential as productive members of society. The likelihood of achieving improvements in the health, education, and economic development of a population hinges on the quality of the underlying and interrelated health and education delivery systems.

This policy brief provides an overview of three key areas in health and education: human resource motivation and performance; procurement, supply delivery and management; and data for decision-making. It reviews challenges and potential policy options to guide quality improvement efforts in those areas. A summary table is included in Annex 1.

Human resource motivation and performance are fundamental to equitable service provision and effective achievement of health and education outcomes. Key challenges include absenteeism; professional attrition (either to urban areas or high-income countries); and low technical competence. Root causes of these challenges include inadequate professional training; stressful working conditions; scarcity of essential supplies and materials; heavy and increasing workloads; low and unreliable remuneration; and lack of opportunities for growth and professional development.

Policy options to tackle these challenges could include reforming remuneration schemes to create a stronger link between payment and performance indicators. Changes could also be made to the recruitment and deployment strategies for health and education workforces, including setting higher admissions standards into the profession, diversifying the workforce and putting in place measures to attract and retain staff in underserved areas. Policies could also include enhanced professional development programs, either in-service or using technology to facilitate remote learning and supervision. Finally, technology could also be integrated into monitoring and service delivery systems to make them more accountable and responsive.

Procurement, supply delivery, and management systems critically affect efficient resource utilization and effective achievement of health and education outcomes. In education, the provision of textbooks is a challenging area for supply chain and procurement, but one which yields excellent returns on investment. Across both the health and education sectors, weaknesses in national procurement and supply chain systems are leading to stockouts and waste of essential supplies, inflated prices, and poor quality of products (including counterfeit or ineffective medicines). The causes of these issues range from high production and import costs, difficulties with making accurate forecasting and requisition estimates, inadequate storage and transportation conditions (which can lead to theft or damage), as well as diffused responsibility in the underlying accountability structure and unpredictable financing.

Effective policies to strengthen these systems should be carefully adapted to the local context and capacity but could include seeking procurement agreements with national or regional producers, the private sector, or through a pooled funding arrangement. Policies could also aim to centralize procurement or streamline the distribution of essential goods, while also potentially reducing the number of wholesalers and intermediaries to drive down costs. Distribution processes could be improved through investments in strengthening the stock-management and requisition systems at local levels (potentially enabled by technology), shortening the lag between replenishment cycles, and integrating systems for improved product traceability and efficient transportation. Finally, focusing on developing and retaining a qualified procurement and supply chain workforce is an important area to consider.

Data-driven decision making is a fundamental delivery tool that impacts the equity, efficiency, resilience, and effectiveness of a delivery system. The availability of quality data is often inadequate in many low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) as well as underutilized when available. Data from health and education systems are often managed in a fragmented system with little capacity for rapid and digestible analysis and dissemination. At the root of this situation is a history of underfunding national statistics offices, an over-emphasis on donor-driven aggregated surveys for cross-national comparisons over disaggregated and actionable national-level data, as well as weak demand for data from users (from government decision makers to citizens).

To enact the “data revolution” called for by the UN, initiatives should be put into place to improve the quality of data, through financing more robust national statistical offices, performing enhanced data audits and better aligning donor and local data streams. The key indicators for each sector should be chosen to reflect the desired outcomes (quality) and not just quantity and should include regularly administered internationally recognized standard measures. Policies should also be enacted to create a culture of “demand for data” at every level, as well as working with data producers to create user-friendly products that meet the needs and are easily actionable for decision makers.

Introduction

There has been increased attention in recent years on moving beyond accessing services to focusing on the quality of service delivery across health and education. High-quality delivery systems are effective at achieving outcomes, efficient at utilizing resources, equitable at providing services, and resilient in the face of challenges. Thus, a high-quality health system should support physical, mental, and social wellbeing of the people it serves and a high-quality education system should help students reach their full potential as productive members of society. The likelihood of achieving improvements in the health, education, and economic development of a population hinges on the quality of the underlying and interrelated health and education delivery systems.

Strategies to improve quality must include policies to improve resource utilization and service delivery in three key areas: human resource motivation and performance; procurement, supply delivery and management; and data for decision-making. This brief will seek to provide context, as well as possible policy options and combinations, to guide quality improvement efforts.

Quality in health systems

A recent Lancet Global Health Commission on High Quality Health Systems in the SDG Era1 has called for “a revolution” in health care quality. Despite gains in health outcomes globally, the commission points to the often poor quality of care provided across LMIC, which leads to nearly eight million avoidable deaths each year. As countries strive to provide universal health coverage (UHC), an integral part of achieving SDG 3 “Good health and well-being,”2 they must also make improving quality a core component of these efforts, together with expanded coverage and financial protection. The Commission’s report includes among the foundational elements of high-quality health systems: workforce numbers and skills, tools and resources from drugs to data, as well as the capacity to analyze and learn from data.1

Quality in education

Since 2000, there has been enormous progress around the world toward achieving Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 2: universal primary education. Total enrollment rates reached 91% in 2015 in developing regions, and the number of children out of school was halved.3 However, these efforts have often eclipsed concerns around the quality of education, a concept which encompasses the learners’ cognitive development and the “promotion of values and attitudes of responsible citizenship and in nurturing creative and emotional development.”4 The 2018 World Development Report has called the current situation a “learning crisis,” with hundreds of millions of children worldwide failing to learn basic arithmetic and reading skills. To address this, SDG 4 is concerned explicitly with “quality education.”

Within UNESCO’s framework for understanding education quality,4 “enabling inputs for quality education” include teaching and learning materials, physical infrastructure and facilities, human resources (teachers, principals, inspectors, supervisors, and administrators), as well as school governance.

Human Resource Motivation and Performance Overview

Worker performance is highly linked to worker motivation due to the labor-intensive and interpersonal nature of the services being provided. The performance of health professionals (though relevant to education professionals as well) has been defined as being available – retained and present – competent, productive, and responsive.5 A WHO framework for health worker performance and its link to motivation is in Annex 2.

Motivation has been defined as “an individual’s degree of willingness to exert and maintain an effort towards organizational goals.”6 This definition also frames motivation as being composed of two components: “the extent to which workers adopt organizational goals (‘will do’) and the extent to which workers effectively mobilize their personal resources to achieve joint goals (‘can do’).”

Herzberg7 provides a theoretical foundation for the determinants of motivation that is grounded in two types of factors:

Dissatisfaction avoidance or hygiene factors Growth or motivator factors
  • Organizational policy and administration
  • Supervision
  • Interpersonal relationships
  • Salary
  • Status
  • Job security
  • Working conditions
  • The work itself
  • Achievement
  • Recognition
  • Responsibility
  • Growth or advancement

While financial incentive levels and schemes may be important determinants of worker motivation, they alone have been found to be insufficient to keep health professionals motivated. A motivated worker must also have the right competencies, work environment, and resources to be high performing.5

Challenges in Human Resource Motivation and Performance

The challenges relating to human resource motivation and performance in health and education systems are considerable.

  • Absenteeism: Many countries have epidemic levels of teacher and health worker absenteeism, particularly in rural and remote areas. A study in six developing countries found an average of 19% of teachers and 35% of health workers were absent during regular working hours.8 In India, more than 23% of teachers were absent during unannounced school visits, which was associated with an annual cost of $1.5 billion for services that were not delivered.9
  • Professional attrition and “brain drain”: Teacher attrition rates in sub-Saharan Africa are variable but high—between 5-30%,10 and yet demand for teachers in low-resource countries is expected to grow dramatically in the years ahead, nearly doubling by 2030.11 Similarly, for health professionals in LMICs, migration to urban areas or higher-resource countries is mostly unplanned, leading to a “brain drain” of talented professionals and exacerbating shortages in resources in health. Despite efforts by the WHO to curb this trend, physician density is still declining in the majority of African countries and physician migration is on the rise.12
  • Low technical competences in teaching and care: A study of nine sub-Saharan African countries using Service Delivery Indicators (SDI) found very weak rates of adherence to clinical guidelines. Less than a third of providers adhered to guidelines for neonatal and maternal health complications, and 35.9% adhered to guidelines for diarrhea, pneumonia, and malaria, with a diagnostic accuracy for these conditions of only 50%. Similarly poor guideline adherence was found in studies in health centers in India.13 Concerns also exist with the quality of teaching. The Learning Barometer survey of student performance, carried out in 28 African countries with primary school-age learners (Grades 4 and 5), identifies the proportion of children who meet a minimum learning threshold. It found that over a third of students—23 million children—fell below the minimum learning threshold, meaning most will be “unable to read or write with any fluency, or to successfully complete basic numeracy tasks.”14

Root Causes of These Challenges

Several of the root causes of the aforementioned challenges are described below.

  • Inadequate initial professional training: Many teachers graduate from their training lacking information on what their pupils are supposed to learn and basic teaching and curricular management skills.14 Training programs for health care professions also suffer from chronic under-investment.15 A survey of medical schools across Africa found “ubiquitous faculty shortages in basic and clinical sciences, weak physical infrastructure, and little use of external accreditation.”16
  • Difficult working conditions, including insufficient physical and supportive infrastructure: Schools and health centers, particularly in rural areas, can lack the very basics such as running water, consistent electricity, and adequate sanitation facilities.17,18 Access to decent housing and family-centered services (schools, daycare) outside of urban areas is also a major challenge for many professionals in education19 and health,20 particularly for women.
  • Lack of work materials and essential supplies: (discussed in the following section)
  • Increasing workloads: Pupil to Teacher Ratios (PTR) have increased dramatically following the roll-out of Universal Primary Education policies. This has meant overcrowded classrooms, more teaching periods, and more non-teaching activities.17 The global needs-based shortage of health-care workers is projected to be 14 million by 2010. When taking into account population size, the most severe challenges are in sub-Saharan Africa, where ratios of health professionals to patients are predicted to worsen between 2013 and 2030.15
  • Low and unreliable remuneration: In many countries, teachers and health care providers do not earn enough to live above the poverty line, requiring many to turn to other part-time work to supplement their income.5,19 They may also experience delays in receiving their salary and be required to travel long distances to receive it.17
  • Lack of constructive supervision, professional recognition or professional development opportunities: Education systems in many countries report having infrequent or ineffective supervisory visits. Teachers also generally receive very little feedback, support, or advice from more senior teachers or school administrators on how to improve.14 Similarly, health professionals have often limited access to professional development opportunities, which tend to be unevenly distributed despite high demand.17

Policy Options to Improve the Motivation and Performance of Human Resources

Below is an overview of policy options that could be considered to improve the motivation and performance of health and education professionals.

It must be noted that worker motivation is sensitive to system-wide or facility reform processes which can affect organizational dynamics, reporting, accountability and incentive structures. These changes may elicit a range of responses from professionals as they often require the development of new workforce capabilities and can affect different health system cadres differently.6 The involvement of health workers in the design and implementation of reforms has been found to be an effective way to manage these concerns.5

Policies to improve motivation and performance can be undertaken at the macro-system level or at the micro-facility level and can be designed to address performance issues by tackling “can do” or the “will do” gaps. They can also address the living conditions of health workers in ways that are adapted to the context, including rural location, age and gender considerations.5

Option 1. Changes to Payment and Reward Systems

Creating stronger linkages between payment and performance indicators can be an important way to improve the quality of professional work. The implementation of reforms to payment schemes requires careful consideration of bureaucratic and political economy considerations, such as resistance from unions, and the required data collection infrastructure.21

  • Health worker performance-based financing (PBF or P4P) schemes: PBF is a contracting mechanism designed to increase the performance and quality of service providers by offering financial incentives to health facilities for the provision of a defined set of services, with adjustments based on measures of quality. These vary considerably in their format (payment structure, target services, etc.) and effect on employee performance and health outcomes.22 In the past decades, PBF schemes have generated substantial interest among policy-makers, donors and international organizations; as of 2015 a dedicated trust fund at the World Bank alone supported 36 PBF programs.23 Conditional cash transfers, modified by quality measurements, were found to be particularly effective in Rwanda – where P4P was found to have a positive effect on health care utilization, quality of care and outcomes, as well as on lowering worker absenteeism.24-27
  • Teacher performance pay schemes: Numerous schemes exist to reward teachers based on specific measures of performance and outputs. Studies in Tanzania, India and China generally found these approaches to be effective when combined with providing resources such as unconditional grants or textbooks.25,28,29 However, several other evaluations showed either no or marginally positive gains from such measures, especially for low-performing schools. It was also found that rewards may have detrimental effects, such as diminishing peer collaboration, narrowing the curriculum, and over-emphasis of teaching to the test. Generally, these schemes remain relatively rare at scale – a review found that only 17 of 101 education systems used test scores to formally sanction or reward schools or educators.30

    • Benchmarking: Payments are based on the number of students that reach specific proficiency levels. This was found to be easier to communicate and implement,31 but difficult to sustain.32
    • Pay for Percentile: Payments are based on students’ test scores relative to other students at the same starting level or similar students in other schools. This is harder to implement but incentivizes teachers to improve learning across the entire student distribution.33
    • Special awards for teaching quality: Particularly when recognizing collaborative work among teachers, as research has found that monetary incentives are more effective when awarded to teaching teams compared to individual teachers.34

Option 2. Changes to Recruitment and Deployment

Macro-level policies can aim to improve education and health workforces by targeting who is recruited into key professions, how they are trained, and where they are deployed to work.

  • Higher standards for recruitment: Setting higher minimum qualifications to enter the teaching or nursing profession, such as an undergraduate degree, could be an effective way to improve the status of the profession as well as to attract high-performing individuals. A merit-based appointment system, such as one implemented in Pakistan for teacher recruitment, included a test administered by a third-party National Testing Service to protect the system from political influence.35
  • Measures to attract and retain professionals in understaffed rural areas: Several initiatives have been found to be effective for health care workers, including providing preferential admissions to students from rural areas, designing a “rurally oriented curricula” with a focus on rural health issues, imposing compulsory training rotations in rural settings, as well as providing scholarships, financial incentives, professional advancement, support networks, and help with setting up medical practices in rural areas.20 In education, other non-monetary incentives have been used, such as offering bicycles, housing, and preferential access to resources and training. “In the short term, the provision of good quality housing with running water and electricity for teachers is probably the most cost-effective way of attracting and retaining teachers at hard-to-staff rural schools.”19
  • Diversification of the health and education workforce: To minimize the time spent by teachers on non-teaching activities, it is possible to include pedagogic assistants, health practitioners, and administrative support.11 Similarly in health care, shifting tasks between health care workers (“task sharing”) and expanding the clinical team, particularly to include community health workers, can relieve short-term human resource limitations.18

Option 3. Enhanced Professional Development Programs

Opportunities to improve existing or develop new technical skills are often a major source of motivation for professionals in health and education, and they also directly address the “can do” gap that inhibits performance.

  • In-service or facility-based skills-development programs: Training is best when done close to practice where learners can immediately apply concepts and receive feedback. Meta-analyses show that successful in-service teacher training, coupled with ongoing monitoring, mentoring, and coaching, is a proven way to improve primary school teachers’ instructional practice in LMICs.36,37 Such approaches are generally more expensive but preferable to external continuing education programs or training-of-trainers cascade models, which have the disadvantage of being expended on a small minority of professionals who are withdrawn from their work.38
  • Training and skills-building programs specific to management professionals: In addition to frontline workers, initiatives to develop the skills of managers are an important part of improving overall system quality. Health facility management training and supervision were found to be effective at improving organizational practices and health outcomes but needed to be ongoing.39 Training programs for headmasters in school management and leadership were also found to be effective across 13 countries at improving teacher motivation and performance.19,34
  • Technology-enabled training and support: Some initiatives, such as technology-assisted professional development and text-message support, have been used to effectively reach teachers in remote areas.40,41

Option 4. Integration of Technology into the Classroom or the Clinic

Technological innovations, from apps to integrated teaching and learning systems, are multiplying in health and education spaces. These present great opportunities for improved performance, but also require significant investments and infrastructure. Across many developing countries, the rate of internet connectivity in schools is less than 10%. There is some concern that uneven access to these resources could exacerbate existing learning inequalities between rural/urban or affluent/resource-constrained areas.11 Nevertheless, technological innovations have been deployed to achieve a number of goals.

  • “Blended-learning classrooms”: This format combines learning using technology with face-to-face teaching and was found to be effective in several case studies.41
  • Technology for improved attendance monitoring: Different approaches have been tried to reduce absenteeism, including using sophisticated surveillance technology or simple mobile phone text systems. Biometric attendance monitors in primary health centers or cameras in schools in India were only found to be effective when attendance was linked to rewards or penalties and there was sufficient buy-in from the stakeholders involved in these processes.42 Other simple phone-based platforms to send daily data on teacher attendance were found to be effective in the Gambia and Zimbabwe.43

Procurement, Supply Delivery and Management Overview

Functioning procurement, supply delivery, and management systems are essential for quality health and education service delivery. A supply chain encompasses an “ecosystem of interlinked organizations, people, technology, activities, information, and resources” that is required to get products from manufacturers to users in the most cost-effective way possible. This includes inventory management, storage, distribution, and inventory control, and requires a large, competent, and properly trained workforce. Supply chains do more than simply delivering products, they also produce critical information related to the need, demand, and consumption to national and regional level planners.44

Procurement and Supply Chains in Health

The structure of supply chains for health varies greatly depending on national health system characteristics, such as the different sources of financing, risk pooling and purchasing, as well as national pharmaceutical regulations and treatment-seeking behaviors of patients. Supply chains play a role in many dimensions of health system performance: payment, organization, regulation, and also behavioral aspects of the health system.44 In the coming decades, as many global health initiatives such as GAVI, the Global Fund, and PEPFAR roll back their support, many LMICs will need to play a larger role in the procurement of health products.45

Procurement and Supply Chains in Education

Access to appropriate learning materials is listed as a key strategy for achieving SDG4 – particularly the dimension related to providing inclusive and effective learning environments for all.3 Textbooks are a particularly important input for improving learning outcomes in contexts with large class sizes, under-qualified teachers, and shortened instructional time. They have been found to be, when they are in the appropriate language and level of difficulty, a particularly cost-effective input with high returns in student achievement.30 A multi-country study of 22 sub-Saharan African countries found that providing one textbook to every student in a classroom increased literacy scores by 5–20%.46

Challenges in Procurement, Supply Delivery and Management

Supply chains can significantly affect the availability, price, and quality of strategic inputs. However, many national procurement and supply chain systems remain ineffective and poorly managed.

  • Lack of availability of working materials and supplies: Key health system inputs, such as medicines, are not consistently available in many low-resource settings. According to an analysis of WHO data, the average availability of generic medicines in the public sector ranges between 29% to 54% across WHO regions.47 Interruptions in the access of medications are an important threat to public health, as they interfere with treatment initiation or continuity and increase the likelihood of ill health and antimicrobial resistance.45 Similarly, the procurement and supply of essential learning materials, particularly quality textbooks, remains a challenge in many LMICs. Between 2000 and 2007, rapid enrollment increases were experienced across several LMICs; however, textbook availability could not keep up. For example, in Malawi, “the percentage of students who either had no textbook or had to share with at least two other pupils increased from 28% in 2000 to 63% in 2007.”46 Gaps in essential school supplies are even more pronounced in rural or underserved areas.
  • Inflated prices: Across LMICs, the prices of many vital inputs for health and education systems can be variable and disproportionately high. According to an analysis of WHO data, median government procurement prices for 15 generic medicines are 1-11 times international reference prices, and procurement prices that were low did not always translate to lower patient prices. This created a situation in which “treatments for acute and chronic illness were largely unaffordable in many countries.”47 The cost of textbooks varies greatly by country and region. In sub-Saharan Africa, the unit cost of a primary school textbook is between US$2 and US$4 compared to Vietnam, which produces books domestically, where the cost is between US$0.33 and US$0.66.46
  • Poor quality of products delivered to end-users: Dysfunctional health product procurement and supply chain systems are associated with an increased risk of substandard quality or counterfeit drugs, which can lead to poisoning, ineffective treatments, and anti-microbial resistance.48 It is estimated that 1 in 10 medical products in low- and middle-income countries is substandard or falsified.45 In education, some national regulatory bodies lack a reliable process to evaluate the quality of textbooks, resulting in the use of substandard materials and production and errors in the content.49 The provision of quality textbooks in the correct language should be prioritized in early grades as this is when they have the largest impact on learning. However, in Chad, a 2010 survey found that only 20% of students had a textbook in the correct language of instruction (French) in grade two, and 40% of students in grade five.46

Root Causes of These Challenges

Weaknesses in national supply chain and procurement systems in health and education have several root causes.

  • High production and import costs: The reasons for variations in the cost of textbooks across country and region include “fluctuating prices for raw materials, manufacturing, procurement, publishing overheads, distribution and storage, importation, and shipping.”46 In the health systems of many countries, depending on the size of the market and regulatory environment, importers and wholesalers of health products are numerous and fragmented, which significantly drives up prices. For example, there are 292 licensed medicine importers in Nigeria and 166 national wholesalers in Ghana.44
  • Inability to correctly predict needs: The capacity to effectively forecast procurement or requisition materials is often deficient, particularly at decentralized levels. Accurate data estimating needs and consumption rates are fundamental to the effective management of procurement and distribution processes, and yet they are often unavailable or unreliable, resulting in stock-outs or waste.44,46 In most national health systems in LMICs “there are no processes by which information about consumption is systematically captured” – with many systems relying instead on “ad hoc surveys.”44
  • Poor storage conditions and theft: Inappropriate distribution, storage, and usage conditions have been found in some cases to lead to an annual loss rate of 50% for textbooks. Moreover, poor security during transport and storage allows school supplies, particularly books, to be stolen and resold in the black market. A 2010 survey in Ghana found that 29% of English textbooks went missing during this process.46 Similarly, product diversion is a major driver of drug stock-outs in LMICs. The complexity of drug distribution systems can create many opportunities for diversion; in Kenya, for example, “medicines can change hands ‘five to seven times’ before reaching local clinics.”45
  • Inefficient transportation: The lack of a well-functioning and managed government transportation fleet is a major barrier to effective supply chains in health. Vehicles for medication distribution are often unavailable due to lack of appropriate planning, poor maintenance, and inappropriate use.44
  • Underlying weakness of the accountability structure: These weaknesses may be a result of fragmented responsibility and governance at different levels. Furthermore, the enforcement of supply chain and distribution regulations may be hampered by underfunding and limited human resource and organizational capacity, as well as inadequate supervision and corruption.44
  • Unpredictable financing: The predictability of financing for the procurement of textbooks is very important because their development, production, procurement, and distribution is a long process. However, this is the case in only a few LMICs.46 In health systems, delays in the disbursement of funds from national finance bodies or international donor agencies often result in disruptions that ripple down the supply chain.44

Policy Options for Improved Supply Chain and Procurement

There is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to improving the performance of procurement and supply chain systems. There are only a few well-designed randomized or quasi-randomized studies that demonstrate effective reforms to improve health system supply chain performance. The external validity of what evidence exists is reduced by the context-specific and complex features of national supply chain systems across countries.50 Nevertheless, some promising policy avenues exist and are described below.

Option 1. Procurement from Different Actors

Working with different actors for the procurement of key inputs in health and education systems may provide opportunities to improve the performance of procurement and supply chain systems. In health systems, however, the flexibility to work across different producers may be more limited.

  • Regional or national production: Depending on the context and the product being procured, these may provide cost savings compared to international producers in relation to competition, taxes, import duties, and transportation. In Viet Nam, for example, the unit price for books is much lower than in many sub-Saharan African countries because it prints books domestically and fosters competition among publishers to drive down prices.46
  • Procurement from the private sector: Turning to the private sector for textbook procurement is something some countries have done to try to drive down costs. For example, in 2002 Uganda began working with a private publisher through a competitive process and “saw the cost of textbooks fall by two-thirds and their quality increase.”46 However, other studies in Ghana, Tanzania, and Kenya suggest that there is little effect on the inefficiency, corruption, and lack of transparency from changing from state-controlled to private sector textbook provision.51
  • Pooled funding mechanisms for improved predictability: These kinds of systems could provide more and predictable funding for textbooks; however, the current pooled funding mechanism for education, the Global Partnership for Education (GPE), has not had the same success as pooled funds in other sectors, such as GAVI health, in attracting more and predictable funding.46

Option 2. Re-Design the Procurement and Supply Systems

There are several potential ways to restructure these processes to make the best possible use of limited resources.

  • Centralized procurement and tendering processes: This can help to create economies of scale and improved purchasing power. Such reforms were found to produce cost savings in a number of case studies from different regions, including the Middle East, Brazil, Mexico, and several countries in Asia and Africa.50
  • Streamlined tiers of the supply chain system: Some countries have sought to decentralize procurement and supply processes to lower levels of the system, to provide additional flexibility, autonomy, and speed for purchasing at local facilities. However, in some cases, this has led to worse outcomes.44 In contrast, a quasi-randomized study in Zambia resulted in large improvements in medical product availability by cutting out the regional distribution step. Multiple modeling studies have also confirmed the benefits of reducing tiers in the supply chains for vaccines and immunization supplies.52 The decentralization of the supply of textbooks has also had mixed success with some countries, like Uganda, preferring instead to centralize procurement to combat corruption and mismanagement at the school and district levels.30
  • Reduced number of wholesalers or middle-men: A smaller number of wholesalers is generally preferable for optimal supply chain performance, since fewer larger wholesalers gain economies of scale in their distribution efficiency and have improved access to capital for infrastructural investments. The creation and enforcement of regulations around quality standards and distribution practices can lead to the consolidation of smaller players, although the resistance from smaller actors who stand to lose from this type of reform may be prohibitive.44 The cost of distributing textbooks can contribute to high variations in price, as seen when comparing Kenya and Rwanda. Although both countries use a commercial distribution system to deliver books, the unit textbook cost in Kenya is nearly double that of Rwanda, partly because Kenya delivers books through a bookseller middleman rather than having publishers deliver directly to schools.46
  • Public-private partnerships: Several effective partnerships have been established, particularly those which involve the contracting of private operators for the last-mile delivery of products. Large multinational companies partnering to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of supply chains in LMICs include Coca-Cola and the UPS Foundation.49,53

Option 3. Improved Distribution Processes

At different points in the supply chain process, improvements can be made to improve forecasting capacity, replenishment systems, as well as product transportation and traceability.

  • Improved stock-management and procurement request practices: Simple technology and software can be used to track consumption and demand—to know when stocks are running short and to update them faster. If such systems are not able to be put in place, particularly in areas with poor technology infrastructure or IT connectivity to carry out stock requisitioning, it is possible to combine information collection with product distribution. Such systems were found to be effective in Zimbabwe and Mozambique.44
  • Reduced lead-times from suppliers and increased frequency of replenishment: Increasing replenishment frequency “increases the speed and velocity of the supply chain and decreases the reliance on long-term forecasts,” approaching actual levels of demand. However, this can lead to higher transport costs, and therefore statistical modeling should be used to determine the best balance between transport costs and benefits from forecast improvement.44
  • Digital technologies that help “track and trace” the movement of products: In addition to improved security throughout the storage and transportation process, unique serial numbers at the package level can be a good defense against theft during the distribution chain.48 “Track and trace initiatives allow actors on a supply chain to determine where a product is at any given time (tracking) and where it came from (tracing). The approach starts with the process of serialization, in which a manufacturer assigns a unique identifier to each product that it ships using a two-dimensional (2-D) barcode that other supply chain actors can scan to obtain information about the product and record when it changes hands.” This creates a digital trail of information linking each package along its path through the supply chain for increased accountability.45
  • New or outsourced delivery methods: “Depending on the geography, overall economic situation, maturity of the transport market and structuring of the price and service level contracts, a third-party logistics provider can offer better service at rates comparable to the fully loaded cost of owning and operating a government fleet.” In the case of Kenya, this approach helped to address problems with transport planning, vehicle maintenance, and inappropriate use.44 Leapfrogging using novel delivery technology is also possible, such as using drone delivery for emergency supplies or deliveries in hard-to-reach areas in Rwanda.54

Option 4. Invest in Human Resources and Management Tools

Recruiting talented supply chain experts into the public sector is important for high levels of financial and operational performance. Management and leadership roles in this sector should not only be restricted to civil servants but also include individuals with strong commercial sector experience.

  • Professional development for procurement and supply chain professionals: Several countries have successfully implemented comprehensive short-term training programs aimed at procurement practitioners, members of tender committees, tender review boards, and oversight institutions. As procurement and supply chain processes become increasingly technology-driven, it is equally important for practitioners to also expand their expertise in business engineering and design and information technology.55 Other effective quality improvement interventions focused on improving teamwork and the human elements of supply chain management.50
  • Benchmarking tools to improve performance: These tools can also help to standardize supply chain performance metrics such as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA).

Data for Decision Making Overview

Data is a fundamental part of strategic, goal-oriented, and effective systems. “Data-informed decision making” is a process that is proactive and interactive, and that “consider[s] data during program monitoring, review, planning, and improvement; advocacy; and policy development and review.”56

For data to be used for decision making, it should be accurate, timely, disaggregated, and widely available, as well as made actionable through analysis.57 Given the ambitious vision of the SDGs—with 17 goals, 169 targets, and 232 indicators to be achieved by 2030—there is a great need for quality data for monitoring and measuring progress.58

Challenges with Using Data for Decision Making

There have been gains in the frequency and quality of censuses and household surveys, however, many of the “building blocks” of national statistical systems remain weak. Importantly, this gap includes data that is central to estimating “almost any major economic or social welfare indicator—[such as] data on births and deaths; growth and poverty; taxes and trade; sickness, schooling, and safety; and land and the environment.”57 The inadequacy and unreliability of official statistics in many Sub-Saharan African countries have led to the U.N. High-Level Panel on post-2015 development goals calling for a “data revolution” to improve tracking of economic and social indicators across the developing world.59

Data in Education

Behind the learning crisis in much of the developing world is a huge data gap. Only a few middle-income developing countries have the political incentives and technical capacity to develop and sustain national data systems for education. Countries in the developing world rarely have the infrastructure of data collection in place, nor the capacity to analyze and feed information back to educators, parents, and communities. International assessments and regional initiatives cover relatively few developing countries; the majority of school children in the developing world are not tested at all. Moreover, while there is a range of data sources on education systems, services, and outcomes, these are not always translated into user-friendly formats for decision making.60

School-level enrollment statistics are necessary to make efficient staffing decisions, however, in some countries, like Kenya, this information is only available from the country’s Education Management Information System (EMIS) three times a year.59

Data in Health

Quality and timely data from health information systems are the foundation of the health system and inform decision making in each of the other five building blocks of the health system. Recent years have witnessed significant commitments to and investments in the strengthening of information systems.56 However, data quality and the availability and demand for timely analysis for decision making remain problematic.

  • Poor quality data: Many LMICs continue to face challenges related to the poor quality of routinely collected data. Comparing administrative and survey data of primary school enrollment in 46 surveys across 21 African countries found a bias toward over-reporting enrollment growth in administrative data—with an average change in enrollment nearly one-third higher in administrative data. “Many countries’ health management information systems (HMIS) databases rely on self-reported information from clinic and hospital staff, which aggregated up by district and regional health officers, each with potentially perverse incentives.”59
  • Under-resourced and under-staffed national statistical agencies: The high turnover of qualified EMIS staff, particularly in Ministries of Health, is a recurring challenge in LMICs, largely due to the low and relatively unattractive salaries.58 These agencies have also failed to improve significantly over time due to a lack of functional independence, as well as being reliant on volatile donor funding.59
  • Fragmented and inadequate information systems: Electronic Medical Information Systems (EMIS) in many sub-Saharan African countries are “chronically weak,” with problematic or at times absent key functions such as data entry control, import-export, data consolidation, consistency checks, and data extraction, estimation and imputations, projections, or archiving facilities.58
  • Limited capacity for analysis and use of data at local levels: All too often, data remains unutilized, sitting in reports, on shelves, or in databases and not being used in program development, quality improvement, policymaking, or strategic planning.56 In a survey of several tiers of Ethiopian government officials, only about 12% of officials stated that they used national information management systems as their primary source of information, preferring instead “formal field visits” (63%) or informal informational interactions such as discussions with frontline colleagues (51%) or colleagues in their organization (45%). Reliance on these more informal information sources was found to lead to only a minority of officials being able to make “relatively accurate claims about their constituents.”61

Root Causes of These Challenges

Challenges related to data for decision making are not merely technical but rather the result of implicit and explicit incentives and systemic challenges, including a lack of stable funding for national statistical systems and minimal checks and balances to ensure that the data are accurate and timely.57

  • Dominance of donor data priorities over national priorities: “The different needs of donors and government present trade-offs between the comparability, size, scope, and frequency of data collection. Given that donors finance a large share of spending on statistics, these differing needs can imply that national statistical systems aren’t built to produce accurate data disaggregated for use by domestic policymakers and citizens.” An example of this is the DHS in Tanzania, which reported results for seven aggregate zones that did not correspond to any practical local unit of measure or political accountability.59
  • Weak demand for data from users: Data are not consistently utilized by senior officials and policymakers within ministries of health and education for a number of reasons. This can be due to a lack of capacity to make data available or “because senior ministerial staff choose not to use data that contradict official views or out of fear it will damage their credibility or subject them to heavy pressure from the executive branch of government.”58

Policy Options for Data-Driven Decision Making

Option 1. Improve the Quality of Data

This can be achieved a number of ways, including through stronger systems, better monitoring, and by reducing the incentives to misrepresent data.

  • Better funding national data collection systems: Improving the funding levels and structure of national statistical systems and organizations could help to improve their performance. Also consider increasing domestic funding allocation for National Statistical Offices, mobilizing more donor funding through government–donor compacts, and experimenting with pay-for-performance agreements.57
  • Improved data collection and reporting accuracy through enhanced data audits: Facility-level technology can be used to support more frequent quality audits of routinely collected data. Regular data audits by an independent third-party verifier are a central part of PBF systems to attempt to overcome asymmetric information between the providers and payers, create accountability, and minimize gaming. Effectively targeting these verification activities can help to balance the costs and benefits of having a large enough sample to carry out effective verification activities.23
  • Integrating different data streams: Redesigning data systems for improved accountability could also be achieved by getting administrative and survey data to “speak to each other,” whereby household surveys can be used to provide regular checks on administrative data at different levels.59

Option 2. Strategically Selecting Data to Collect

The effort to generate data for international goals should not displace the focus from building the capacity of national statistical agencies.

  • Diversifying and prioritizing indicators: Health and education systems should identify and prioritize key indicators for tracking progress toward SDG targets as well as answering questions of national relevance.62,63 For measurement to promote accountability and quality improvement, it must capture the processes and outcomes that are most important to people. In many cases, data systems produce metrics that yield inadequate insight at a substantial cost both in terms of finances and front-line workers’ time. For example, a frequently used indicator is the proportion of births with skilled attendants, however, this does not adequately reflect the quality of care during childbirth and therefore may deceptively represent progress in maternal and newborn health.1
  • Introduce internationally recognized standard measures: Currently, few countries in the sub-Saharan African region perform international learning assessments of their students,1 and most collect learning data in a “fairly haphazard fashion.”14,60 Most school children should be able to take a test that can be compared year over year or globally benchmarked. Policymakers and citizens need a basis to assess the quality of schooling.

Option 3. Improve Demand for Data from Decision Makers

To improve the use of data at all levels, data systems and tools can be put into place.

  • Develop decision-maker facing data dashboards: To complement smaller initiatives to present data to decision makers, other larger dashboards or toolkits have been introduced, including the World Bank’s multidimensional Global Education Policy Dashboard and the “Data4SDGs Toolbox,” which seeks to help countries “create and implement their own holistic data roadmaps for sustainable development.”64
  • Data briefs or review meetings: For data to be understood and digestible by potential users, they must be synthesized and disseminated in formats that are specific and adapted to users. Different targeted information products, focusing on “need to know” information, could include standardized reports and presentation templates for regular dissemination and feedback to decision makers.56 “External briefings” were found to significantly reduce errors made by officials, particularly in contexts where organizational incentives for data use were in place.61
  • Targeted capacity building for data utilization: These efforts can include ministries, national institutes, academia, and other stakeholders. Better linking the data producers with data users, who may otherwise be working at different levels of the health system and have an incomplete understanding of each other’s needs and roles. By addressing barriers to data use together, producers and users of data can also identify programmatic priorities and make data available to work on them.56,59

1 International assessments and regional initiatives such as LLECE in Latin America (Latin American Laboratory for Assessment of the Quality of Education) or PASEC (Program for the Analysis of CONFEMEN Education Systems) and SACMEQ (Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality) in Africa, cover relatively few developing countries (Source: Birdsall, 2016).

Annexes

Annex 1: Summary Table of Challenges and Policy Options

Strategic Area Major Challenges Root Causes of the Problems Policy Options
Human Resource Motivation and Performance Absenteeism
Professional attrition and “brain drain”
Low technical competences in teaching and care
• Inadequate initial professional training;
• Difficult working conditions, including insufficient physical and supportive infrastructure;
• Lack of work materials and essential supplies;
• Increasing workloads;
• Low and unreliable remuneration;
• Lack of constructive supervision, professional recognition or professional development opportunities.
Option 1: Changes to payment and reward systems
• Health worker performance-based financing (PBF or P4P) schemes;
• Teacher performance pay schemes.

Option 2: Changes to recruitment and deployment:
• Higher standards for recruitment;
• Measures to attract and retain professionals in understaffed rural areas;
• Diversification of the health and education workforce.

Option 3: Enhanced professional development programs
• In-service or facility-based skills-development programs;
• Training and skills-building programs specific to management professionals;
• Technology-enabled training and support.

Option 4: Integration of technology into the classroom or the clinic
• “Blended-learning classrooms”;
• Technology for improved attendance monitoring.

Procurement, Supply Delivery and Management Lack of availability of working materials and supplies
Inflated prices
Poor quality of products delivered to end-users
• High production and import costs;
• Inability to correctly predict needs;
• Poor storage conditions and theft;
• Inefficient transportation;
• Underlying weakness of the accountability structure;
• Unpredictable financing.
Option 1: Procurement from different actors
• Regional or national production;
• Procurement from the private sector;
• Pooled funding mechanisms for improved predictability.

Option 2: Re-design the procurement and supply systems
• Centralized procurement and tendering processes;
• Streamlined tiers of the supply chain system;
• Reduced number of wholesalers or middle-men;
• Public-private partnerships.

Option 3: Improved distribution processes
• Improved stock-management and procurement request practices;
• Reduced lead-times from suppliers and increased the frequency of replenishment;
• Digital technologies that help “track and trace” the movement of products;
• New or outsourced delivery methods.

Option 4: Invest in Human Resources and Management Tools
• Professional development for procurement and supply chain professionals;
• Benchmarking tools to improve performance.

Data for Decision Making Poor quality data
Under-resourced and under-staffed national statistical agencies
Fragmented and inadequate information systems
Limited capacity for analysis and use of data at local levels
• Dominance of donor data priorities over national priorities;
• Weak demand for data from users.
Option 1: Improve the quality of data
• Better funding national data collection systems;
• Improved data collection and reporting accuracy through enhanced data audits;
• Integrating different data streams.

Option 2: Strategically select data to collect
• Diversifying and prioritizing indicators;
• Introduce internationally recognized standard measures.

Option 3: Improve demand for data from decision makers
• Develop decision-maker facing data dashboards;
• Data briefs or review meetings;
• Targeted capacity building for data utilization.

Annex 2: Framework for Analysis of Motivation

Source: Adapted from “Improving health worker performance: in search of promising practices” by Marjolein Dieleman and Jan Willem Harnmeijer (WHO, 2006)5

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Introduction

The London 2012 Olympicsi is generally regarded as the most successful Games ever. The path to success was far from smooth. One person more than any other had championed these Games for Britain for ten years, from inception to closing ceremony. Tessa Jowell, UK Secretary of State for Sport and Culture, and a senior political ally of Prime Minister Tony Blair, had overseen Britain’s successful hosting of the Commonwealth Games in 2002. With this experience, Secretary Jowell felt passionately that Britain was in a strong position to host the 2012 Olympics. She was also convinced that there could be real benefits for the country and that the Games could create a strong legacy.

The Olympics is the world’s largest sporting event on a scale far greater than any other government project. For a host city and for the government of the host country there must be gains beyond prestige. The UK government therefore planned to convert contaminated, waterlogged and derelict land in the east of London, at the heart of an effort to regenerate one of the most deprived parts of the city, into an Olympic Park with a mix of permanent and temporary venues, and accommodation for athletes and the media. London’s notoriously crowded public transport systems and roadways presented another major challenge. Overdue investment would be accelerated. Jowell was confident that with strong government support, good planning and management these challenges could be met. The far greater initial challenge was winning support across government and with the wider public.

This case explores what lay behind the success of the London Olympics. How the lessons from the Games can be applied to ministerial leadership in implementing other ambitious government priorities and projects. This case is based mainly on in-person interviews with Tessa Jowell, as well as reported interviews by other principal players in the delivery of the Games.

Building Political Support

The UK had a track record of failure in Olympic bidding. The UK put Birmingham up for the 1992 Games and Manchester for both the 1996 and 2000 Games. The bid from Birmingham and the first Manchester bid ended in embarrassment, with both coming fifth out of six competing cities. By contrast, the Manchester bid for the 2000 Games saw the city achieve a more respectable third place.ii By 2002 the International Olympic Committee (IOC) was clear that only a bid for the Games in London would be seriously considered.

The newly appointed Secretary for Sport and Culture, a seasoned politician, was impressed by the successful delivery of the Commonwealth Games and understood the “co-lateral benefits” of such major sporting events. Jowell, a progressive member of the British Labor Party, saw real potential gains for the British economy, boosting employment and regenerating a seriously deprived section of east London. She was supported in this latter objective by the Mayor of London, Ken Livingstone — known by many as “Red Ken” referring to his leftist political leaning. The Mayor saw the Games as a way of securing cash to regenerate London’s East End — an important part of his political agenda.

Prime Minister Tony Blair was a “sports nut,” but the Prime Minister was not in the early stages prepared to wage the political battle to get government and public support. Getting his support was critical. Blair told Tessa this was up to her. The Prime Minister was particularly wary of picking this battle with Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown. Tension between the Prime Minister and Chancellor are well documented.

According to Jowell, there was little initial support in the government or the civil service for hosting the Games, and the strident criticism of the media created deep public skepticism. Jowell knew that she had to proceed strategically. She says that taking the time to persuade key players individually was essential to selling the idea. This ensured they would not feel steamrolled. If the UK was to bid for the Games the Cabinet had to own the ambition too. Over more than six months, she met individually with senior government colleagues and strategically laid out the potential benefits to each of their departmental and political priorities. Jowell’s pitch was built around the answers to four questions:

  • Was the project deliverable?
  • Was it affordable?
  • Would it leave a legacy?
  • Could we win and beat Paris?

The substance of Jowell’s pitch was that the Games would be a major shot in the arm for the UK economy with substantial additional benefits in areas such as transportation, tourism, infrastructure development and urban regeneration, as well as boosting sport, physical wellness and national spirit. The IOC would be impressed by the evidence of ambitious planned legacy. Jowell knew that it was also important to her credibility not to overplay expectations; she needed to ensure projections of the probable benefits were not mere hyperbole, but based on solid evidence. She also had to be sure that the eventual budget was sufficient and that the project could be delivered “on budget and on time.”

Jowell left the biggest challenge until the last before seeking formal Cabinet approval. The Treasury had made clear its opposition to the idea and the Chancellor avoided engagement, declining for weeks to meet with Jowell. His support was essential to persuade the rest of the Cabinet. Jowell says she deployed a combination of “persistence, charm and a flash of steel” in eventually forcing a meeting with Chancellor Brown days before the Cabinet was scheduled to consider whether or not to agree on support for the proposal to bid for the Games. The Chancellor was eventually engaged in the face of Jowell’s persistence. She at that stage knew that she already had the support of the Prime Minister and most of the Cabinet.

In May 2003 the Cabinet gave the go ahead for the bid and London became a late entry in the race to host the 2012 Olympics – with Paris still very much the lead contender. Over the next two years the bid company was established and the underpinning machinery of government was put in place to maximize success and to safeguard the necessary financial guarantees from government departments (and the opposition) to allow the London bid to proceed.

The Game is On: Marshaling Resources

Jowell, with the support of London Mayor Livingstone, set about addressing some of the most significant hurdles to a bid, namely the cost, and concerns that London had no chance of beating a better-prepared Paris. They needed more information about the likely necessary budget and jointly commissioned a consulting company, Arup, to undertake a cost-benefit analysis of a specimen Olympics. Initially, Arup reported that the Olympics would need a public subsidy of £1.1bn.iii However, by Christmas, the press was reporting that the Olympics could cost the taxpayer as much as £2.95bn. The Olympic budget caused headaches from the start. There were so many uncertainties and unanswerable questions. There could be no site surveys to assess the scale of essential remediation. The Delivery Authority which would build the Park might be liable for VAT, but that could not be settled until the technical details of its functions were clarified. At that stage, consultant advice was that project contingency would be sufficient. This was much less than the programme contingency of 60% subsequently required by the Treasury.

Jowell prepared the groundwork for public funding, agreeing with Ken Livingstone that up to £1.1bn of public subsidy would be met by London, split equally between the London Development Agency (LDA) and London council taxpayers.iv Thanks to Tony Blair’s predecessor, John Major, there was an additional source of funds potentially available which would not place a burden on the taxpayer – the National Lottery that had opened for business in 1994. Jowell also met with lottery operator, Camelot, and the Lottery Commission to discuss raising £1.4bn through an additional Olympics Lottery game. This was controversial since the decision to divert Lottery Funding of 11% from all specialist distributors plus the creation of an Olympic Lottery Fund meant less for non-Olympic programmes. This received an angry reaction from many quarters.

The task of convincing colleagues and the public that a win was possible was more difficult. Formal government decision-making about the bid process was through “Misc 12” – a cabinet committee chaired by Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw. It remained wary as the common view persisted that Paris would host the 2012 Games. Such was the concern over Paris being the pre-ordained victor of the bidding process that Jowell decided to go to Switzerland in January 2003 to seek assurances from IOC chair Jacques Rogge about whether “this [was] actually an open race or a competition that [would] lead to a Paris victory.”v He gave absolute assurance about the openness of the contest. This was important. The timing of a government decision to proceed with the bid was further complicated by the imminent military intervention in Iraq. A government decision on the Olympics was originally due in February 2003 but was delayed by three months while the potential war with Iraq obviously took main priority.

Some have argued that ironically the presumed “unwinnability” of the Games was helpful to those pressing for a London bid. After all, some reasoned when signing up, there was little risk they would have to deliver – Paris was going to win, and it was not worth antagonizing cabinet colleagues and wasting political capital opposing something that was highly unlikely to happen.

Organizing a Winning Bid

With the clock ticking down on the deadline for submission of the 2012 bids, Jowell now had to combine her role as chief political champion with that of top executive, assuming responsibility as the newly appointed Minister for the Olympics responsible for winning the bid and delivering the Games. She knew from experience that her leadership would only be as good as the team around her.

A team to lead the bid was assembled, and in line with IOC rules, a private bid company named London 2012 took charge of this. Barbara Cassani, an American businesswoman who had successfully launched British Airways’ low-cost airline, Go, was appointed by Jowell after open competition to chair London 2012. Keith Mills, described by Barbara Cassani as “one of the least known, most successful businessmen in Britain,” became Chief Executive. Between them, Cassani and Mills had just over a year to create a master plan (known as the ‘Bid Book’) that would:

  • Detail where events would be held and what infrastructure would be built
  • Provide an overall budget projection for the staging of the Games
  • Persuade the public to support the Games through a significant marketing campaign

They also had to organize a huge lobbying effort to convince the 115 IOC members, the electorate for the Host City 2012, that London was the right choice. Jowell recruited Sebastian Coe to lead on liaison with the IOC. Sebastian Coe, a celebrated Olympic gold medalist and a former Conservative Party member of the British parliament, was a strong addition to the team.

London 2012 was given the freedom to lead on developing the Bid Book. The company board and a monthly crosscutting committee chaired by Mills were the main interfaces with Government. It was here that London 2012 met with Government to agree on the crucial departmental guarantees that were to be signed by relevant secretaries of state, which the IOC required of all candidate cities. London 2012 was directly accountable to Tessa Jowell. Importantly, Jowell notes, there was no back channel to the Prime Minister. Jowell had been clear from the beginning that there could be no confused lines of accountability.

In May 2004, London passed the first hurdle when the IOC selected it as one of the five formal candidate cities – along with Paris, Madrid, New York, and Moscow. This triggered a change of leadership at London 2012. Barbara Cassani decided she was not suited to the next stage of the lobbying task. She suggested to Jowell that Seb Coe, as a double Olympian, would be the most powerful Bid leader. Jowell then negotiated his appointment in the face of some politically tribal skepticism. London was now moving into the final stages of the bid, finalizing details of the candidate file to be submitted in November 2004.

At this point, Coe, Mills, and other London 2012 staff stepped up their work with politicians on speeches and marketing materials that would showcase London. Politicians – most often Tony Blair, Ken Livingstone, or Tessa Jowell – were asked to give speeches according to which of them IOC members would be most impressed by. In some cases, a mayor was the most appropriate figure, while in others a prime minister or Olympics minister was a better fit. The key to these events was encouraging the individual politicians to set aside their specific objectives (e.g., the regeneration of East London) to emphasize the importance of a great and successful Games. This was by far and away the most important test for the IOC.

Even then, the UK was still perceived as the underdog. In January 2005, The Guardian newspaper reported that the bid team was demoralized at being “so far behind Paris.” Even bid company staff acknowledged that “the consensus was that we weren’t going to win anyway.”

The bid company spearheaded an impressive marketing campaign and Olympics offer. Despite this, the majority view in the UK remained that the UK would not win. In the final months leading up to the IOC decision, Jowell and the bid company worked tirelessly to increase public support for the Games and developed an even stronger marketing program. In its final lobbying activities, three key points were emphasized by those representing the UK:

  • The sports experts highlighted the technical merits of the stadium design, which was seen as more sophisticated than Paris’ Stade de France.
  • Tessa Jowell pledged support from government investment for elite sport and a legacy of investment in school sport and adult participation in sport and physical activity.
  • Ken Livingstone praised the transformative potential of the Games for London.

All this was sealed with a bit of glamour, with appearances from British Olympics Association chair, Princess Anne, and legendary soccer star David Beckham in the final publicity blitz, with Prime Minister Blair on hand to “press the flesh” of IOC officials in the final hours before the bid-deciding IOC meeting. To cap this, Jowell and Coe agreed that they had to “go for broke” in the presentation to the IOC. “Safe” would deliver the Games to Paris. They therefore decided to showcase, not the corporate sponsors, but 20 young people from East London. They were of more than 10 nationalities speaking 20 languages. Theirs were the faces of modern London.

While the technical plans and marketing campaign might not have convinced the home crowd (or the bookies; the odds were still on Paris the night before the decision was announced), it convinced the people that mattered. The risks paid off, and against all expectations, on 6 July 2005, London was announced as the host of the 2012 Olympics.

The British public were euphoric, and even the institutionally cynical British media had to put a positive spin on the come-from-behind win. Jowell, exhausted by the effort, woke up the next morning saying she “felt the awesome loneliness of leadership.” Weighed down by the huge responsibility that lay ahead even after such a marathon struggle to win the bid, she says the thought crossed her mind that “second place might not have been so bad.” That lasted a moment before her focus shifted to “now we have really got to do it.”

A False Start

Before the Olympics Minister could get home to London, the euphoria turned to catastrophe when four suicide bombers exploded bombs on the London transport system, killing 52 people. All the attention and resources of government were diverted in response to the worst terrorist attack ever on the British mainland. Jowell was given responsibility for government support for the affected families and survivors. This was totally consuming for many weeks after.

To move from bid to staging the biggest ever event in the UK required the establishment of new delivery bodies:

  • The Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA) as a public body to build the venues;
  • The London Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games (LOCOG) as an independent entity to fund and stage the Games. (See Appendix A for an overview of the Olympic delivery bodies.)

Government also had to establish trading rules in the vicinity of the Games, establish advertising restrictions which would later become the subject of controversy, and ensure the land needed for the Olympic Park was under public control. The London Development Agency (LDA) had started purchasing the site of the Olympic Park earlier in 2003. Work on the Olympic Park started in the summer of 2004, after the existing occupants – including allotment owners, businesses, travelers, and feral cats – were evicted from the site.

Due to the significant pre-planning about governance and legislative plans in the event of a successful UK bid (structures, organizations, and shareholders agreements had all been signed off at the insistence of the bid company to avoid post-bid delays), the London Olympic Games and Paralympic Games Bill was introduced in Parliament just over a week after the announcement that London would host the Games. This speed was a real achievement and radiated confidence.

But while land purchasing, undergrounding power lines, and Games legislation – including the design of and appointments to the Olympic delivery institutions – were well planned and quickly executed, government was less prepared when it came to its own role in the Games. There were disputes about which department would lead on the Games, what civil service capacity existed for a major delivery project, and, crucially, the real size of the budget.

Before the bid was won, Jowell had made clear that, if they won, the budget would have to be reviewed. By the end of 2005, Jowell knew that the actual cost of delivering the Games was going to be substantially higher than the £2.9 billion publicly bandied about before the bid and the final bid number of £4.2 billion. The main reason was that once thorough site inspections were completed and detailed plans developed, it was possible for the first time to calculate the real cost. Security requirements had to be ramped up following the bombing attacks. Throwing fuel on the fire, the Treasury insisted on adding a 60% contingency on the whole project and required the ODA to pay VAT, adding a further £1 billion to the bottom line and pushing the total to £9.2 billion. It took nearly two years to settle the revised budget. According to Jowell, Prime Minister Blair was furious about the Treasury’s deliberate attempt to sabotage the Games. (See Appendix B for a budget timeline.)

The Prime Minister initially refused to accept the new budget number, but eventually told Jowell “to use her own judgment” and left it to her to present and justify the revised budget to the UK parliament. Compounding what Jowell calls a “real moment of crisis,” the media had a field day, panning Jowell’s leadership and the credibility of the effort.

The Treasury initially demanded that it should have sign-off on contracts exceeding £12 million. Jowell says that the Treasury contended it was worried about cost control, but in reality, they were “agents of delay,” aggressively questioning every contract. In a final showdown with the Treasury Committee assigned oversight of the Games, Jowell challenged Committee members to say which of them had ever built a stadium or managed a major sporting event. Of course, none had. Her point well made, Jowell told the Committee she had hired the best people for the job and they should be allowed to get on with their work. She was able to support her stand by showing that up to that point all implementation targets had been met on time and under budget. This included most impressively the undergrounding of the power cables which crossed the site of the Olympic Park.

Government itself had to gear up to oversee what the ODA and LOCOG were doing. The Olympic Park Development was the largest public sector construction project in Europe but compounded by the risk of a fixed deadline for completion.

It did this by creating the Government Olympic Executive (GOE), which Jowell chaired. GOE was purposely designed as a stand-alone unit. As Olympics Minister, Jowell was a passionate advocate, supporter, and broker for the Olympics within government and outside it.

Jowell had hardly secured these victories when Olympic super-skeptic Chancellor Gordon Brown succeeded in his long-time ambition to unseat Prime Minister Blair. Fortunately for Jowell, most of the major agreements were locked in place and implementation was well underway. Brown did not replace Jowell as Olympics Minister, which as incoming Prime Minister had been his prerogative.

The Final Sprint

With stadium construction finally underway in 2008, Jowell was dealt another double blow. Close political ally London Mayor, Ken Livingstone, lost his re-election bid to Conservative Party candidate Boris Johnson. But worse still was the 2008 financial crisis, which saw global stock markets tumble and governments in Europe and the U.S. facing financial catastrophe.

The election of Boris Johnson altered little, mainly because plans were far advanced and London was a major beneficiary. In contrast to the ease of the mayoral transition, the 2008 financial crisis created significant challenges for the project. While most of LOCOG’s sponsorship revenue had been raised prior to the economic downturn,vi the collapse of the private funding of the Olympic Village was seen as the largest budgetary crisis. In May 2009, government made a decision to ramp up the public sector contribution by £350m.vii This proved a sound investment as the Government’s share of the Village was later sold for £570 million.

In the midst of the financial storm and hardly two years before the Games, Jowell’s Labor Party lost the general election to a Conservative-Liberal Party Coalition. Jowell was no longer Olympics Minister. However, Jowell’s foresight in establishing cross-party management of the Games was vital to the stability of the project at this critical stage. The new Minister, with whom Jowell had established an extremely good relationship, had shadowed the Olympics brief since 2004 and throughout this period had unusual access to government briefings on the progress of the Olympics project. He felt “it was a great help to have shadowed the brief for five years” because this, and regular briefings, allowed him to hit the ground running. Jowell says because she had worked hard to build cross-party support, and because the implementation process had been disciplined, turning in projects on time and mostly on budget, the government had little quarrel to pick with what was likely to be a big boost for the national morale at a very difficult economic time.

The new government immediately launched a period of harsh financial austerity to get control of Britain’s extraordinary public debt. While the Olympic budget came under scrutiny, the new Sports Minister recalls that “given the importance of the project, the Olympic budget was largely protected.” Ultimately, only £27 million was taken out of the £9.3 billion funding package for the Olympics, with a totemic decision to remove the publicly funded wrap around the stadium.viii This was subsequently and controversially replaced by a privately tendered wrap, manufactured by Dow Chemicals.

By early 2011, public awareness of and interest in the Olympics started to increase. The public ticket ballot opened in spring 2011 to a flood of interest with 1.9 million people applying for tickets, although many were left disappointed and dissatisfied as they failed to get the tickets they applied for. Jowell’s early insistence that the tickets should be available by ballot and not only with the rich and famous at the top of the queue over time dulled some criticism, but ultimately the ticket applications reached some 24 million, far outstripping availability.

Olympic stadium construction was completed in March 2011, on schedule and over a year ahead of the Games. This was a triumph for ODA, government, and the delivery partner CLM who had met their target date with relative ease.

Now with a year to go, the baton was passed onto LOCOG, thousands of volunteer Games Makers, and operational partners including Transport for London (TfL), the police, the Borders Agency, and the military, who needed to test and prepare the country for Olympics action. The Foreign Office, Defra, and Cabinet Office all had roles to play too – from using the run-up to the Olympics for diplomatic opportunities to ensuring vets were on hand for animals used in the opening ceremony. (See Appendix C for the scale of public sector activities.)

A series of Home Office-led test exercises with police, military, and emergency workers took place to ensure security and other operational concerns were ready for the Games and that “everyone was in the right frame of mind.”ix These exercises included “Exercise Forward Defensive” – a February 2012 two-day exercise involving 2,500 people simulating a response to a bomb on the Tube networkx and “Exercise Olympic Guardian,” which took place over eight days in May 2012 and included the deployment of fighter jets, helicopters, and ships around London and Weymouth.xi The final test exercises neatly transitioned into the operational phase of the Games, which officially began on 19 May 2012 when the Olympic Torch Relay began.

As the Games approached, TfL, the Department for Transport (DfT), and LOCOG were working to prepare Londoners and their transport system for the estimated 20 million extra journeys that would take place during the Games. The major public information campaign encouraging individuals to plan their travel during the Games started on 30 January 2012.xii Prior to this, organizations involved in delivering public transport during the Games had started working with businesses in November 2010 through the “Travel Demand Management Business Influencer Campaign,” urging businesses to plan for the impact of the Games. The Department for Transport led a cross-government initiative to reduce travel into central London with 17 government departments committing to change at least 50% of their own travel footprint over summer 2012. A trial week for this programme called “Operation Step Change” took place in spring 2012. Testing of the Olympic travel programme continued into July 2012, with commuters being deterred from central London through delays caused by the testing.xiii Overall this was a successful programme, with up to 35% of people adapting their normal travel behaviour to take account of the Olympics.

The role of LOCOG during this period should not be underestimated. They took control of the Olympic Park in January 2012, at which point large quantities of work in order to make venues Games-ready still needed to be undertaken. They received considerable assistance from the ODA with this. In addition to the work on venue preparation, they organised the Torch Relay, which confounded expectations and was viewed by an estimated 12 million people as it made its journey around the UK.xv LOCOG also had key roles to play in areas including venue security, transport management, and the monumental task of training and working with thousands of volunteer Games Makers, another runaway Games success story. Although TfL were responsible for running London’s public transport system, LOCOG’s role included assisting with the development of the Olympic Route Network and working with transport partners on delivering the public transport system. Similarly, although the Home Office was ultimately responsible for delivering security arrangements around the Olympic Games, LOCOG were responsible for contracting for security arrangements at the Olympic venues and playing an increasingly leading role in discussions around security in the run-up to the Olympics.

Overall this went remarkably smooth, with the very serious exception of G4S failing to fulfill their contract to deliver a full complement of guards for venue security. This was a major hiccup in the last weeks before the Games and was subject to intense media scrutiny. In the event, the detailed contingency planning that government had undertaken in collaboration with LOCOG moved into action quickly though, and the armed forces were deployed to fill a 3,500-person shortfall. This was not the disaster it could have been, as a senior civil servant at Cabinet Office recounted: “the plan was exactly as it was, just with more highly trained and disciplined personnel providing the security.”

As the end of July drew close, eyes now turned to the Olympics themselves. The torch relay had built a mounting enthusiasm for the Games and only weeks before the Opening Ceremony, UK Sport confirmed they were aiming for Team GB to finish in the top four of the medals table with a medal take of at least 48 medals.

Finally the Flame is Lit

A decade after Jowell embraced the idea that London should host the 2012 Olympics, she watched the Olympic torch lit in the spectacular main Olympic arena. What followed were the most successful Games in Olympic history. Jowell, through determined and unrelenting leadership, had succeeded against enormous political, economic, and organizational odds. In retrospect, Jowell says she thinks success at the end of the day was because the effort reflected the “values and the mood of the time.”

Jowell says the project had been very sensitive to local communities affected by the Olympics infrastructure development, they kept costs under control, and the entire process had been transparently conducted. Jowell also takes pride in the fact that not a single life was lost nor any serious injury occurred in the construction of the Olympic venues.

Despite initial reticence, the British public enthusiastically embraced the project because many communities beyond the city of London had seen benefits from the build-up to the Games, but also because the nation desperately needed a morale boost as it wrestled with the worst economic crisis in a century. In retrospect, Jowell says that the most troubling part of the process was the time it took to come up with a reliable cost estimate. The Olympic bid process makes this almost impossible and the eventual budget contained large provisions, VAT, a doubled security budget post-London bombings, and a programme contingency of 60% that could not have been foreseen three years before the decision to award the Games to London. Sometimes, as a leader, you just have to be prepared to take the beating!

Questions for Discussion

  1. How did Jowell continue to focus on her priorities in spite of the recurring distractions?
  2. How did Jowell manage the politics, including the relationship with the PM and the Chancellor of the Exchequer?
  3. How did Jowell ensure continuity of her goal through a change of government?
  4. How did Jowell secure the right financial support to deliver on her mission?
  5. What did Jowell do to build a strong and effective team?

Appendix

Appendix A: The Olympic Delivery Bodies

LOCOG and the ODA both sat outside of government, but were hugely different organizations. The ODA – as a statutory executive NDPB – existed in a structure with which DCMS was familiar. The London Olympic and Paralympic Games Act 2006 gave the ODA broad powers, including the right to “take any action that it thinks necessary or expedient for the purpose of preparing for the London Olympics.” The Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport had responsibility for appointing the ODA Board, the first ODA chief executive, and had the right of veto over appointees to be finance director, transport director, or any chief executive other than the initial appointee.

LOCOG was an entirely different entity. Its structure had been agreed during the bid phase, meeting the requirement of the Olympic Charter that it report directly to the IOC Executive Board. It was clear from interviews that while LOCOG viewed its relationship with government as important, its crucial relationship was with the IOC. LOCOG was accountable to its three stakeholders – the Secretary of State, the Mayor of London, and the British Olympic Association – who were collectively responsible for appointing the Board under the terms of a joint venture agreement. As a private company limited by guarantee, however, it did not see itself as having a conventional “sponsorship” relationship with government. This was heightened by its determination to remain financially independent of government, raising its £2bn budget from the private sector and IOC (while government would put close to £1bn into LOCOG, this was largely to cover scope transferred to LOCOG, rather than for its core functions).

Appendix B: The Budget Timeline – Key Events

  • May 2003: Government and Mayor of London agree memorandum of understanding providing a public sector funding package (PSFP) of £2.375bn to meet the costs of the Games – £1.5bn of which would come from the National Lottery. Government also commits a further £1.044bn of Exchequer funding for non-Olympic infrastructure. Combined with anticipated private sector funding of £738m, the expected gross cost of the Games was £4.036bn (excluding the LOCOG budget).
  • 31 October 2005: Olympic cost review steering group (an officer-level group initiated to review all costs associated with the London Olympic Games) meets for the first time.
  • 21 November 2006: Tessa Jowell indicates to the House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee that additions to the Olympic budget in the bid will include an additional £400m to be spent on the ODA’s delivery partner, and £900m in the costs of the Olympic Park. Further liabilities are identified as the tax status of the ODA, the need to develop a programme contingency, and increased security costs.
  • 15 March 2007: Revised PSFP announced, including ODA budget of £5.254bn, an ODA tax bill of £836m, a £2.247bn programme contingency and revised policing and wider security costs of £600m, up from £190m at the time of the bid.
  • November 2007: Announcement of ODA baseline budget at £6.09bn, which served as a basis for future reporting.
  • 13 May 2009: Public sector funding is agreed for the construction of the Olympic Village after a potential public-private deal collapses.
  • 24 May 2010: PSFP is reduced to £9.298bn.
  • 20 October 2010: PSFP is not reduced in the Comprehensive Spending Review; the publicly funded “wrap” around the stadium is removed, saving £7m from within the PSFP.xvi Dow Chemical won a competitive tendering process to privately fund a wrap around the stadium in August 2011. PSFP funding is shifted from construction to operations.
  • 12 August 2011: Majority of the Olympic Village and adjoining land is sold to Qatar’s investment arm for £557m.
  • 6 December 2011: DCMS and National Audit Office both report that venue security costs have risen to £553m – an increase of £271m from October 2010. The NAO also puts the cost of 18 legacy programmes at £826m, with this cost sitting outside the PSFP for the Games. £41m of public money is put into LOCOG to fund more ambitious opening and closing ceremonies for the Olympics and Paralympics, with a total of £354m of uncommitted programme contingency remaining.
  • 31 October 2012: Final GOE quarterly financial update is released. The anticipated final spend against the PSFP is £8.921bn – a £377m saving. Estimated costs of policing and venue security respectively are £455m and £514m – a combined decrease of £60m against expectations in May 2012.
  • 14 November 2012: LOCOG release details of their revenue streams to the Greater London Assembly, showing that their upper sponsorship target of £700m has been exceeded by £46m.

Appendix C: Public Sector Scale

  • 11 hospitals designed as “Olympic hospitals” on standby to provide free medical care for the “Olympic Family”.xvii
  • 52 police forces involved in providing security for the Olympics – every police force in the country.
  • 98% of scheduled kilometres run on schedule on the Tube, London Overground, and London bus network during the Olympics.
  • 200 extra buses provided in London for the Games.
  • 4,000 extra Games-time train services provided over the Olympics and Paralympics.xviii
  • 13,000 London businesses attended seminars prior to the Olympics where TfL explained Games transport impacts.
  • 15,000 police officers deployed on the Olympic operation on peak days.xix
  • 18,200 troops required to provide security for the Olympics at peak timesxx – nearly double the number serving in Afghanistan at the time.xxi This number consisted of 13,500 service personnel announced in December 2011, a further 3,500 deployed as assurance against G4S’ failure to meet their contract on July 12, 2012,xxii and an additional contingency of 1,200 troops called up on July 24.xxiii
  • 138,000 passengers handled by Heathrow on the busiest days of the Olympics – up 45% on normal levels.xxiv
  • 450,000 people requiring some level of special access for the Games who were background-checked by the UK Border Agency (UKBA), including contractors, “Olympic Family” members, and volunteers.xxv
  • 3,000,000 additional public transport trips above normal levels on the busiest day of the Games in London.xxvi

References

Where relevant throughout this report references to the success of the ‘Olympics’ should be taken as applying to the success of the 2012 Olympic & Paralympic Games.

  1. House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee, A London Olympic Bid for 2012 (2003), p. 11
  2. House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee, A London Olympic Bid for 2012 (2003), p. 16
  3. Mihir Bose, “Olympics: Jowell seeking to win over skeptics,” The Telegraph, January 29, 2013, link
  4. Mike Lee, The Race for the 2012 Olympics (2006), p.14
  5. Roger Blitz, “Rogge hits back over sponsorship criticism,” Financial Time, July 9, 2012, link
  6. Owen Gibson, “Olympic Village to be fully funded by taxpayers,” The Guardian, May 13, 2009, link
  7. ODA, 2011/12 Annual Report
  8. “London 2012: Olympics and Paralympics security test,” BBC News, February 22, 2012, link
  9. “London 2012: Major Olympic security test unveiled,” BBC News, April 30, 2012, link
  10. House of Commons Transportation Committee, Section 3.5 from Session 2010-12 on Transport and the Olympics, March 14, 2012, link
  11. Sam Jones, Paul Owen, and Haroon Siddique, “Olympic test-run on London transport leaves commuters grumbling,” The Guardian, July 10, 2012, link
  12. Simon Israel, “New security challenges for Paralympic torch relay,” Channel 4 News, August 20, 2012, link
  13. “Scrapping London 2012 curtain ‘sensible’, Lord Coe says,” BBC News, November 2, 2010, link
  14. London 2012 Olympic Games healthcare guide
  15. Network Rail, Our Plans for London 2012
  16. House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, Olympics Security (2012)
  17. David Horsey, “U.K. military at Olympics outnumber U.K. troops in Afghanistan,” Los Angeles Times, July 27, 2012, link
  18. Hansard HC Deb 12 July 2012, vol 548, col 451
  19. House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, Olympics Security [OS 07] (2012)
  20. Heathrow Airport, Heathrow’s Preparations for the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games
  21. UKBA 2011/12 Annual Report
  22. TfL, Hosting a Great Games and Keeping London Moving this Summer

Background

In June 2010, Benigno Aquino, a chain smoker, was elected President of the Philippines. President Aquino campaigned on a 16‑point agenda for reform, which he called his “Social Contract with the Filipino People.”1 This social contract promised to transform health from “just another area of political patronage” to a “measure of good governance.” President Aquino also committed not to increase and reduce, where possible, taxation and tariffs impacting regular citizens. When he took office, Aquino was alarmed to learn that an estimated 30% of Filipinos died prematurely due to inadequate access to health care. Hence, the President appointed renowned surgeon Dr. Enrique Ona, Health Secretary, with the specific charge of alleviating the burden of disease in the Philippines by expanding the national health insurance program (PhilHealth) to all Filipinos.

Tobacco use was a major cause of morbidity and premature mortality in the Philippines. Historically, the Philippines has had one of the highest rates of smoking in the world. Low taxes on tobacco products made cigarette prices in the country among the lowest in the world. In 2007, more than a quarter of 13-15-year-olds were regular smokers,2 and in 2008, more than half of men (53.2%) and 12.5% of women aged 20 or older smoked.3

To address tobacco-related deaths, in 2003, the WHO established the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) with the goal of reducing smoking worldwide, including by promoting higher taxation on tobacco products.4 The WHO FCTC was based on substantial research over many years demonstrating the effectiveness of higher tobacco taxes and prices in reducing the consumption of cigarettes and other tobacco products.5-7

The Philippines joined 167 other WHO Parties (member states) in signing the WHO FCTC in 2005.8 Nonetheless, tobacco cultivation has also traditionally been a source of income for many Filipinos in the tobacco-producing provinces of the country, where multiple farmers planted tobacco in addition to other profitable crops.9 In 2010, tobacco excise revenues accounted for 0.3% of the Philippines’ GDP.10 In 2010, tobacco farming accounted for 0.4% of total agricultural employment, and farmers produced more than 70 million kilograms of tobacco leaf valued at PhP 4.85 billion (USD 108.4 million)11, and approximately 40 million kilograms were exported.12

Funding Expanded Universal Health Coverage

As Health Secretary, Dr. Enrique Ona had the mandate to reduce the burden of disease in the Philippines by expanding the national health insurance program (PhilHealth) to all Filipinos. However, given President Aquino’s promise not to introduce new tax measures, Secretary Ona recognized that to fund the increase in PhilHealth coverage, he would have to leverage existing government revenue streams.

Secretary Ona was appointed at the beginning of President Aquino’s presidency, and the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control Alliance, Philippines (FCAP) knew that with this new administration in office, a new legislative session would convene, and there would be new leadership in the Department of Finance (DoF) and Department of Budget and Management (DBM). This meant that many policies, including the tobacco and alcohol taxes, would likely be reviewed.

Therefore, the FCAP requested a meeting with Secretary Ona to advocate that the Department of Health (DoH) support dramatic Sin Tax Reform to fund the cost of extending PhilHealth coverage to all citizens. Based on his experience as a doctor who had seen many patients with tobacco-related diseases over the years, Dr. Ona agreed to work for an increase in taxes on tobacco products, though he was unsure how best to design the tax policy to ensure sufficient revenue. He was also not sure how to muster political support and counter the forceful political influence of tobacco growers and cigarette manufacturers.

After their meeting with Secretary Ona, FCAP invited Action for Economic Reforms, a Philippine NGO experienced in advocacy and economic policy research, to collaborate on promoting the Sin Tax Reform. “We had a new President, so there was a breath of fresh air—the possibilities seemed endless,” one advocate reflected. “It was an opportune time for groups to re-strategize the approach to passing sin tax reforms.”

Action for Economic Reforms received a grant from the US-based foundation Bloomberg Philanthropies to unite local and national tobacco control, health care, and economic reform groups. They called their collaboration ‘the sintax coalition’. Representatives from the groups met to establish a shared goal: to improve public health by reducing smoking and, secondarily, to generate revenues for health by raising taxes on cigarettes and alcohol.

Despite being a smoker himself, President Aquino supported the idea of raising taxes on tobacco products to discourage smoking and raise revenues to expand healthcare access. He agreed after being convinced by his advisers that it did not violate his campaign promise of “no new taxes” as this was just a restructuring of existing taxes. In August 2011, he announced his official legislative agenda, which included increasing ‘sin taxes’ to fund the expansion of universal health coverage. He directed all his cabinet secretaries to join Secretary Ona in prioritizing Sin Tax legislation reform.

Civil society coalition members set up meetings with legislators allied with the Aquino administration to ask if they would “champion” a Sin Tax Reform measure. They focused initially on members of the Ways and Means Committee in the House of Representatives, where tax bills were filed first and where legislators with known connections to the tobacco industry typically dominated the Committee.

Proponents and Opponents of the Sin Tax Reform

One key strategy used by reform proponents involved presenting the Sin Tax not as a tool for generating revenue but rather as a health-focused instrument that would help attain Universal Health Care. A government official explained:

“But when we said, ‘This is really a health measure, not a revenue measure,’ I mean, then you are able to create more allies, yeah? Because health resonates with more people than—I mean, if you say, ‘Revenue,’ people just said, ‘You’re just greedy, you want more money for government to corrupt.’”13

Proponents included civil society organizations, international organizations, and government departments and offices such as the Office of the President, the Department of Budget and Management, the Department of Finance, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the Department of Health, some legislators, and local government executives. Moreover, “political mapping was also undertaken continuously throughout the legislative process to identify supporters, fence-sitters and staunch opponents.”13

Proponents anticipated strong opposition from opponents such as the National Tobacco Administration, the Philippines Tobacco Institute, the Philippines Tobacco Growers Association, as well as some legislators who were part of the Northern Alliance, an influential group composed of members of Congress from Northern Luzon.

Hence, before speaking publicly about the Sin Tax Reform, Secretary Ona, DoF Secretary Cesar Purisima, and DBM Secretary Florencio Abad met to align their messaging. The DoF convened meetings, inviting point persons from other government agencies and civil society to share updates and concerns and to coordinate actions in support of the Reform. Undersecretary of Finance Jeremias Paul emphasized the value of a “whole of government approach,” noting that “If we’re not united, powerful opposing lobbies will capitalize on that.”

The core group of proponents met regularly in what they called the “war room” to align strategies, share their perspectives, and have a unified response to issues raised by the tobacco industry and their allies. They also allowed members to enact their own strategies if they were geared towards a common goal. They also anticipated that the issue of burden sharing between the tobacco and alcohol industries would most likely be an issue raised in Congress. Discussions ensued, and consensus was reached that they needed to choose their battles. In the case of tobacco versus alcohol, they focused on tobacco.13In the case of alcohol, the government’s key objective was to be compliant with WTO rules. The Philippines lost a case in the WTO as it was deemed that domestic alcohol products had a favorable tax treatment over imported ones. Moreover, tobacco use posed a bigger health challenge than alcohol at that time. As an NGO actor explained:

“The alcohol people threatened not to support the reform unless they were given some concession. So we didn’t fight that battle, in order to get the tobacco reforms”13

To be consistent with existing Sin Tax legislation and mitigate opposition, proponents also proposed allocating a portion of incremental revenues to encourage farmers in tobacco-growing provinces to shift to other crops or economic activities. Secretary Ona consulted with the Department of Agriculture’s National Tobacco Administration to understand how the Reform might impact tobacco farmers and cigarette manufacturing workers. Because of this, some were concerned Dr. Ona might favor more conservative tax increases. He countered, “I was aware that five of our provinces depend on tobacco as a major industry,” Ona explained. “I wanted to ask them what their concerns were and to convince them that this was a health issue.”

Data Proves Critical

The tobacco industry and their allies raised a lot of issues about the wisdom of raising tobacco taxes significantly. They claimed that raising tobacco taxes increases smuggling and illicit trade, is anti-poor or regressive, that revenues will go down, and it will have a negative impact on employment. The alcohol industry was not vocal in its opposition.

To counter tobacco industry lobbying, civil society groups reached out to local chronic disease experts to estimate the economic costs of smoking and compare it to the tobacco revenues collected by the government. Dr. Antonio Dans, a Filipino epidemiologist, had been studying the economic and health costs of tobacco for more than a decade. His work had never been used for advocacy. One advocate explained:

“It had worked for the tobacco industry that nobody could connect these things. All of these data existed, so the work in 2011 was to connect the dots.”

Dr. Dans updated his previous studies using current data and found the cost of death and disease resulting from four tobacco-related illnesses (lung cancer, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, coronary artery disease, and cerebrovascular disease) to be PhP 188.8 billion (USD 4.22 billion) — nearly 2% of GDP.14 Costs included health care, productivity losses, and premature death losses.

Dr. Dans also modeled how many premature deaths could be prevented given various combinations of price elasticity of demand values and excise tax increase assumptions. He created a table showing how various combinations of price elasticity of demand and magnitude of tax increase assumptions would affect smoking prevalence and revenue generation. The exercise was meant to point out that regardless of the price elasticity of demand assumption, the net impact on revenues would be positive. Drawing on the data, the DoF and coalition members decided to advocate for the highest tax rate possible. Traditionally, DoF and DBM preferred not to earmark legislation because it restricted the government’s flexibility. In this case, all government parties agreed that it will be an exception and that the incremental revenues from higher tobacco and alcohol taxes would be “soft-earmarked” with the DoF drafting the implementing regulations.

The DoF calculated the price elasticity of demand for cigarettes to be –0.5, meaning that a 10% increase in cigarette prices would yield, on average, a 5% reduction in cigarette consumption. Tobacco industry stakeholders argued that elasticity was closer to –0.8, suggesting that a tax increase would discourage smoking so much that the revenue-generating goals of the bill would be undermined. Lower consumption would have a negative economic impact, they warned, stifling business for local tobacco farmers and cigarette manufacturing companies. Some also cautioned that such a tax increase would disproportionately burden poor Filipinos.

In contrast, proponents of the tax increase cited studies showing that job and economic losses owing to higher tobacco taxes were usually more than offset by increased spending and employment in other sectors. Studies suggested money previously spent on tobacco was diverted to other goods and services.15,16 In response to arguments that higher tobacco taxes would be regressive, the DoF countered that poor Filipinos had the most to gain because they would not otherwise be able to afford health care.

Traditionally, the DoF took the lead on submitting tax proposals to Congress. For the Sin Tax legislation, Paul reflected, “What differentiated this from past efforts was that health and finance were working together.” Ona and Purisima entrusted day-to-day coordination and communications to their under-secretaries. DoF Undersecretary Paul and his team helped Secretary Ona determine how much revenue the DoH required to achieve its goals of universal health coverage, while DoH Undersecretary Herbosa worked with the DoF and civil society coalition to emphasize the legislation’s health objectives.

Getting the Law Passed

With respect to the tax reform, an agreement was also reached with President Aquino on the negotiable and non-negotiable parameters so that discussions with the industry stakeholders would be transparent. The non-negotiable reform parameters were: (a) removal of the price/brand classification freeze, which gave legacy brands a tax advantage over new entrants; (b) indexation of tax rates to inflation; and (c) compliance to WTO rules with respect to alcohol. The negotiables were: (a) length of transition period from a four-tiered structure to a two-tiered or unitary tax structure; (b) rate of tax increases; and (c) period of time between tax rate increases.

Legislative power in the Philippines rests with Congress, which is made up of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The House, which has 250 members, and the Senate, which has 24 senators, are important for enacting tax legislation such as the Sin Tax. Under the Philippine Constitution, all revenue bills must emanate from the House of Representatives. The Senate has the power and responsibility to suggest changes or modifications to proposed Bills.13

Historically, proponents had typically faced opposition in the Ways and Means Committee of the House, which was the first step in getting a revenue bill passed, and almost always, this Committee was dominated by the tobacco industry. Fortunately, the 2010 House elections elected a new chair of the House Ways and Means Committee who did not have ties with the tobacco industry.13

Even before the Sin Tax House Bill was published, the tobacco industry mobilized farmers and factory workers to protest with the aim of stopping or at least slowing the passage of the House Bill. Northern Alliance members proposed lower rates and a three-tiered tax structure. Faced with this political pressure, the House Bill’s authors made some compromises, agreeing to a two-tiered structure and a phased transition. San Miguel Corporation, one of the largest corporations in the Philippines and the dominant beer player, with revenues equivalent to 5.4% of GDP, was a critical player in advancing this Bill. To secure their support, pro-Sin Tax legislators lowered the premium on fermented liquor brands to include its popular premium beer brand. Similar negotiations were made with representatives of the Distilled Spirits Association of the Philippines.

Despite organized opposition from the tobacco growers and manufacturers, the Filipino public, recognizing the potential health care benefits, was overwhelmingly supportive. An organization representing local government leaders appealed to a nationally known former governor from a tobacco-growing province to endorse the legislation by publicly denouncing the notion that higher Sin Taxes would lead to the demise of the Philippines’ tobacco industry—a popular argument among opponents. The Governor supported the local government leaders and argued the tax would “level the playing field” for smaller domestic companies trying to compete with Philip Morris Fortune Tobacco Corporation (PMFTC), a joint venture between Fortune Tobacco Corporation and Philip Morris International. Secretary Ona believed the former Governor’s public support of the Bill convinced several politicians from northern tobacco-producing provinces to support it.

The coalition organized press conferences, testified before Congress, and worked closely with media outlets to broadcast data on the negative effects of smoking. Former Secretaries of Finance and Health who had participated in past Sin Tax Reform efforts spoke publicly in favor of the Bill. When Secretary Ona spoke publicly, he emphasized the Bill’s health aims. He noted:

“…[This] was probably the most important role I played: to make it very clear to everybody to forget about it being a tax measure and focus instead on it being a health measure.”

Dr. Dans and other coalition members presented the data showing how different tax rates would impact smoking and revenue generation during legislative hearings. Proponents began calling the Sin Tax Reform Bill an “anti-cancer tax” and rallied more than 50 medical associations to sign a petition in favor of it.

A government official observed, “Anything coming from government is considered propaganda, and anything coming from legislators and other politicians is perceived as meant to enhance their political careers.” To put additional pressure on Congress, the coalition created a public webpage that tracked which legislators supported the bill and which opposed it. “Elections were scheduled for May 2013, and people were checking how senators had voted,” one advocate explained. “We made it an election issue.”

International credit rating agencies were also watching the Bill’s trajectory carefully. They recognized its potential to broaden the Philippines’ fiscal base for higher spending on infrastructure, health, and education. In October 2013, Moody’s Investors Service joined Fitch Ratings and Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services in upgrading its assessment of the country’s debt quality to a level below investment grade. The DoF hoped to achieve an investment grade rating—which would reduce some borrowing costs and attract more investment funds—by 2014.

The Sin Tax Bill, being a revenue bill, required House passage, and Congressman Sid Ungab, Chairman of the Ways and Means in the House of Representatives had to strategize how to get the bill out of the committee, mindful that a majority of members were allied with the tobacco industry. To address this hurdle, Secretary Purisima requested a meeting with the President, the House Speaker, and key members of the Ways and Means Committee, on the reform parameters.

They compromised on the House version, knowing they could work on a better Senate version, and it passed on June 6, 2012.13

After the House approval, the Sin Tax House Bill required Senate passage. The Senate could either propose its own version of the Sin Tax Bill or just ratify the House bill version. However, Senator Ralph Recto, then chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, filed a Senate version of the Sin Tax Bill which, when passed, was very similar to Philip Morris’ low-rate proposal. Consequently, there was an outcry from civil society, with some coining the Senate bill as the “Recto-Morris Bill”. Sin Tax proponents in the Philippines used various strategies, including lobbying, media advocacy, and daily rallies asking for Senator Recto’s resignation. Under public pressure, Senator Recto resigned from his position as Chairman and was replaced by Senator Franklin Drilon, whose wife died of lung cancer. A government official explained:

“But what really moved the reform for us was that the chairman, [he] was behind us all the way. So, he used his powers and authority as the Chair to move the discussion and the approval in favor of the reform.”13

The Senate version of the bill proposed by Senator Drilon had a unitary tax structure, tax rates indexed to inflation, and a five-year transition period.

The House and Senate passed separate versions of the measure; the difference between the two Bills was subsequently resolved in a Bicameral Conference Committee. This was another challenge as the tobacco and alcohol industries were able to put in their allies in the Bicameral Conference Committee. Both Senator Drilon and Congressman Ungab, while chairing the Senate and House negotiating panels, respectively, did not have full control of the membership of the Bicameral Conference Committee as it was the Speaker of the House and the Senate President (a known tobacco industry ally) who would finally make that determination. After long deliberations, consensus was reached in the Bicameral Conference Committee, and their version of the Bill had to be ratified by both Houses of Congress.

On December 11, 2012, the committee signed the report and sent the measure to the President for approval. Both Houses of Congress ratified the bicameral version of the Sin Tax Bill with a very narrow margin in the Senate – 10 votes for and 9 votes against. President Aquino signed the Bill (Republic Act 10351, more commonly referred to as “the Sin Tax Reform Act”) into law on December 19, 2012, with the higher tax rates taking effect on January 1, 2013.

Initial Results

With the passage of the Sin Tax Reform Law, cigarette taxes increased by up to 340% in the first year of implementation18, and the average price per cigarette pack increased from PhP 21.12 in 2012 to PhP 31.26 in 2013.19 Total Sin Tax revenue collections for tobacco and alcohol reached PhP 70.4 billion (US$1.57 billion) and PhP 33 billion (US$737.7 million), respectively during 2013. The total tobacco excise tax collection in 2013 represented a 114% increase over 2012 collections, while total alcohol tax collections grew by 38%. The Sin Tax Reform Act resulted in an unprecedented year-over-year increase in the DOH’s budget of 57%. 85% of incremental tobacco tax revenues and 100% of incremental alcohol tax revenues were earmarked for health. Of these combined revenues, 80% would be used to finance PhilHealth, the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals, and health awareness programs. The remaining 20% would be used for health infrastructure improvements and support for indigent patients. Incremental tobacco tax revenues not supporting health (15%) would fund economic development projects in tobacco-growing provinces.

Surveys conducted in 2014 found a marked decline in smoking across all demographics. The most dramatic declines were in the lowest income quintile (from 38% to 25%) and among adults 18–24 years of age (from 35% to 18%). Proponents of the Sin Tax believed the reduction in smoking was largely the result of fewer Filipinos starting the habit. Dr. Antonia Dans, who had presented the costs of tobacco-related diseases during the Sin Tax Reform debates and whose epidemiologic research spanned a variety of lifestyle-related diseases, attributed the change to the Sin Tax Reform effort. He said:

“Studies show that people don’t exercise in the Philippines because there are no facilities for nonmotorized traffic. There’s no place to walk or to bike. Filipinos don’t eat vegetables because they’re too expensive, and they smoke because tobacco is so cheap. So, we used this logic, and whereas for 30 years we were unable to reduce smoking by telling people it was bad for them, with just a small tax measure, the prevalence went down from 31% to less than 26%. This seems small, but it’s the equivalent of 3 million fewer smokers in 2013. Our estimate is that about 32,000 premature deaths were averted.”

References

  1. A social contract with the Filipino people |Official Gazette of the … (n.d.).
    https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/about/gov/exec/bsaiii/platform-of-government/
  2. Philippines – Global Youth Tobacco Survey 2007. (n.d.). Extranet.who.int.
    https://extranet.who.int/ncdsmicrodata/index.php/catalog/827/related-materials
  3. Food and Nutrition Research Institute. Philippines: National Demographic and Health Survey. Manila; 2008.
    http://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/FR224/FR224.pdf
  4. World Health Organization. Tobacco fact sheet Key facts. (n.d.).
    https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/campaigns-and-initiatives/world-no-tobacco-day-2020/wntd-tobacco-fact-sheet.pdf
  5. Philippine Statistics Authority. A Filipino family earns an average annual income of P206 thousand in 2009 (preliminary results from the 2009 Family Income and Expenditure Survey). 2010.
    https://psa.gov.ph/statistics/incomeexpenditure/fies/node/1405
  6. Steele G, Avila J, Miller D, Britan G. Ending extreme poverty in the Philippines through urban‑led growth. In: Shah R, Unger N, eds. Frontier in Development 2014: Ending Extreme Poverty. Vol Washington: U.S. Agency for International Development; 2014:82‑87.
    https://seatca.org/dmdocuments/Media_Farming%20Regional%20Paper_final.pdf
  7. Dumlao D. OFW remittances to increase by 8.5% in 2014.Philippine Daily Inquirer.
    http://business.inquirer.net/160057/ofw-remittances-to-increase-by-8-5-in-2014-standard-chartered
  8. Parties to the WHO FCTC (ratifications and accessions). (2014, May 5). Framework Convention Alliance.
    https://fctc.org/parties-ratifications-and-accessions-latest/
  9. Espino R, Assunta M, Kin F. Tobacco Farming in the ASEAN Region. Bangkok; 2013.
    https://seatca.org/dmdocuments/Media_Farming%20Regional%20Paper_final.pdf
  10. Fund, I. M. (2012). Philippines: Technical Assistance Report on Road Map for a Pro-Growth and Equitable Tax System. IMF Staff Country Reports, 2012(060).
    https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/002/2012/060/article-A001-en.xml

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Inter-ministerial collaboration can take a number of forms, varying greatly in commitment and scale. A ministry’s commitment to collaboration can range from informal to formal and the scale of collaboration can range from bilateral to whole-of-government.

Commitment

Informal Intermediate Formal
Unofficially Recognized, Non-Binding Officially Recognized, Non-Binding Officially Recognized, Legally Binding

Scale

Bilateral Sectoral Whole-of-Government
Cooperation of 2 ministries Cooperation of 3+ ministries (with related interests) Cooperation of many ministries to implement a coordinated national strategy aimed at achieving a major national goal

Why Collaborate?

There are significant advantages to working across ministries in various situations, but inter-ministerial collaboration defies the traditional silo organization of government. Changing the way government usually works is not easy and should be deliberately planned and diligently managed if it is to be effective.

Benefits
  • Optimize use of public resources
  • Combine and amplify related skills and capacities
  • Welcome a wider inclusion of perspectives into the policymaking process and increase the degree to which policies reflect the will of the public by involving previously unheard perspectives
  • Increase clarity surrounding roles, responsibilities, goals, and mission
  • Increase the satisfaction of constituents and enthusiasm of staff
Barriers
  • Challenging to ensure shared ownership for inter-ministerial collaboration
  • Overlapping jurisdiction between ministries
  • Unwillingness of some ministers and other government officials to relinquish and share power over decision-making and agenda-setting processes
  • Lack of clearly operationalized collaboration plans

When to Collaborate:

Ministers should be routinely on the lookout for opportunities to advance their specific policy goals or national priorities through closer collaboration with other ministries or government agencies. Such opportunities may be relatively modest, focusing on one particular part of a bigger undertaking, or it could be jointly implementing a major complex program. In evaluating opportunities for inter-ministerial collaboration, ministers should consider the following key factors:

Considerations

  • Length of goals to be achieved: Opportunity to formalize medium to long term engagement between ministries towards a common goal
  • Level of information sharing required: Opportunity to integrate, share, and better validate data from different sources
  • Level of existing collaboration: Opportunity to build on existing institutional relationships
  • Required budgetary resources: Opportunity to consolidate resources to be used more efficiently
  • Required skills and capacity: Opportunity for peer learning and knowledge sharing across ministries
  • Required political capital: Opportunity to break through the status quo and accomplish meaningful institutional and sectoral change but sufficient risk tolerance needed

How to Collaborate:

The sustainability and success of a collaborative partnership fundamentally depends on the amount of time and effort invested in setting up the partnership, instituting the most practical organizational structure to oversee and implement the initiative, and consistent ministerial leadership. Clear lines of responsibility and accountability are essential. The following are key factors for the success of inter-ministerial collaboration:

Enabling Factors
  • Existence of strong and sustained ministerial initiative to drive process
  • Detailed, inclusive planning before implementation
  • Clear roles, routines, and lines of accountability for all parties
  • Relentless consultation to ensure inclusive input and generate cultural buy-in
  • Downstream collaborative routines and structures at regional levels when required
  • Designated budgetary resources pooled and allocated to a singular plan

1. WHY COLLABORATE? EVIDENCE FOR INTER-MINISTERIAL COLLABORATION

“…collaboration is capable of addressing complex social problems more effectively than ever before, achieving more and better outputs and outcomes for individuals and their families, empowering communities to be more self-reliant, and creating a more inclusive and coordinated public sector.”
-Debiprosad Majumdar, Social Policy Journal of New Zealand (2006)

As collaborative efforts in countries of varying cultural, historical, and economic backgrounds have gained more recognition, common learnings have emerged. This section sets out the evidence about inter-ministerial collaboration regarding varied approaches, benefits, and barriers for consideration by government leaders regardless of their country’s governance system or size of government.

Approaches to Inter-Ministerial Collaboration

Inter-ministerial collaboration can take a number of forms, varying in commitment and scale (Dill & Kopsick, 2017; Colgan, Kennedy, & Doherty, 2014). A ministry’s commitment to collaboration can range from the informal to the formal as outlined in Table 1. The scale of inter-ministerial collaboration ranges from bilateral to whole-of-government as outlined in Table 2.

Table 1. Levels of Commitment in Inter-Ministerial Collaboration
Commitment Description
Informal Unofficially Recognized, Non-Binding
E.g. Unscheduled, periodic sharing of information
Intermediate Officially Recognized, Non-Binding
E.g. Memorandum of understanding
Formal Officially Recognized, Legally Binding
E.g. Collaboration enshrined in law

Adapted from Dill and Kopsick, 2017

Table 2. Levels of Scale in Inter-Ministerial Collaboration
Scale Description
Bilateral Cooperation of two ministries
Sectoral Cooperation of three or more ministries (typically those with related interests)
Whole-of-Government Cooperation of many ministries to implement a coordinated national strategy aimed at achieving a major national goal

There is no single way to collaborate effectively. Ministers can select the form of collaboration – with regards to level of commitment and scale – that is most appropriately suited to their goal. As an example, Table 3 outlines multiple forms of inter-ministerial collaboration across the spectrums of scale and commitment that could be implemented by a government looking to improve its youth health outcomes.

Table 3. Example Demonstrating Various Forms of Inter-Ministerial Collaboration to Improve Youth Health Outcomes
Scale Informal Intermediate Formal
Whole-of-Government In their inaugural address, the Prime Minister asks ministry leaders to prioritize sharing of data related to youth health across ministries The government submits a proposal soliciting international funding that will be used to create an integrated, cross-government data platform to better monitor youth health outcomes and other relevant data across all sectors The Prime Minister declares improvement of youth health to be a national priority in the country’s national economic development plan and ties significant national-level funding to one inter-ministerial plan to improve youth health indicators
Sectoral The Ministries of Education, Health, and Housing grant respective Deputy Ministers access to data focused on youth health The Ministries of Education, Health, and Transportation draft and sign a non-binding agreement to share responsibility in ensuring youth have physical access to affordable healthcare The Ministries of Education, Health, Sport, and Agriculture are required by legislation to contribute representatives to a taskforce aimed at reducing rates of childhood obesity
Bilateral The Ministry of Education agrees to exchange student health data with the Ministry of Health on a quarterly basis The Ministry of Education signs a MOU with the Ministry of Health to create a taskforce and conduct research on the integration of healthcare services into schools Parliament passes a law mandating collaboration between the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Education to improve youth health, requiring monthly reports detailing the outcomes

Benefits of Inter-Ministerial Collaboration

When implemented with sufficient ministerial commitment and a clearly operationalized collaboration plan, the benefits of inter-ministerial collaboration can significantly bolster existing ministerial efforts and create long-lasting institutional change. Effective collaboration between ministries can achieve numerous benefits as outlined below:

  • Optimize use of public resources: Given the interrelated nature of most human development challenges, a key benefit of collaboration is its ability to use budgets for intersecting programs that overlap, allowing for more efficient use of public funding. Furthermore, improving returns on investment can motivate greater investment for future programs, from both domestic and international sources (Majumdar, 2006).
  • Combine and amplify related skills and capacities: Collaboration across ministries requires ministry officials to plan and implement together, prompting learning about each other’s sectoral considerations and developing intersectoral capabilities that support more effective and comprehensive programs (Wanna, 2008).
  • Welcome a wider inclusion of perspectives into the policymaking process, thereby increasing the degree to which policies reflect the will of the public: Inter-ministerial collaboration forces decision makers to hear varying perspectives and weigh costs and benefits beyond their sector – this is a decision-making process that better reflects human development and societal interactions (Wanna, 2008).
  • Increase clarity surrounding roles, responsibilities, goals, and mission: Tasks are more likely to be accomplished when the path to completion is reached together, when lines of accountability are rigid, and when communication plans are clear among all collaborating parties (Majumdar, 2006).
  • Increase the satisfaction of constituents and enthusiasm of staff: Ministry staff feel pride in delivering services in a more efficient way while constituents notice and appreciate integrated public services and effective public spending (Roberts & O’Connor, 2007).

Barriers to Inter-Ministerial Collaboration

Inter-ministerial collaboration has the ability to expand the quality and reach of government services. To achieve this potential, however, ministers must be prepared to identify and address complex challenges.

Even the most well-intentioned collaborative effort can fall victim to these common barriers:

  • Ensuring shared ownership for inter-ministerial collaboration can be challenging: While effective inter-ministerial collaboration requires clear leadership and lines of accountability, there is also a need for shared ownership to ensure that collaborative efforts are prioritized and ministerial obligations are met. Sharing credit among ministries is critical to ensure shared reward but also shared responsibility for collaborative implementation.
  • Presence of conflicting jurisdictions between ministries: Government ministries are built to operate in silos and yet often have highly interrelated or even overlapping mandates. For example, more than 50 percent of Sub-Saharan African countries and over 70 percent of West and Central African countries’ education systems are represented by two to four ministries, representing a challenge in establishing integrated goals and policies that will allow them to reach Sustainable Development Goal 4 (Neyestani-Hailu & Reuge, 2018).
  • Some ministers and other government officials are unwilling to relinquish and share power over decision-making and agenda-setting processes: Ministerial commitment is paramount to effective collaboration. However, many inter-ministerial initiatives exist within the context of other competitive political and financial forces. Ministers must be on board to sacrifice some amount of independent control for collective gain.
  • Lack of clearly operationalized collaboration plans: Collaboration in theory is insufficient. Ministers must agree to clear lines of accountability, communication routines, and chains of implementation at the outset of collaboration.

2. HOW TO COLLABORATE? APPLIED EXAMPLES OF INTER-MINISTERIAL COLLABORATION

“Public sector performance is fundamentally about governments being able to deliver on their policy commitments for the benefit of their citizens… However, many countries adopt sensible policies that do not result in better healthcare, education, sanitation, infrastructure management or reduced crime… Improving public sector performance therefore entails closing [implementation] gaps.”
-2018 World Bank Report on Public Sector Performance

Once ministers have the intention to collaborate, they must ensure that they have a plan to do so. Just as “policy without implementation is worse than no policy at all,” the intention to collaborate without a plan to operationalize it can actually obstruct progress (Majumdar, 2006). Thus, in order to effectively implement a collaborative initiative, ministers should clearly identify the following for each participating ministry:

  • Programmatic Role: What programs and/or elements of the collaborative initiative is this minister and ministry responsible for implementing? What are the key actions that they will take to do so? What is the timeline associated with each of these key actions?
  • Political Role: How can this minister and ministry use their political capital to support the collaborative initiative? How can they generate support with the President and/or Prime Minister, other ministers, constituents, and other stakeholders?
  • Collaborative Role: What is this minister and ministry’s role in communicating, liaising, holding others accountable to support effective collaboration? Who is the lead ministry? What lines of accountability will be drawn between ministries and what communication routines are expected? What is the chain of implementation?
  • Budgetary Information: How will fiscal space be created to support the cost of this collaborative initiative?

This section includes examples of collaborative initiatives that showcase collaboration at different levels of commitment and scale, examine how each initiative was operationalized, and the pitfalls and successes that resulted. Table 4 highlights where these case studies appear within the spectrum of scale and commitment.

Table 4. Case Studies in Inter-Ministerial Collaboration

Scale Examples
Whole-of-Government A. Moldova
B. Ethiopia
Sectoral C. Brazil
Bilateral D. Kenya

A. Collaborating to Improve the Livelihoods and Promote the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Moldova

Ministries/Agencies Involved:

  • Ministry of Education
  • National Bureau of Statistics
  • Ministry of Labor, Social Protection and Family
  • Ministry of Health

Programmatic, Political, and Collaborative Roles:

Ministry/Agency Role
Ministry of Education Prioritized funding of project; Code of Education modified to be more inclusive of students with disabilities; national curriculum on inclusive education created and used to train hundreds of teachers.
National Bureau of Statistics Began measuring information related to inclusive education and reformed their data collection process to promote accurate monitoring of project progress.
Ministry of Labor, Social Protection and Family Worked with organizations representing persons living with mental disabilities to reintegrate unnecessarily institutionalized persons back into their communities.
Ministry of Health During the writing and implementation of a national health initiative, ensured that community mental health centers were established in every district of the country.

Budgetary Information:

The Ministry of Education prioritized funding intended to ensure children with disabilities had access to mainstream education services; supplemented with international funding.

Successes:

  • Reduced traditionally siloed nature of ministries.
  • Collective strategy was carefully designed before the intervention began.
  • Society’s understanding of the rights of persons with disabilities increased.
  • The project planning teams involved persons who would be affected by its implementation.
  • Capacity of local health authorities increased.
  • Judges’ understanding of legal rights of persons with mental disabilities improved.
  • New admissions to mental health institutions were reduced and there was an increase in the reintegration of former institution residents into original communities.

Pitfalls:

  • Collaboration limited to singular funding proposal, not institutionalized to support future collaborative efforts.

From 2005 to 2015, the number of citizens with disabilities in Moldova had increased by 20% (UNDG, 2015). Access and quality of treatment for those with mental and intellectual disabilities was of particular concern for the government, as they are some of the most common types of disability in Moldova and these persons “are more vulnerable to exploitation, violence, and abuse and other losses of human rights” (UNDG, 2015). A welcome invitation arrived in 2012 when the government of Moldova was encouraged to submit plans for funding aimed at advancing the rights of its citizens with disabilities to the UN Partnership to Promote the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNPRPD). Leaders created a plan that involved the high-level collaboration of many segments of the Moldovan government which was eventually accepted and, following financial and logistical support from the UN, implementation began in January 2013 (UNDG, 2015).

Moldova’s national campaign to improve the standard of living for their citizens with disabilities utilized the whole-of-government approach. The plan submitted to the UN required that ministers and leaders of national bodies reform their respective areas of the government in a collective march towards a society more inclusive and informed of disability rights. Three of the core goals of the plan were to increase the capacity of city and regional authorities to support Moldovans with disabilities locally, deinstitutionalize persons whose disabilities did not require hospitalization, and increase the inclusivity of education systems. Each ministry had clearly defined responsibilities for implementation within their sector. The Ministry of Education developed a new national curriculum that emphasized inclusivity, taught practitioners how to effectively instruct all types of students, and ensured that their schools were inclusive. With the goal of accurately monitoring the implementation of inclusive practices in schools, the National Bureau of Statistics began to measure information related to inclusive education and reformed the framework related to their data collection process. The Ministry of Labor, Social Protection and Family introduced the National Strategy and Action Plan on Adult Deinstitutionalization to ensure that mental healthcare became covered under primary healthcare plans and that community health centers were opened in every region of Moldova. Finally, the Ministry of Health created the National Mental Health Programme, a nationwide medical strategy that resulted in the opening of community mental health centers in all districts of Moldova starting in January 2014.

B. Collaborating under the Seqota Declaration to Eliminate Stunting in Ethiopia

Ministries/Agencies Involved:

  • Ministry of Health
  • Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources
  • Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries
  • Ministry of Water, Irrigation, and Energy
  • Ministry of Education
  • Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs

Programmatic, Political, and Collaborative Roles:

Ministry/Agency Role
Ministry of Health Lead ministry; brought on board Deputy Prime Minister and Regional Presidents of critical regions to show support; improved delivery of direct nutrition interventions through the public health system; improved WaSH education and behavior.
Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources Increased production and consumption of locally available, nutrient-dense crops; co-chair coordinated multisectoral committees.
Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries Increased small-scale livestock ownership.
Ministry of Water, Irrigation, and Energy Expanded irrigation potential to improve water-use efficiency and extend growing seasons; improved quality and increased quantity of water in households, health facilities, and schools; improved access to hygienic sanitation facilities.
Ministry of Education Included school health and nutrition strategies in education programs to improve related services for school-age children; co-chair coordinated multisectoral committees.
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs Expanded existing social safety net program to improve child protection, women’s empowerment, gender equity, and economic access.

Budgetary Information:

Despite limited initial funds, strong guidance and commitment by government leaders effectively developed political will and led to increased financial investment; supported by international funding.

Successes:

  • Leaders’ effective use of political pressure yielded funding from donors that would otherwise not have been available.
  • Reduced traditionally siloed nature of ministries.
  • Clear organizational structure for collaboration.

Pitfalls:

  • Weak accountability between collaborating ministries.
  • Effectiveness of coordination varies at regional levels of government.

Ethiopia has long identified stunting as a serious, intersectoral concern impeding its human capital development efforts. Children who are stunted have, on average, lower academic performance, reduced wages as adults, and a potentially heightened risk of nutrition-related chronic illnesses later in life (WHO, n.d.). Early efforts to collaborate with regards to nutrition led to the development of the National Nutrition Coordinating Body (NNCB) and the National Nutrition Technical Committee (NNTC) as part of the National Nutrition Program I (NNP I, 2008-2015) (HMLP, 2019). The NNCB involves 13 government sectors and is led by the Minister of Health with the Ministers of Agriculture and Education as co-chairs. It meets every six months and develops an annual work plan to ensure that various sectors are mainstreaming nutrition activities into detailed sector-specific plans, allocating budget to nutrition interventions, and assigning focal persons to work on nutrition. The NNTC, which also involves 13 government sectors and nongovernmental stakeholders, has three steering committees on program management, food fortification, and monitoring and evaluation. These two national entities have different goals as the NNCB is responsible for providing policy and strategic decisions related to the NNP. However, the NNTC works under the NNCB, and is responsible for the technical work related to the federal level NNP coordination. At the regional level, there is a similar structure, known as the RNCB and RNTC.

Multisectoral coordination as part of the NNPI was able to demonstrate some improvement in outcomes, but was not fully effective in creating the intended outcomes. Interventions in agriculture, health, and other sectors were not properly contextualized and everyone in government acted separately without keeping an eye on what was actually necessary to get the job done. The Minister of Health knew that incorporating nutrition goals and actions into existing programs across sectors could enhance said programs’ nutrition sensitivity and thus their likelihood of improving nutrition outcomes. Thus, in July 2015, the government initiated the Seqota Declaration, a high-level whole-of-government commitment to end stunting in children under two years by 2030. The Declaration was accompanied by the launch of the National Nutrition Program II (NNP II, 2016-2020) and the National Nutrition-Sensitive Agriculture Strategy (2016-2020). The Seqota Declaration builds on and supports the implementation of NNP II which highlights the “Five Building Blocks of Effective Nutrition Governance” as consensus building and coordination, political commitment, financing, service delivery capacity, and transparency and accountability (HMLP, 2019).

The Seqota Declaration has ten multisectoral strategic objectives and is implemented by six federal sectors (Ministry of Health; Ministry of Agriculture; Ministry of Water, Irrigation and Energy; Minister of Labor and Social Affairs; Ministry of Education; Ministry of Women, Youth, and Children). In addition to these six ministries, development partners and community organizations are also involved. To ensure stakeholders were correctly envisioning collaboration in practice, they adopted a clear collaboration framework known as the “Three Ones” which meant that there was “one goal, one plan, and one monitoring and evaluation system” in place for better coordination across sectors (HMLP, 2019). The “Three Ones” collaboration framework dictates that all nutrition-related monitoring and evaluation activities be assessed under one integrated and unified system. The different sectors involved in the Seqota Declaration each have a list of key performance indicators for which they are responsible. These indicators cut across sectors where relevant. For example, key WaSH indicators illustrated that the MOH needed to more effectively promote hygiene and sanitation practices by collaborating with the MOE during targeted interventions at school. Routine service and administrative records collected through sectoral information systems were used to provide information for timely monitoring, supervisory visits, and review meetings. Currently, the FMOH and UNICEF are working together on a pilot Unified Nutrition Information System (UNISE), a performance management tool that allows all sectors and partners to upload their targets and results so as to generate scorecards at the federal, regional, zonal, and woreda levels. This unified system is extremely important for progress towards meeting Seqota Declaration goals as it facilitates robust and continuous nutrition data management and becomes useful when seeking further investment.

In the past, there had been concerns about issues related to the bureaucracy of government, which limited intersectoral coordination mechanisms to exist only horizontally at federal and regional levels. In order to achieve the goals of the Seqota Declaration, it was necessary to establish entities with people from different sectors that would be fully dedicated to the initiative. These entities were realized with the creation of three Program Delivery Units (PDUs), a tangible “embodiment of intersectoral government” (HMLP, 2019). PDUs are small teams of multisectoral experts placed in the federal, Amhara, and Tigray President’s offices to secure higher-level political commitment to regional nutrition activities, to ensure accountability to the highest level of the regional government, and to provide technical leadership and performance management support.

Approximately two years into the implementation of NNP II and the Seqota Declaration, it is clear that the NNCB has played an important role in bringing together various ministries. However, ongoing challenges with accountability and ownership continue – there is a persistent perception that nutrition is primarily a Ministry of Health issue and a lack of accountability across ministries represents a barrier to successful multisectoral coordination. Even as nutrition has grown in national importance and public awareness, ministry staff feel that with no cross-ministry reporting structures, there has been a lack of ownership and clarity about responsibilities for nutrition outcomes. A key component of accountability is the clear delineation of roles and responsibilities for all stakeholders. However, defining a role for each sector is a challenge when it comes to nutrition: Deciding where the work of one ministry starts and ends and how it interfaces with other ministries at the national, regional, and local levels is a dynamic process with implications for political interests, leadership, budgeting, and accountability.

C. Collaborating under Criança Feliz to Improve Early Childhood Development in Brazil

Ministries/Agencies Involved:

  • Ministry of Citizenship
  • Ministry of Education
  • Ministry of Human Rights and Culture
  • Ministry of Health

Programmatic, Political, and Collaborative Roles:

Ministry/Agency Role
Ministry of Citizenship Lead ministry; coordinated efforts through Secretariat for Promotion of Human Development; established home-visiting budget.
Ministry of Education Accommodated children found to have learning disabilities during home visits.
Ministry of Human Rights and Culture Ensured that home visits under the program included culturally relevant activities for all children.
Ministry of Health Improved the health conditions of children found to be ill during home visits.

Budgetary Information:

Each ministry contributed financially to the program; the National Management Committee, the main coordinating agency, determined the overall funding that the inter-ministerial team would allocate to the program; the Ministry of Social Development determined the home-visiting budget.

Successes:

  • Led by a passionate and persistent minister.
  • Scientific evidence supported the initiative.
  • Civil society coalition organized as a formal network.
  • Parliamentary coalition with representatives from all political groups was formed.
  • Shared management structures were constructed.
  • Implemented by a coordinating body comprised of diverse stakeholders.

Pitfalls:

  • On-the-ground implementation was highly variable due to unreliable levels of local preparation.
  • Some families resisted this new program fearing they would lose benefits from existing social programs.

In October 2016, Brazil had 15 million children under the age of four and high rates of poverty (HMLP, 2019). Economic progress had been made through cash transfer programs, but they were not enough to break the cycle of poverty and overcome the long-term challenges of violence in the country. Thus, Brazil’s Ministry of Social and Agrarian Development (now Ministry of Citizenship) introduced a collaborative early childhood development intervention called the Criança Feliz Program (PCF). PCF is a program that involves regular home visitations as the basis for multisectoral support of early childhood development. Primeira Infancia Melhor (PIM), a predecessor program to PCF, established the expectation that the division of ministry roles during home visits be widely recognized. For example, the discovery of a medical issue would require the Ministry of Health to act; the presence of a child with a learning disability automatically prompts action from the Ministry of Education; the Ministry of Human Rights and Culture is obliged to ensure that the government visitors brought culturally appropriate materials with them to the homes.

The introduction of PCF was only possible due to the significant groundwork laid by Minister of Citizenship Osmar Terra that established early childhood care as a national priority: Minister Terra launched a cross-sector alliance of child advocacy stakeholders in 2003, formed another far-reaching coalition in 2007 that united actors from across government ministries, civil society organizations, and businesses, and later led the charge to create a collection of representatives from ministries that sought to enact a federal law instituting a national legal framework guaranteeing the rights of children across varying public policy domains. PCF began as a direct consequence of this federal law.

The Ministry of Citizenship coordinates the efforts through the Secretariat for the Promotion of Human Development and management committees exist at the national, state, and municipal levels. The National Management Committee houses representatives from the Ministries of Education, Health, Human Rights, Culture and Social Development in what they call the “inter-ministerial government space” (HMLP, 2019). This is a place in which all involved parties have previously agreed to uphold the mission of implementing PCF; as a result, it serves as a place to coordinate and solve technical issues, rather than argue about objectives. This intersectoral committee was created by presidential decree, giving it the formality and gravitas to ensure that each ministry prioritizes it appropriately. The management committee has high-level representation from each ministry, and it is therefore a place for decision-making, rather than day-to-day collaboration. To get things done, there is also the Technical Group, under which a number of inter-ministerial working groups coordinate efforts.

An example of collaboration that has been achieved by the Technical Group and the National Management Committee is the redesign of the notebook that mothers receive after they give birth. Traditionally, the Ministry of Health would provide such mothers a notebook that included general child health tips. Now, since the creation of the National Management Committee, these notebooks include information about child development milestones and cultural specificities contributed by other ministries. Other examples of collaboration include a guide for visitors for children with disabilities and the development of training materials and workshops for both visitors and families.

The general duties of the National Management Committee are to strengthen the intersectionality of the program, to approve training and program resources, to make decisions about the stages of the program, and to agree on regulatory instruments that distribute responsibilities for different policies. One especially important responsibility, though, is to set the intersectoral budget.

As coordinator of the program, the Ministry of Citizenship sets the home-visiting budget, which it distributes to the municipalities through the National Fund of Social Assistance. Its leaders decided to organize this fund so that the resources would flow directly from the ministry to each municipality, avoiding intermediaries and countless individual contracts. However, a budget for home-visiting is inadequate to ensure the success of PCF. It was important that each ministry allocate funds in order to effectively address the intersectoral needs that emerge from the visits. The National Management Committee is the place where the ministries negotiate the allocations that each ministry will contribute to PCF.

At the state level, similar Management Committees exist, but are composed of representatives from State Secretariats. The role of Secretariats is to monitor the implementation and to give technical assistance to the municipalities. To achieve this goal, Secretariats hire multiplicadores, professionals who are educated by national-level trainers. In turn, they go on to train local coordinators, who train local visitors. This modality of waterfall training has led to a number of implementation problems; however, it was the only way that Brazil could scale the program to over 2,000 municipalities in just one and a half years.

At the municipal level, Municipal Management Committees are much more operational in scope. They discuss, support, and approve operational issues of the program. For instance, they identify the beneficiaries of home visits, hire and organize local training for visitors, follow up with different sectoral responses on the demands that they identify, and coordinate with local NGO networks. At the municipal level, intersectoral collaboration is often informal and they escalate any challenges to the state level.

A final component of Brazil’s inter-ministerial implementation effort is its integrated information system, Cadastro Único, which allows different ministries to identify families and work from the same data. This has been an important tool because without it, the registries of potential beneficiaries housed by each ministry would vary, thereby leading to coordination problems and leaving people unattended. This has also allowed for more effective monitoring and evaluation of implementation across ministries.

Today, after almost three years, PCF has survived a change of president in Brazil and it grows day by day as more and more municipalities voluntarily sign up for the program. To date, PCF has made it possible for nearly 500,000 children and 85,000 pregnant women in Brazil to receive home visits every week, a total of almost 2.4 million visits a month in over 2,000 municipalities (HMLP, 2019).

D. Collaborating Through a Zoonotic Disease Unit (ZDU) to Improve Public Health Outcomes in Kenya

Ministries/Agencies Involved:

  • Ministry of Health
  • Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries

Programmatic, Political, and Collaborative Roles:

Ministry/Agency Role
Ministry of Health Contributed one medical epidemiologist to ZDU; created and supported county-level One Health teams; advocated for and coordinated funding.
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries Contributed one veterinary epidemiologist to ZDU; created and supported county-level One Health teams; advocated for and coordinated funding.

Budgetary Information:

Each ministry contributed financially to the ZDU and supplemented ZDU funds by engaging multilateral and bilateral agencies and partners, local and international research institutions and universities working on zoonosis in Kenya.

Successes:

  • Reduced traditionally siloed nature of ministries and sectors.
  • Strengthened capacity for surveillance and reporting in the animal health sector.
  • Foundation of effective national coordinating office.

Pitfalls:

  • Implementation gaps continued at the local level.
  • Unequal financial capacity of participating ministries prevented full realization of plan.
  • Change in government structure required modification of strategy.

A recent global movement called One Health recognizes the connection between the health of people, animals, and the environment and seeks to employ a collaborative, multisectoral approach to achieve improved outcomes for each. Kenya is one country that utilizes the One Health approach. On August 2, 2011, the Ministry of Health (MoH) and Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries (MALF) signed a Memorandum of Understanding agreeing to collaborate by jointly administering the ZDU (Republic of Kenya, 2014). The ideal structure and mission of the ZDU was investigated and debated for four years before being finalized and the divide in power and responsibility between ministries was clearly specified before the collaboration began. The MoH and MALF maintain equal authority over the ZDU, each contributing financially and periodically staffing the unit with one senior epidemiologist who ultimately returns to their respective ministry to report updates (Republic of Kenya, 2014; Mbabu et. al, 2014). Through the ZDU, the ministries co-author human and animal health studies, create and support county-level One Health teams, and advocate for and coordinate funding (Mwatondo et al., 2017). The national One Health coordination office was tasked with improving the prevention, monitoring, and control of zoonotic epidemics. While the ZDU is primarily a bilateral approach to collaboration, the team is empowered to collaborate with experts affiliated with both government and private sectors from veterinary health, public health, wildlife health, and information communication and technology, among others.

Relatedly, forward-looking changes were made to the education and on-the-job training of veterinary and medical fields. Since 2004, veterinarian and medical students have had the option to lead teams comprised of both fields through a zoonotic outbreak investigation as part of their training in order to develop a One Health-ready workforce (Mwatondo et al., 2017). This joint training approach has removed long-standing boundaries between the education systems and replaced them with collective networks. This collaboration continues into their professional lives, when medical specialists from the MoH and veterinary specialists from the MALF are trained in unison, allowing members from each ministry to acquire a deep understanding of the other (Munyua et al., 2019).

Since its foundation, the ZDU and its partners have discovered new pathogens key to improving readiness for zoonotic disease prevention; widened and improved national programming that increases public awareness of zoonotic disease prevention; developed and updated evidence-based prioritization of zoonotic diseases critical to public safety; incorporated the reporting of zoonotic diseases into the general disease surveillance system, ensuring prioritized zoonotic diseases are no longer neglected; and developed the Strategic Plan for the Elimination of Human Rabies in Kenya 2014-2030 (Munyua et al., 2019; Octaria et al., 2018).

3. SUCCESSFUL TAKEAWAYS: A DECISION-MAKING GUIDE

This section synthesizes the previous information into a decision-making manual that can guide policymakers through the process of launching collaborative efforts across ministries.

Determining the Optimal Level of Commitment

Collaboration between ministers spans a spectrum of commitment ranging from the informal to the formal. The characteristics of a given intervention that spurs inter-ministerial collaboration can provide helpful insight into determining the ideal level of commitment for that endeavor.

Leaders of an intervention would want to advocate for informal collaboration if:

  • The intervention involves short-term goals (Majumdar, 2006).
  • The intervention would be better supported by the occasional sharing of information or sharing of limited resources because the initial process of completely intertwining budgets and/or significant resources would be too time-consuming relative to the goals.
  • Existing collaboration between stakeholders is weak or nonexistent and it seems unlikely that coordination will be mandated by law anytime soon.

Alternatively, an intervention should be coordinated and implemented through formal inter-ministerial collaboration if:

  • The intervention seeks to generate substantial, long-term change (Majumdar, 2006).
  • The intervention would benefit from deeply connected budgets and in-depth deliberation on every aspect of the process and has the initial time to devote to this process.
  • The political will exists to enshrine collaborative principles between stakeholders in law.

Determining the Optimal Level of Scale

Inter-ministerial collaboration can occur between two ministries (bilateral), three or more ministries of related focus (sectoral), or involve all or most government ministries (whole-of-government). When concluding which of these three avenues of scale is most appropriate for a given collaboration, it is most important to consider the number, demographics, and needs of the targeted constituents. Consider the following examples:

  • Bilateral collaboration: The Ministry of Veterans Affairs is interested in improving the lives of military service members after the conclusion of their service. It has been determined that by far the most pressing challenge for former military service members is meeting the expected qualifications of new jobs as they transition into new sectors. Thus, increasing the accessibility and quality of veteran job training programs will be the primary focus of their intervention. As this is a specific group of citizens and a single issue has been identified as the focus, the Minister of Veteran Affairs has decided to collaborate with the Ministry of Labor under a bilateral agreement to carry out this intervention.
  • Sectoral collaboration: The Ministry of Housing is attempting to drastically reduce the rate of homelessness among youth in its country. Upon examination, it becomes clear that the housing status of parents (and subsequently their youth) is strongly associated with the level to which parents have access to quality education and healthcare. Realizing that providing housing to homeless youth will require dedicated support from these related sectors, the Ministry of Housing enlists the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health to develop a plan and collaborate throughout its implementation.
  • Whole-of-government collaboration: A Prime Minister is dedicated to reforming the way in which their country consumes energy. They have pushed for and achieved the passing of legislation that requires every ministry to submit a plan for approval that demonstrates how they will shift their operations to be run on primarily green energies by 2030. The Prime Minister and each ministry head then collaborate to develop best practices and reasonable benchmarks, collectively reassessing progress every six months and making changes when necessary.

Enabling Factors for Successful Inter-Ministerial Collaboration

  • Existence of strong and sustained political leadership: The preliminary political backing of at least one senior official is vital to launching and sustaining collaborative efforts. If such an official is not involved, stakeholders interested in installing a collaborative intervention should prioritize enlisting one. The government leader should be “technically skilled and politically savvy, as well as close to the chief executive” and should be adept at forming and maintaining productive relationships (UNDG, 2015).
  • Detailed, inclusive planning occurred before implementation: Inter-ministerial interventions operate with shared elements of responsibility and accountability, and any lapse in understanding of the daily objectives or overall mission threatens to derail the efficacy of the initiative. One effective way to prevent such lapses is to develop robust collaboration plans that clearly outline roles, routines, and the chain of implementation.
  • Significant emphasis placed on the creation of buy-in and changing of culture: It is likely that there will always be some level of pushback when collaboration begins. Collaborative efforts that were most successful anticipated this and responded by uniting the curriculum of students who will eventually support the intervention, hosting communal training sessions of stakeholders, and soliciting the assistance of top-level leaders (UNDG, 2015).
  • Coordinating offices established at different regional levels: Particularly when an intervention requires collaboration across significant geographic boundaries, the installment of coordinating offices across a country at regional and municipal levels is helpful in ensuring constant and clear communication between stakeholders and supporting downstream implementation of collaborative efforts.

References

  • Colgan, A., Kennedy, L., & Doherty, N. (2014). A primer on implementing whole of government approaches. Centre for Effective Services. Retrieved from: https://bit.ly/31KWdKU
  • Dill, D. & Kopsick, D. (2017). Improving cooperation between customs and environmental agencies to prevent illegal transboundary shipments of hazardous waste. World Customs Journal, 8(2). Retrieved from: https://bit.ly/2MSTH11
  • Majumdar, D. (2006). Collaboration among government agencies with special reference to New Zealand. New Zealand Ministry of Social Development. Retrieved from: https://bit.ly/2BMD4NZ
  • Mbabu, M., Njeru, I., File, S., Osoro, E., Kiambi, S., Bitek, A., … Njenga, K. (2014). Establishing a one Health office in Kenya. The Pan African Medical Journal. Retrieved from: https://bit.ly/31SfJVC
  • Munyua, P., Njenga, M., Osoro, E., Onyango, C., Bitek, A., Mwatondo, A., … Widdowson, M. (2019). Successes and challenges of the one health approach in Kenya over the last decade. BMC Public Health, 19(3). Retrieved from: https://bit.ly/2pj6NLY
  • Mwatondo, A., Munyua, P., Gura, Z., Muturi, M., Osoro, E., Obonyo, M., … Thumbi, S.M. (2017). Catalysts for implementation of one health in Kenya. The Pan African Medical Journal. Retrieved from: https://bit.ly/36kIZYS
  • Neyestani-Hailu, L. & Reuge, N. (2018). Strengthening national learning systems towards SDG4-Education 2030 and CESA. RCG4 Education Systems Strengthening Task Team. Retrieved from: https://bit.ly/346q95F
  • Octaria, R., Salyer, S., Blanton, J., Pieracci, E., Munyua, P., Millien, M., Nel, L., & Wallace, R. (2018). From recognition to action: A strategic approach to foster sustainable collaborations for rabies elimination. PLOS Neglected Tropical Diseases. Available at: https://bit.ly/2NlUnLa
  • Harvard Ministerial Leadership Program. (2019). Intersectoral collaboration in the Criança Feliz early childhood intervention program.
  • Harvard Ministerial Leadership Program. (2019). The Seqota Declaration: Demonstrating intersectoral collaboration.
  • Republic of Kenya, 2014. National Strategic Plan for the Implementation of One Health in Kenya. Available at: https://bit.ly/33ZBNPQ
  • Roberts, J. & O’Connor, P. (2007). The inter-agency services collaboration project. Wellesley Institute. Retrieved from: https://bit.ly/2pTDEqK
  • UN Development Group, 2015. Eight Case Studies on Integrating the United Nations’ Normative and Operational Work. Available at: https://bit.ly/2PpQqIe
  • Wanna, J. (2008). Collaboration government: Meanings, dimensions, drivers and outcomes. Australian National University. Retrieved from: https://bit.ly/31SOYkb
  • World Bank, 2018. Improving Public Sector Performance: Through Innovation and Inter-Agency Coordination. Available at: https://bit.ly/2PmWv8c
  • World Health Organization, n.d. Stunting in a Nutshell. Available at: https://bit.ly/346prW8

Background

Over several decades, Nigeria has confronted major health crises characterized by a double burden of disease — preventable infectious diseases and a rising prevalence of non-communicable diseases (Li et al., 2022). Vaccine-preventable diseases, in particular, have contributed to the country’s high child and maternal mortality rates (Ophori et al., 2014).

Minister Muhammad Ali Pate was appointed Nigeria’s Minister of State for Health in June 2011. Before he was appointed Minister of Health, he served as the Chief Executive Officer of the National Primary Healthcare Development Agency (NPHCDA) for three years, made significant progress in improving Nigeria’s primary healthcare system, and initiated crucial health sector reforms during his tenure.

President Goodluck Jonathan appointed Dr. Pate Minister of Health to continue his previous work at NPHCDA. His mandate included improving efforts to eradicate polio and enhancing routine immunization. Initially focusing on polio, his goal as Minister of Health expanded to encompass child and maternal health through the Saving One Million Lives campaign. The Saving One Million Lives campaign by Minister Pate was developed to ensure that efforts to improve health in Nigeria also addressed other urgent health issues such as measles and malaria.

This case study explores how Minister Pate was able to navigate the fraught politics of Nigeria and win the support of the President, key Cabinet allies, and 36 state governors for a country-wide transformative health initiative.

Building a Guiding Coalition

When Minister Pate took office, there were rumblings of discontent regarding Nigeria’s health system, but health issues were not high on the national political agenda. Plus, given the decentralized nature of the health system, the Minister had limited control over how each of the 36 states spent their federal budget allocation. Although a significant part of the state budget came through federal allocations by a constitutionally determined formula, the fiscally decentralized federal system of government allowed states fiscal autonomy. The result was limited federal oversight or accountability regarding how much states allocated to health and how such resources were allocated. National Health Account data showed that most health resources were spent on politically popular curative facilities. These were often geared to the health needs of wealthy citizens. Even though the federal government had conceptually sound health policies, execution and enforcement at the state level were difficult.

Developing a Legacy Goal

Soon after taking office, Minister Pate assembled a core leadership team, led by a long-time trusted colleague, Dr. Kelechi Ohiri. With the support of his core team, Minister Pate reflected on the healthcare landscape in Nigeria to determine what he wanted to accomplish during his limited term of a maximum of four years. He said:

“I built a very strong team, including some I had mentored before, like Dr. Kelechi Ohiri. I chose people who were not only competent but had the right mindset and character attributes to help me deliver on our goals. As a Minister, very early on, you need to know what you want to accomplish. Build a good team, mobilize resources, and ensure everyone is accountable, including yourself. Focus on execution, or you will not achieve much.”

Minister Pate wanted to focus his agenda on something that would help Nigeria achieve something tangible, particularly given the multiplicity of problems within his main portfolio of primary healthcare. As he reflected, he realized that all around him was a culture of input-based thinking. Healthcare policy was made based on what else could be put ‘in’ to the health system. He wanted to shift the conversation to what was coming ‘out’ of the system, i.e., an outcomes-based approach. To drive this mindset, Minister Pate asked his ministry:

“What are we here for?”

When they thought about primary healthcare, saving lives was the most concrete outcome. The next step was to define ‘saving lives’ in a way that was easy to communicate. From this discussion, Minister Pate’s signature program, “Saving One Million Lives (SOML),” was born.

SOML was an aspirational target that was big enough but also tangible enough to focus people on the outcomes that matter and to work backward toward the inputs. SOML aimed to strengthen primary healthcare and prioritize interventions that could save lives, such as improving maternal and child health, eliminating mother-to-child transmission of HIV, strengthening immunization, scaling up access to essential medicines, controlling malaria, and improving child nutrition.

SOML built on existing policies outlined by the National Strategic Health Development Plan and the President’s Transformation Agenda rather than introducing new ones by way of strengthening existing delivery channels.

Minister Pate also used the Lives Saved (LiST) tool to prioritize the critical intervention areas that would contribute the most to lives saved. Based on this analysis, the six key priorities of SOML were improving maternal and newborn child health, eliminating mother-to-child transmission of HIV, strengthening routine immunization and achieving polio eradication, scaling up access to essential medicines, malaria control, and improving child nutrition. The underlying idea was that to save one million lives; the primary healthcare system would have to be strengthened by increasing health personnel, introducing performance management systems to increase health worker productivity, improving quality of care, and using information and communication technology for the supply chain management. By linking health systems strengthening to concrete outcomes, Minister Pate hoped that beyond saving one million lives, the benefits of these systemic changes would continue. Nonetheless, Dr. Pate realized that SOML’s success depended on the political will that supported it. This began with the President.

Working with the President

According to Minister Pate:

“When I started in 2008 as CEO of the Primary Healthcare Development Agency, it was polio that led the previous President to appoint me. To deal with polio and immunization, I had to build a primary healthcare system. By 2011, when the new President was elected, he asked me to join his government to build on the work I had started.”

Soon after his appointment as Minister of Health, Dr. Pate made sure to meet with President Goodluck Jonathan to thank him for the honor of appointing him to serve. In that meeting, he promised to serve the President with his very best and asked him for one thing in return:

“If I make any mistakes or if I am not doing something you really want, I want you to call me directly. And if I have a similar issue with you, I want to be able to come to you directly.”

This conversation formed the foundation for an effective working relationship and proved useful for the duration of Pate’s term.

To communicate SOML to the President, Minister Pate recollected what he knew about the President. Two key factors proved important. Firstly, President Jonathan had lost several siblings to preventable diseases at a very young age. Secondly, President Goodluck’s term had begun with a deeply unpopular move – the cancellation of longstanding subsidies to Nigerians on oil and petroleum gas.

Saving children from death and disease was something the President had a connection to, and the public was concerned about it, so it made for a compelling goal.

After the President’s support for the SOML campaign, Minister Pate provided monthly written updates to the President to regularly reinvigorate his political will and to maintain their connection. The President wanted to say that he had eradicated polio and ‘saved one million lives’ as part of his Transformation Agenda. His and Minister Pate’s legacies were aligned. Minister Pate said:

“Polio and immunization were embedded within the context of primary healthcare revitalization. We reframed the polio fight to include vaccines and saving the lives of children and mothers, rather than isolating it as a separate issue.”

Minister Pate gained this high-level backing by aligning SOML with the President’s personal experiences and the public’s needs.

Finance Minister

After the President, Minister Pate set his sights on bringing the Minister of Finance, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, on board with SOML. He knew Minister Okonjo-Iweala as a senior colleague from their time together at the World Bank, where she remained until her cabinet appointment. He had built on this pre-existing relationship with her by visiting her in Washington, DC, after her appointment but before her taking office. He also knew that during her previous tenure as Minister of Finance, she had been frustrated with the health sector because she did not have a clear sense of what had been accomplished with the funds she had allocated.

To get Okonjo-Iweala on board, Minister Pate had to stress the outcomes-based approach to SOML. Okonjo-Iweala was swayed by SOML’s clear definition of goals and deliverables because she could easily see and understand it as Minister of Finance. Thus, she was willing to support it. She asked Minister Pate to serve on the Economic Management Team and the Economic Management Implementation Team – two intersectoral working groups housed within her ministry. This was the first time the health sector was fully represented in such a body.

As part of the Minister of Finance’s Economic Management Team, Minister Pate gained a higher-level understanding of government priorities and connected with his colleagues on the team – including the Minister of Planning, the Director General of the Budget Office, and the Chief Economic Advisor to the President. He made SOML one of the key deliverables of the Economic Management Team, which further solidified their buy-in to its success.

Consequently, Minister Pate convinced both the President and the Minister of Finance to invest part of the money recouped from the cancellation of oil subsidies in maternal and child health to deliver results for the public. In September 2011, with President Jonathan’s and Minister Okonjo-Iweala’s support, Dr. Pate made a public announcement about defining his term with the goal of Saving One Million Lives in Nigeria.

Managing Stakeholders with Influence

With the support of the President, the Minister of Finance, and high-level officials from the Ministry of Health, Minister Pate moved to identify other key stakeholders that needed to be managed. Later in his career, he would learn more about using stakeholder analysis to explicitly map supporters and opponents against their level of influence. Still, at this time, he took a more intuitive approach. He maintained an internal inventory of the relationships he had cultivated and leveraged his social networks to forge connections with those who were truly influential, regardless of their positional authority.

Within his own ministry, Minister Pate had traditional authority by virtue of his position as Minister of State for Health, but this was supplemented by good relationships with the Federal Minister of Health (whose primary focus was on tertiary care and health insurance, among other areas), the Permanent Secretary, key directors, and the Primary Health Care Agency.

Nonetheless, within his own health ministry, Minister Pate sensed a feeling of “passive resistance.” The Health Ministry had traditionally taken responsibility only for the allocation of the federal health budget to states without monitoring the use of the state health budgets, with minimal state accountability and little regard for impact. At the outset, senior officials in the health ministry thought they could ignore Minister Pate’s SOML initiatives and “let it die on its own.” Nonetheless, Minister Pate persisted onwards with the higher-level health officials who formed his guiding coalition to prove to these opponents that SOML was not going away.

As SOML gained traction in the form of support from the President, the Finance Minister, and more state entities, and by raising substantial funds, the naysayers not only came on board but also began to be champions of the initiative.

As Minister Pate continued to work to achieve his mandate, he had a secret weapon on his side: the initiative’s name – “Saving One Million Lives.” By framing the program this way, opposing stakeholders, particularly those in the political sphere, had a challenging time voicing their opposition to “Saving One Million Lives.”

Engaging Governors and Community Leaders

Minister Pate leveraged his previous relationships with governors and community leaders to understand the importance of state-level cooperation, especially when it came to vaccinating citizens. He organized forums and secured commitments from state governors to support primary healthcare improvements. Additionally, he established the Northern Traditional Leaders Committee on Primary Healthcare to engage trusted community leaders in vaccination and health campaigns. He explained:

“When it came to vaccination hesitancy, we worked to earn the trust of communities and community leaders. We created the Northern Traditional Leaders Committee on Primary Healthcare, which engaged religious and community leaders across Northern Nigeria. This network became crucial in planning and implementing vaccination campaigns. To select the Northern Traditional Leaders, we went to the Sultan and asked him to convene a group of representatives from each of the 19 states in the North. The Sultan and a committee selected leaders who were relatively younger, stronger, respected, and trusted. We then organized them into a committee and enabled them to act effectively. To engage communities, we provided them with information and involved them in planning, which built legitimacy in the eyes of the people.”

As he had anticipated, Nigeria’s 36 state governors were key stakeholders whose support Minister Pate needed to save one million lives. Fortunately, Minister Pate had existing relationships with several governors and with the Director General of Nigeria’s Governors’ Forum. The Governors’ Forum had preexisting goals to eradicate polio and implement effective routine immunization programs as part of Nigeria’s 2009 Abuja Commitments to Polio Eradication. Minister Pate said:

“When I became Minister, it was easier for me to build on the relationships I had already established with the governors. As CEO of the Primary Healthcare Development Agency, I had worked closely with the Governor’s Forum, helping to organize their secretariat and getting them to sign the Abuja Commitment Declaration in 2009. This previous work allowed me to leverage those relationships when I became Minister.”

While this was helpful in aligning them with SOML, convincing them to relinquish their budget autonomy was still a challenge. Ultimately, the President had to play a significant role in bringing the governors on board.

The President asked the Governors to be accountable for progress in their states. Minister Pate’s team provided each state with a ‘Countdown to 2015’ one-page document summarizing how many lives the state could save by expanding specific services relevant to its context. This provided each state with its own baseline and endline target.

Once the states had pledged their commitment to their targets, Minister Pate’s team set up a scorecard system tracking progress state-by-state. The data comparing state performance was presented at the quarterly meeting of the Presidential Task Force on polio eradication, with the governors in attendance, presided over by the President, and quickly became a major incentive for the states to improve performance. Initially, some governors were uncomfortable with the pressure to be accountable and pushed back. However, according to Minister Pate, the measurement of performance became:

“An inflection point shifting the dialogue to focus on the data to its use in decision-making and results.”

Furthermore, the scorecards on state performance were published in newspapers. This decision was made to ensure that data collected from the public was ‘given back’ to the public and to further motivate state progress.

Finally, there were donors. Minister Pate needed donor support to generate more innovative ideas for technical assistance and strategy for the maternal and child health programs associated with SOML. Traditional and particularly non-traditional donors were eager to fund the initiative, and he was able to work with philanthropic foundations with flexible sources of funding to recruit world-class experts to help with ideation and design. He explained:

“As Minister, I was very active in mobilizing resources. I leveraged traditional domestic financing, multinational financing, and other sources to move the agenda quickly. We raised resources through innovative financing, which helped draw states in the direction we wanted.”

Implementing Strategically

As he worked to bring stakeholders on board, Minister Pate was invited to attend the Harvard Ministerial Leadership Forum in June 2012. This gave him the opportunity to learn about tactics for effective policy implementation and organization. In his own words:

“I was internally strengthening my hand while externally learning and strengthening relationships to succeed.”

The President officially launched SOML in Nigeria on October 16, 2012. The idea behind this campaign was a national rallying cry to end preventable infectious diseases and curtail infant and early childhood mortality. SOML had a strong brand identity (including a logo) and a deliberate communications strategy.

Minister Pate created a culture of collaboration and a sense of obligation amongst public and private sectors to do their part by positioning the campaign as a collective social movement across the nation. The communications strategy allowed key actors to pledge how many lives they would save – the private sector initially pledged to save 30,000, which later increased. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, SOML’s multichannel messaging plan created a sense of accountability to the people. This made it more difficult for state governments to allocate resources away from the program’s initiatives.

Once launched, Dr. Pate had to ensure implementation success. He needed some control over state-level health spending to ensure compliance with the national goals.

To this end, he introduced three key nationally managed elements to the program. The first was developing a robust data management system to monitor and evaluate performance. Historically, data had been collected independently at the state level, but in order to improve its reliability and comparability across states, he implemented a centralized data management system to enable the tracking of outcomes for the nationally outlined priorities. Furthermore, this data would be used for decision-making purposes regarding future state health budget allocations.

The second element was stewardship and stakeholder engagement. It involved introducing a steering committee housed within his ministry comprising representatives from federal and state government, professional associations, civil society associations, and donor groups. The goal of this committee was to enhance coordination through increased transparency and mutual accountability for the outcomes determined by the data collection. Pate chaired meetings with the steering committee every three months to review progress and ensure stakeholder alignment.

The final element introduced by Minister Pate was a program delivery unit, jointly accountable to the health and finance ministries, to support execution and ensure effective, high-quality delivery. This was led by competent professionals with a focus on results.

After Strategic Implementation

Minister Pate resigned in July 2013, confident that SOML was institutionally secure and embraced by his successors. By 2018, one million lives had been saved, and SOML had raised over US$1 billion in investments. The initiative had survived three Ministers of Health and fundamentally shifted the mindset towards primary healthcare. SOML’s principles were further institutionalized through a partnership with the World Bank, rewarding federal and state governments based on performance.

Looking back, Minister Pate was gratified by the adoption of outcomes-based thinking within the ministry and state governments. However, he reflects on areas for improvement, such as spending more time with state governors, consolidating information management systems, focusing on public sector supply chains, and integrating health insurance into SOML plans. His final reflection underscores the importance of strategic decision-making in complex systems:

“In a complex system, you cannot always fight in all directions. You have to choose which battles to fight and when.”

In 2020, “Nigeria was declared free of wild polio in 2020” (The WHO, 2023).

2023 Reappointment

In 2023, Minister Pate was again appointed Coordinating Minister of Health & Social Welfare, Federal Republic of Nigeria. He said:

“I’m refreshing and learning from every experience I have had. When I enter a new role, I treat it as a fresh start and apply the lessons learned from previous experiences, ensuring we build strong teams, mobilize resources, and maintain a clear focus on execution. In my current role, I quickly did a stock take together with my colleague the Honorable Minister of State, engaged with the ministry bureaucracy and agencies, and developed an agenda and blueprint. We are focused on saving lives, reducing pain, and producing health for all Nigerians. I brought in capable hands, the best I could find, to ensure we could deliver on our objectives.”

References

Li, Z., Shi, J., Li, N., Wang, M., Jin, Y., & Zheng, Z. (2022). Temporal trends in the burden of non-communicable diseases in countries with the highest malaria burden, 1990–2019: Evaluating the double burden of non-communicable and communicable diseases in epidemiological transition. Globalization and Health, 18(1). https://doi.org/10.1186/s12992-022-00882-w

Ophori, E. A., Tula, M. Y., Azih, A. V., Okojie, R., & Ikpo, P. E. (2014). Current Trends of Immunization in Nigeria: Prospect and Challenges. Tropical Medicine and Health, 42(2), 67–75. https://doi.org/10.2149/tmh.2013-13

The WHO. (2023, August 24). Protecting every child in Nigeria from poliovirus. WHO | Regional Office for Africa. https://www.afro.who.int/countries/nigeria/news/protecting-every-child-nigeria-poliovirus#:~:text=Nigeria%20was%20declared%20free%20of

Executive Summary

Despite seemingly insurmountable odds, on November 15, 2022, the Parliament of Sierra Leone passed the Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment Act (GEWE). Passage of this historic legislation was the culmination of two years of indefatigable effort and astute political strategy by the Minister of Gender and Children’s Affairs, Manty Tarawalli.

Background

Despite seemingly insurmountable odds, on November 15, 2022, the Parliament of Sierra Leone passed the Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment Act (GEWE). Passage of this historic legislation was the culmination of two years of indefatigable effort and astute political strategy by the Minister of Gender and Children’s Affairs, Manty Tarawalli.

Even though women in Sierra Leone are 52% of the population, they face many discriminatory practices related to customary law in areas such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, and family relations, highlighting unequal rights, roles, and socio-economic outcomes.2 When President Julius Maada Bio was elected in 2018, only 11% of parliamentary seats were held by women. Moreover, Sierra Leonean women were disproportionately less likely to access post-secondary education and to own assets such as radios, mobile phones, and bank accounts, and the country was ranked 114th out of 149 countries on the Global Gender Gap Index.3

The historical context of Sierra Leone, tainted by colonialism and further exacerbated by the brutal civil war of 1991-20022, contributed to the entrenched gender inequalities in the country. Emerging from the ashes of the 11-year civil war that wreaked havoc on every facet of the nation’s well-being, Sierra Leone confronted the colossal task of rebuilding its social, economic, and physical infrastructure.

Despite various non-government initiatives and efforts by the few women in Parliament, women in Sierra Leone still grappled with deeply entrenched historical challenges, including limited access to education and economic opportunities, as well as gender-based violence.4,5 To tackle issues adversely affecting women and children, President Bio, in 2019, established the Ministry of Gender and Children’s Affairs. At its head, he nominated Manty Tarawalli, whose well known commitment to sustainable and gender-equitable development became priorities.

As head of the Ministry of Gender and Children’s Affairs, Manty Tarawalli’s efforts to help rebuild gender equity in the nation were multi-dimensional, encompassing the collaboration of various governmental sectors and civil society. This case study examines the trajectory of her leadership, beginning with the inception and extending to the coordination of national and regional entities cumulating in the successful enactment of the Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment (GEWE) Act.

The Minister’s Goal

Upon assuming office in 2020, Manty set her ministry’s goal to improve gender equality in Sierra Leone by increasing women’s representation in the public and private sectors to 30%. She believed that by doing so, women would be empowered to live their rights and socio-economically support themselves, their families, and the country.

Manty’s goal to increase women’s representation in both the public and private sectors to 30% was rooted in President Bio’s 2018 election manifesto. During the election campaign this manifesto garnered widespread support, signifying a desire for a positive transformation in the status of women within the country.

A Bill to be Introduced: A Controversial Endeavor

Prior to Manty’s appointment as Minister of Gender and Children’s Affairs, various initiatives focused on women’s empowerment were already underway in Sierra Leone. Nevertheless, the perception of women’s empowerment initiatives was unfavorable to many due to misconceptions held by both men and women that gender equality efforts aimed for a strict 50/50 arrangement of power, potentially resulting in women assuming total control.

Historically, Sierra Leone had a prevailing male dominance in all key positions and every facet of its society. When President Bio was elected, the percentage of women Members of Parliament stood at a mere 11%. Aspiring to promote women’s participation in the public and private sectors to 30%, especially in Parliament, was complicated by the limited overall seats available. This initiative meant reshaping the composition of Parliament, as well as other sectors. Men who predominantly held executive, governmental, and leadership positions were unwilling to relinquish their place at the table in order to reserve 30% for women, making the prospect of a GEWE Act controversial.

A Leader’s Support as the First Step: The President of the Republic

Because of the far-reaching implications of the initiative under discussion, the Minister recognized that her goal could only be realized through legislation. The Minister also recognized that this goal required full support from the President of the Republic. She said:

“I needed to hear ‘I support your goal’ from the President. That is all I needed. I knew the road would not be easy, but I knew I could make it with support from the first man in the country.”

Seeking the President’s support, Manty met with him to deliberate on her objective, underscoring its alignment with the President’s manifesto. Unequivocally, the President endorsed the Minister’s goal and strategy.

From the President’s perspective: “Structural and cultural limitations had hindered women’s involvement in various areas in Sierra Leone, including education and development.” His perspectives on the issue were shaped by the formative role in his life of his mother and sister. Therefore, during his presidency, he was committed to dismantling ingrained societal biases and demonstrating unequivocally that women possess equal abilities and may even surpass men in certain aspects. In President Bio’s words:

“I firmly believe that involving women in decision-making brings diverse perspectives. Their participation leads to well-rounded decisions, which is crucial at the national level. Now, I trusted the Minister to lead us toward that.”

“After receiving the ‘I support this goal’ from the President,” Minister Manty said, “my ministry decided to put a GEWE Bill together.”

Strategic Key Collaborators

Alongside the backing of the President, Manty strategically identified and enlisted vital collaborators to champion the enactment of the GEWE. She extended her outreach to engage prominent female politicians, lawmakers, gender activists, and the UN Women, among others. In Sierra Leone’s context, these key collaborators wielded significant influence that extended across the country. They were pivotal in providing counsel, outreach, and financial support for the logistics involved in lobbying and motivating public support for the proposed GEWE Bill.

Steps to Making a Law in Sierra Leone

In Sierra Leone, when a Bill originates from the executive branch of the government, it is referred to as a government Bill. This Bill must then be presented in Parliament by the Minister who holds jurisdiction over the subject matter. The following are the steps of how a Bill becomes a Law in Sierra Leone:

Table 1: How a Bill Becomes a Law in Sierra Leone6

Initiation of a Bill to be introduced from the executive arm of government

  • Encapsulate the policy of the government
  • Introduce the policy to the Cabinet for deliberation

The cabinet approves the government Bill after deliberation, and it goes to Parliament for the legislative stages

Stage 1: Notice regarding the Bill being introduced

  • The Bill is published in at least two issues of the gazette 9 days before first reading
  • Minister or Members of Parliament (MPs) sends a memo explaining the objects and reasons for the Bill
  • Parliament holds pre-legislative consultation with the Minister or MP in charge of the Bill

Stage 2: Introduction and first reading

  • The Minister or MP moves the motion for the first reading
  • The Clerk reads short title of the Bill to Parliament

Stage 3: Second reading

  • Clerk reads long title of the Bill to Parliament
  • MPs debate the merits and principles of Bill

Stage 4: Committee stage

  • Detailed discussion of Bill
  • Sittings may include public hearings
  • Relevant amendments are made
  • Bill is reported to the Committee of the Whole House

Stage 5: Third reading

  • Parliament amends errors and review Bill
  • Bill is read for the third time, including any amendments
  • Bill passed to law in parliament

Stage 6: President’s assent

  • The president of Sierra Leone signs the Bill

Stage 7: Publication in gazette

  • Bill becomes law on the day it is published in the government Gazette

A Government Bill Policy: No Backing from Your Own Political Party

“So, how do we meticulously construct the Bill?” Manty said, “The process involved a collaborative effort, bringing various partners together.” Manty diligently engaged legal practitioners and lawyers. Through comprehensive meetings and thorough studies, they endeavored to gain insights from countries that had already embarked on similar initiatives, mainly learning from their strategies for garnering significant female participation in their Parliament. According to Neneh Lebbie, the President of the Parliamentary Female Caucus:

“This investigative approach proved highly valuable, leading to uncovering methods that were instrumental in increasing the involvement of women in politics.”

These learnings helped further inform discussions about the proposed Bill. However, when the draft Bill was presented to the Cabinet for initial deliberation, Cabinet Ministers, for the first time, voiced their concerns about the transformative implications of the proposed legislation. Manty said:

“The preceding work happened behind the scenes within the ministry, while here is where I was showing my head. Now, having assumed my role in the Cabinet as a new Minister, I presented the proposal with enthusiasm. However, to my dismay, it faced a severe setback. It was met with opposition, leading to its thorough dissection and eventual rejection.”

In a disheartening testimony to resistance to the legislation, the Cabinet deemed reserving a 30% quota for women unattainable. At this first deliberation, the resounding message from Cabinet Ministers was that a transformative approach for women should not merely involve slotting them into existing positions; this would mean removing some men from their seats. Instead, the focus should be cultivating opportunities that defy traditional gender roles. Manty said:

“No man was willing to leave and give their seat to a woman. The Cabinet chopped this Bill to death. This was my own Party, and they chopped it out. They said absolutely no to 30%. I was down, and I took two weeks to recover. Then I got up again. And then, we started with a different approach. Now, I went to speak to each Cabinet Minister independently.”

Communicating the Vision to Cabinet Members: A One-on-One Approach

Following initial rejection by the Cabinet, Manty recognized the necessity for a fresh approach to securing Ministers’ support for the Bill. With this objective in mind, she embarked on individualized discussions, engaging in one-on-one conversations with each Cabinet Minister. She meticulously presented her case to every Minister, articulating compelling arguments tailored to their perspectives and concerns. In Manty’s words, she told every Cabinet member that:

“As Cabinet members, our goal is clear—we aspire to elevate our nation to a middle-income country. In this pursuit, the integration of women in leadership positions is indispensable. It is imperative to recognize and harness women’s diverse skill sets. Women have unique perspectives and contributions that are distinct from traditional male leadership. This assertion about women in leadership positions is substantiated by data that indicate that such an approach is beneficial and integral to our country’s growth trajectory. Nations that have successfully transitioned to middle-income status have actively integrated women into leadership roles.”

Subsequently, the proposed legislation underwent a second presentation in the Cabinet. Now, there was a palpable sense of optimism regarding the potential for the policy to earn the Cabinet’s endorsement. As the second deliberations commenced, the first Minister to speak expressed his support for the proposed legislation and set the stage for a productive discourse. Manty elaborated:

“An eminent figure, formerly Minister of Information and now serving as the Minister of Labor, was first to respond and comment on the Bill. I recall engaging in a thoughtful exchange when we convened in his office. Now, he was in full support of the Bill. There, he told Cabinet members that Minister Manty presented comprehensive information and data that unveiled a compelling growth narrative if we were to bring more women into leadership positions. Witnessing what she presented, I experienced a profound shift in perspective. It was an introspective moment, and while I recognize that the decision might personally impact me, the overarching impact of a GEWE Act would propel our nation forward. I support this Bill.”

This was a pivotal moment, and in response to this powerful first statement, Manty said: “His Excellency (the President) smiled.”

Consequently, more Ministers voiced support for the proposed legislation, and a government Bill came out of the Cabinet. To tell the population what had happened on that day, Minister Manty explains:

“It was phenomenal. I do not usually go to social media, but I went there and informed the population of what had happened that day. A wave of endorsement of the Bill surged across social media platforms. The resonance was palpable as individuals from all walks of life enthusiastically rallied around this triumphant moment.”

From the Cabinet to the Parliament: Parliamentarians Decide

The next step involved presenting the government Bill to Parliamentarians. In Sierra Leone, the Parliament operates independently from other decision-making bodies. With the submission complete, the Bill’s fate lay in the hands of the Parliament. Considering that the Minister’s political Party did not hold the majority in the Assembly, support from some opposition members would be needed. At the outset, opponents in Parliament were categorized as follows:

  • A surprising fraction of women, although a minority, embarked on opposing the initiative. Their stance pivoted on the notion that making the path easier for other women would undermine the essence of strength and perseverance that define female leadership. Their perspective advocated that if a woman aspires to lead, she should earnestly strive and demonstrate her merit. No one should give her a seat at the table.
  • With a pointed reminder of their historical commitment to this cause, some women in Parliament were opposed to Manty’s leadership, especially as a new Minister. They asserted that their contributions over the years rendered them the rightful torchbearers of this movement.
  • Many men in Parliament and members of opposing political Parties were unwilling to give up their seats for women nor let their political opponents win.
  • Others said they could not oppose their esteemed political elders, even when personal convictions diverged.

Using Human Rights Arguments: Partners Needed Everywhere

At the beginning stages of the legislative process in Parliament, Minister Manty and her key collaborators advocated for the Bill by highlighting human rights arguments. These arguments underscored the fundamental principle that every woman has the inherent right to determine her identity and aspirations and that gender equality and women’s empowerment would positively impact Sierra Leone society.

However, using human rights arguments, the Bill encountered resistance. Counterarguments against the human rights notion were rooted in skepticism, suggesting Minister Manty was injecting personal viewpoints into her political objectives. A factor in these negative perspectives was subjective perceptions such as the Minister’s foreign education and accent, portraying them as evidence of the foreign influence she was bringing to her ministerial ambitions. They posited that she was trying to impose Western ideals onto Sierra Leone’s cultural fabric, implying a potential disruption to their traditional norms. For many parliamentarians, it was a no for the GEWE Bill.

At this stage, continuing to use human rights arguments meant failure in Parliament. Consequently, Manty began considering the multifaceted dynamics at play and the differing viewpoints in the private and public sectors regarding women’s empowerment. Switching tactics, the Minister began advocating for her goals using economic instead of human rights arguments.

Using Economic Arguments: Partners Needed Everywhere

Manty and her key collaborators leveraged economic arguments to garner more support, highlighting that the GEWE, if enacted, would elevate Sierra Leone into the ranks of a middle-income country. They argued that this transformative Bill would echo within every household in Sierra Leone by increasing income, potentially improving every aspect of life in the country. Using economic arguments, the conversation began to change, and more were willing to engage in favorable conversations about the Bill.

According to the Vice President, Mohamed Juldeh Jalloh, the economic discourse struck a chord with many. They envisioned households flourishing as women contributed more substantially to their communities’ development. The economic message was a compelling call to action that appealed to everyone across genders. In the Vice President’s words:

“Empowerment is not representation; it is economic uplifting. People understood they could reduce their dependence and vulnerability if more women were empowered.”

From Vice President Mohamed’s standpoint, the economic discourse developed a movement for women and girls in the country, mainly supported by President Bio’s Manifesto and commitment to women’s equality. Vice President Mohamed said:

“The President wanted to bring gender in all aspects of the country, and that is what we began to work on. We were set to create conditions for women to suffer less.”

While parliamentarians were still deliberating the Bill, President Bio’s administration increased the budget for girls’ education to 22%, STEM education became free for every girl in the country, energy access was brought to many women’s markets, an ambulance to primarily serve pregnant women was made available in every district, and budget allocation to decrease maternal mortality in the country increased from 6% to 11%. From President Bios perspective, working on resolving issues faced by women, as communicated in his manifesto, even without the GEWE Act, was a way to show the populace what more could be possible if the GEWE was enacted. In Vice President Mohamed’s words:

“We created the noise. Politics must be noise. Strategically understand public opinion and reflect the needs of the people.”

From the opposition standpoint, Emerson Lamina, an opposition leader in the Parliament of Sierra Leone, elaborated that:

“This approach underscored the need for collective action to support national goals. Two key values that emerged from the President’s initiatives were empathy and equality. His efforts included reducing school fees for girls, addressing sexual violence, and declaring a state of emergency to combat rape. These actions resonated with my 23-year journey advocating for women’s rights.”

Emerson further explained that to support the President’s vision, he transitioned from an opposition position to a supporting one. According to him, dialogue, consensus-building, negotiation, and partnership were crucial strategies employed by Minister Manty and proponents of the Bill. They recognized the need for representation from various Parties and beliefs, facilitating a more inclusive approach to supporting women.

Parliamentarians Still Not Supporting the GEWE Bill: What Next?

Despite positive momentum, the Bill hit another roadblock when parliamentarians raised concerns that the GEWE Bill was discriminatory. They argued, mandating a 30% quota for women raised concerns about the Bill’s constitutionality because the legal framework in Sierra Leone strongly opposes any form of discriminatory legislation. Consequently, according to them, the call for men to abstain from contesting all available seats by reserving 30% to women, especially within the Parliament, was discrimination.

However, according to the Parliament’s Speaker Abass Bundu:

“Not every aspect of the Bill was considered discriminatory. The argument arose whether preferential treatment should be given to either sex. This issue prompted discussion on the practicality and fairness of such provisions, and we realized that specific conditions were needed to address concerns about fairness.”

In this context, the insights of the Parliament’s Speaker emerged as pivotal. His counsel to the proponents of the Bill consisted of the following key points:

  1. Conduct a comprehensive analysis of Sierra Leone’s laws to identify potential ambiguities that could be leveraged.
  2. Engage directly with the people who elect the parliamentarians, bypassing the need for solely parliamentary deliberation.
  3. Undertake a thorough rewording and revision of the Bill to ensure alignment with the principles of fairness and equality.

In response to the Speaker’s advice, the Bill underwent further revisions. The process also involved more comprehensive public consultation to gather perspectives and address concerns. This process intensified over 13 months, during which the Bill was being revised and deliberated in Parliament.

Comprehensive Analysis of Sierra Leone’s Laws: Ambiguities to Leverage

While conducting an extensive review of Sierra Leone Constitution, proponents of the Bill discovered a pivotal clause within the Constitution of Sierra Leone (Amendment) Act of 2001. This clause made provision for a District Block System, a form of Proportional Representation Elections System, which served as the foundation for several key provisions outlined as follows:

(1) A candidate shall be nominated in writing by 3 voters of the electoral area for which he intends to contest an election and shall not be in more than one electoral area

(2) For every 3 candidates nominated under subsection (1), one of them shall be female

(7) On the delivery of the nomination paper together with prescribed nomination fee, the returning Officer for the electoral area shall for with acknowledge receipt of the nomination paper and nomination fee:

Provided that the returning officer shall reject the Nomination of Candidate made in contraction of subsection (2)

Consequently, the Bill shifted from asking for a strict 30% quota for females to proportional representation. The change in terminology effectively addressed the concerns about discrimination that some parliamentarians had. The revised Bill stated that for every two male candidates nominated in any given district, the third nominee should be female. Similarly, in any public or private sector, the third appointee should be female for every two males appointed.

This shift marked a departure from an inflexible quota system to a more proportional representation approach. Nonetheless, while employing the proportional approach, the Bill, if enacted, would still ensure at least 30% female representation across all sectors.

Simultaneous with the legislative process, comprehensive public consultation was underway to incorporate diverse viewpoints, and address concerns regarding the Bill.

Consulting with the Population: A Bill by Them and for Them

While advocating for the enactment of the GEWE Bill, Minister Manty and her key collaborators used various platforms, including print, social media, radio, and television, to disseminate positive messages regarding the proposed Bill. Their approach involved sharing educative content through impactful infographics via social media, as well as information snippets through the radio. Neneh Lebbie, the President of the Parliamentary Female Caucus, said:

“Radio, in particular, emerged as an invaluable tool due to its widespread popularity among villagers, who attentively tuned in and frequently discussed broadcast contents with peers.”

In this way, proponents of the Bill initiated a national dialogue that rippled through society. Manty went to every district in Sierra Leone to meet with the population. She also went to remote villages and communities and visited schools throughout the country to comprehensively address people’s issues and improve the proposed Bill based on their input. Where needed, she relied on village leaders to convey her message to their peers.

Everywhere Manty went, she first introduced herself as a wife to address issues regarding her foreign influence and reassure those arguing that women would no longer want to assume their roles as wives and mothers if empowered. She told everyone:

“A man is a household’s sole breadwinner, responsible for feeding ten mouths. However, if his wife starts working in income-generating activities, their household will have more money to subsist.”

To appease husbands’ fears, she told their wives:

“Do not misappropriate my advocacy to justify disrespecting your partner.”

Manty underscored the Bill’s importance to households and Sierra Leone’s economic growth everywhere she went. This Bill, she explained: “meant a thriving home and a thriving nation.”

Cross-Collaboration

According to UN Women Country Director, Setcheme Mongbo, collaboration between UN Women and Manty’s ministry aimed at mainstreaming the GEWE Bill within ministries was crucial. The role of UN Women extended beyond public visibility and included crucial behind-the-scenes interactions such as connecting Minister Manty with opportunities for grants for logistical support or meeting with stakeholders who had questions about indicators around gender equality or women’s status in society. In Setcheme Mongbo, the UN Women Country Director, words:

“This required patience, negotiation, and dialogue to facilitate collective understanding and ensure all stakeholders aligned with the goal.”

Another collaborator, Nicky Spencer-Coker, a radio host, practicing barrister, and solicitor of the High Court of Sierra Leone, explained that this Bill presented a window for many gender equality advocates to advance the position of women and girls in Sierra Leone. In her words:

“This Bill served as a blueprint for advancing girls’ and women’s development and promoting a feminist perspective in all aspects of life. Women organizations, women rights activists, and feminists had worked tirelessly for these advancements. However, it required significant political will and leadership to unify these efforts into a coherent vision for the country.”

With Minister Manty leading the movement, Nicky and other collaborators such as Neneh Lebbie, the President of the Parliamentary Female Caucus, joined in by providing legal counsel and other logistical and technical support throughout the legislative process.

Gradually, collaboration between the Ministry of Gender and Children’s Affairs, other Ministries, prominent female politicians, lawmakers, gender activists, the UN Women, and others brought the country together to improve Sierra Leonean women’s lives. Manty and her collaborators met with the opposition when needed, answered questions from the population, and worked to bridge communication gaps between opponents and proponents of the Bill, garnering more support for the enactment of the GEWE Bill.

The Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment (GEWE) Act of 2022

By engaging every corner of the country, navigating complex negotiations, and cultivating alliances, the GEWE Bill, step by step, garnered greater support among citizens and parliamentarians. In Manty’s words: “It was an arduous path that embodied challenges and resilience.”

Despite initial resistance, the GEWE Bill was ultimately enacted in parliament with 100% support from parliamentarians. After President Bio had signed, it was published in the Government Gazette on December 30, 2022 and finally became law.

References

  1. 1“Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment: Sierra Leone.” U.S. Agency for International Development, 17 Feb. 2023 http://www.usaid.gov/sierra-leone/gender-equality-and-womens-empowerment
  2. 2Rubio-marin, Ruth. What Happened to the Women?: Gender and Reparations for Human Rights Violations. Columbia University Press, 2006
  3. 3Reports. World Economic Forum. (n.d.)
  4. 4Cullen, L. C. (2020). Female Combatants and the Post-Conflict Process in Sierra Leone. Journal of International Women’s Studies
  5. 5McFerson, H. M. (n.d.). Women and Post-Conflict Society in Sierra Leone. Journal of International Women’s Studies
  6. 6National Democratic Institute. (n.d.). How our Laws are made – National Democratic Institute